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Abstract 
This thesis explores the competing models of partial cosmopolitanism suggested by Kwame 
Appiah and the Marvel Cinematic Universe. This exploration is undertaken as a response to 
a larger concern with the place of difference within a shared humanity. To do this, this 
thesis examines first the history and the influences of the models of cosmopolitanism that 
Appiah and the Marvel Cinematic Universe suggest; it then completes a thematic analysis of 
these models, before comparing and contrasting the two models in a dialectical approach. 
The models are also located within a broader theoretical context, with a consideration of 
Marxist / neo-Marxist and popular cultural theory providing background and grounding for 
this thesis. 
This thesis argues that the models of partial cosmopolitanism that Appiah and the Marvel 
Cinematic Universe suggest are, individually, insufficient answers to the question of 
difference. They suffer from similar limitations, such as an inability to be considered as 
anything other than theoretical and an inaccessibility to anyone without significant levels of 
actionable agency. This thesis instead argues that a synthesis of these two models is 
required. A third model of partial cosmopolitanism is outlined; this model of situational 
cosmopolitanism combines aspects of Appiah’s ethical cosmopolitanism and the Marvel 
Cinematic Universe’s reactive cosmopolitanism, and extends this synthesis through the use 
of Joseph Fletcher’s situation ethics.  
Situational cosmopolitanism suggests a cosmopolitanism that is context dependent; it also 
requires the participation of not just those with high levels of actionable agency but those 
with lower levels as well. It is underpinned by notions of partiality and driven by the desire 
to lay the foundations for a future that is better – more equal, fair, and just – than today. It 
is an ongoing aspiration, understanding that there is no cosmopolitan state to be reached, 
just an ethos to be fostered and encouraged. 
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Introduction 
How as humans we can best live together is a question consistently proposed throughout 
human history. It is a question that can be found in our text books, newspapers, and in our 
myths and stories; a question that has fuelled violence and a question that has called for 
peace.  Any answers that have arisen are constantly being challenged and reviewed, with 
ideas changing and evolving over time.  
Cosmopolitanism is one particular answer to this question. In this thesis, it is defined as a 
form of politics based on the belief that all human beings belong to a shared community 
based on a shared moral code, regardless of where they are from in the world and the 
particulars of any culture, ethnicity, and religion. It sits as an alternative to the two opposing 
poles of globalised universalism and multiculturalism. These poles suggest subsuming 
differences and retreating into cultural silos respectively. This thesis argues that neither is 
an appropriate, nor a realistic, answer; rather, as an alternative that favours neither side, 
partial cosmopolitanism is a more convincing answer. To construct this argument, this thesis 
investigates the high culture model of partial cosmopolitanism presented by Kwame Appiah 
and the popular culture model of partial cosmopolitanism that is suggested by the Marvel 
Cinematic Universe.  
Kwame Appiah theorises a model of cosmopolitanism which focuses on the universal 
individual. This thesis argues that Appiah’s model can be labelled an ethical 
cosmopolitanism; it considers how an individual should live their life in accordance with 
other people and social structures. It is a partial cosmopolitanism, in that Appiah believes 
that humans live better on a smaller scale and cannot be expected to care about strangers 
in the exact same way that they care about those closest to them. Alternatively, the Marvel 
Cinematic Universe (MCU) suggests a different model of cosmopolitanism that can be 
labelled reactive. This model focuses on a collective of individuals engaging in cosmopolitan 
responses to (physical) threats, disengaging from this cosmopolitan collective once the 
threat has passed. It too is a partial cosmopolitanism, careful not to demand that moral 
obligations are put above ethical obligations and vice versa.  
However, I believe that these two models are insufficient answers in and of themselves to 
the question of how we can best live together. In this thesis, presented as an extended 
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discursive essay so as to facilitate flow and discussion, I take a dialectical approach to 
develop an alternative model of partial cosmopolitanism that exists as a synthesis and an 
elaboration of Appiah’s and the MCU’s models. After locating this thesis within a broader 
theoretical framework, I examine the history, influences, and models of cosmopolitanism of 
both Appiah and of the MCU. This will be followed by an argument as to why these two 
models are insufficient. I will then present an alternative model of cosmopolitanism, arguing 
that a model of situational cosmopolitanism can be used to reimagine a cosmopolitan 
approach to the question of how we can best live together with our varied, and at times 
incompatible, differences as a part of a broader theoretical context of modern and post-
modern tensions. 
The discussion now moves to the first section of the thesis, which will undertake a Marxist / 
neo-Marxist approach to this thesis’ primary concern with how it is that we can best live 
together given all our varied and at times incompatible differences. It argues for the 
inclusion of the consideration of popular culture alongside a consideration of theoretical 
works as an approach to this concern. 
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A Common Existence 
The concern with how it is that we can best live together is not new. This thesis is informed 
by the tradition of Marxism that traces back to Karl Marx in the 19th century, and follows 
(Western) neo-Marxist thinkers who have emphasised the importance of understanding 
culture in the pursuit of social equality. The emphasis on culture is important for this thesis 
because, as Antonio Gramsci (2000) suggested, through aspects of culture such as literature 
and film, a gradual and lasting social change towards a more fair society can occur. 
 In the spirit of theorising how to create a better society – that is, a fair, just, and equal 
society – Karl Marx (2002), along with Friedrich Engels, emphasised the importance of the 
proletariat, the importance of those who were not part of the dominant social class in 
Western society. The proletariat, Marx argued, should be able to rise up and set off a 
revolution, fuelled by industrialisation and the urbanisation that was occurring as a result of 
this industrialisation.  This revolution would result in a shift to socialist relations that would 
change how people interact with one another. Wealth would be redistributed. Resources 
would be shared equally amongst everyone. The world, in the spirit of progress, would 
change. This emphasis on the role of the non-dominant social class in social change is 
included in the model of cosmopolitanism that this thesis argues for.  
Marx’s idea for a better future had a strong focus on the economic factors that underlay 
society; it was by progressing through different economic epochs that communism would 
ultimately be realised. This focus on the strength and power of an economic-based class 
system meant that not only did the dominant economic class control the means of material 
production, but also the “means of mental production,” indicating that “the ruling ideas are 
nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant [social class]” (Marx, 1975, p. 59). 
Whilst this idea of the means of mental production struck a chord with thinkers around the 
world, Western thinkers in particular turned to it after Marxism failed to revolutionise the 
West after the First World War, the revolution transforming Tsarist Russia into the Soviet 
Union did not find its way into and take hold of industrialised Europe. There was a growing 
realisation by leftist thinkers that economic division was not going to be enough to 
overthrow the rule of the dominant social class. Lacking the same levels of industrialisation, 
it had been the peasants in Russia that had revolted – led, of course, by a Leninist vanguard 
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and armed forces. In areas of higher industrialisation, where a middle class had had the 
opportunity to develop, revolutionary attitudes were less likely to come to anything 
tangible. Revolution in these areas was a middle class dream, a dream that the working class 
did not share. For the working class, it was too big of a risk to take; they had more to lose if 
the revolution was to fail than did the rural peasants of Tsarist Russia. Revolutionary 
thinkers began to see the need to overhaul Marx’s theories and to re-evaluate the situation.  
In Italy, Antonio Gramsci, involved with the Italian Communist Party, began to formulate a 
strategy in the 1920s and 1930s that extended Marx’s thinking “for socialist movements in 
non-revolutionary environments and situations” (Hobsbawm, 1999, p. 11). In his famous 
Prison Writings 1929-1935, Gramsci (2000) articulated a belief that it was important that 
economics were not the sole focus and driver of communist thought. What was needed was 
“a satisfactory analysis of how [the dominant] class itself holds power” (Ransome, 1992, p. 
135 emphasis added); an analysis that would go beyond economics and examine the 
political and (importantly for this thesis) cultural aspects of a given society as well. Gramsci, 
cited in Forgacs (2000, p. 429) understood that Marxism was more than a set of 
philosophical ideas; it was “the absolute bringing down to earth and worldliness of thought, 
an absolute humanism of history”. In a post-1917 world, the consideration of society as a 
whole was seen as being of particular importance.  
In his strategy for fostering communist attitudes in non-revolutionary environments, 
Gramsci drew upon the connected ideas of hegemony and ideology. Hegemony is a concept 
understood by Gramsci as the power to determine the “ideological terrain” and “conception 
of the world” (2000, p. 192). When applied as a political strategy, hegemony was 
understood as “the need to amalgamate at a political level all sections and aspirations of the 
working class into a greater whole with a single unified aim, which … transcends the 
inherent divisiveness of economistic trade-union consciousness” (Ransome, 1992, p. 133).  
An ideology is understood in this thesis as a set of beliefs. Gramsci noted how ideologies 
were denatured under the totalitarian Fascist regime that controlled Italy from 1922 to 
1943. He explained how these ideologies were separated from structures, and that the idea 
developed “that it is not ideology that changes the structures but vice versa” (Gramsci, 
2000, p. 199). This led to the belief that anything that was ideological could not change the 
structure so it was therefore pointless; this in turn “passes to the assertion that every 
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ideology is ‘pure’ appearance, useless, stupid, etc.” (Gramsci, 2000, p. 199). Challenging this 
thinking, Gramsci argued that ideologies are not necessarily a bad thing, nor necessarily 
useless; people had just been convinced to think that they are. Ideologies instead serve a 
purpose in a society; they are “historically necessary [as] they have a validity which is 
‘psychological’; they ‘organize’ human masses, they form the terrain on which men move, 
acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.” (Gramsci, 2000, p. 199). 
Gramsci took these base ideas and worked to expand them. He encouraged a “much greater 
emphasis on the synthesis of … concerns which go beyond immediate and practical 
economic problems,” and a “more explicit indication of the need to develop productive 
communication with, and assimilation of, other social groups which are, in the first instance 
at least, and in a predominately economic sense, friendly towards the proletarian class” 
(Gramsci, 2000, p. 134). He also “applies his analysis to all forms of class association and 
homogenisation including that of the dominant social group” (Ransome, 1992, p. 134). 
Gramsci encouraged the coming together of various non-dominant groups within a society, 
forming an alternative ideology that could displace the dominant ruling social class, and 
instituting a different hegemonic order in its place.  
To bring about this social change, Gramsci (2000) considered the notions of coercion and 
consent to be crucial. Coercion, which he associated with physical force, can only be a part 
of controlling a society. Consent takes on a concession role, where the dominant ruling 
group must concede certain things to the group(s) that it rules over, indicating a belief in the 
idea of positive social control. Those being ruled need to consent to the dominant class; 
they need to allow them to continue to rule. Subtle manipulation and persuasion can be 
used to get non-dominant groups to voluntarily assimilate to the dominant ideology, as 
exampled by the idea of a welfare state1. Gramsci’s core argument was that wealth and 
political power alone are not enough to ensure the position of the dominant class. By giving 
concessions to the non-dominant groups, the dominant group is providing them with a 
reason to consent, to allow the system to continue without challenge. This idea of consent 
and the power that it subsequently provides the non-dominant class is picked up in the 
                                                     
1 Karl Marx (1997) criticised the notion of a welfare state for this reason; he believed that by the provision of 
higher wages, improved working conditions, and social insurance – examples of concessions – there would be 
a weakened revolutionary consciousness. He believed that by providing these concessions, the public would be 
placated and consent to the dominant rule. 
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model of cosmopolitanism that this thesis argues for, as there is an emphasis on a gradual 
rather than a sudden change to more equal society.  
The idea of a dominant culture, Marx’s means of mental production, is used to give 
legitimacy to the ruling class, used to control and preserve the power of those already in 
charge. However, by taking some of that control away from the hands of the dominant 
social class through the notion of concessions and consent, Gramsci was emphasising the 
power and ability of the non-dominant classes. He was suggesting “a much more fluid, 
contingent, agent-centered and culturalist view of social life than was to be found in 
classical Marxism” (Seidman, 2008, p. 280). A balance is required between coercion and 
consent; both the dominant and non-dominant groups in society need to contribute, a 
central idea in the model of cosmopolitanism that this thesis argues for. 
Gramsci wrote from a different social situation than other communist thinkers of the time, 
which contributed to his particular ideas around the place and power of mass culture. In 
Italy, there were high rates of illiteracy, placing illustrated magazines, comics, and film in a 
central position for Italian cultural consumption (Forgacs, 2000). The illiteracy of the masses 
also contributed to the class divide in the country, with little to bring the ruling class and the 
general population together. This divide was also fuelled by the tensions between the 
industrialised north and the rural, poor south, and between the Catholic Church and the 
communist party. Gramsci (2000) himself located this divide in a long-standing Italian caste 
tradition between the Italian intellectuals and the nation. It is this caste divide that he 
sought to reconcile in his thinking; the synthesis of the upper and lower classes that would 
result in a new socialist hegemony. Socialism, in this instance, becomes a model of living 
together in harmony. Where Marx focused on the economic structure of society, Gramsci 
turned to culture as an answer as to why revolution failed to materialise and how the 
dominant class continued to remain dominant. He believed that the culture of the masses 
were of utmost importance. Mass culture was how the dominant class retained their 
control, through the notion of consent and concession, but it also provided a potential 
location to gradually change the prevailing ruling class. The importance of the comic book 
and the film is reflected in this thesis through the use of the MCU and the understanding 
that this franchise has an ability to be more than just a source of entertainment.  
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Gramsci treated folklore and popular culture in much the same way that he treated 
ideologies; both have a purpose. “Folklore must not be considered an eccentricity, an oddity 
or a picturesque element, but as something which is very serious and is to be taken 
seriously,” Gramsci wrote whilst imprisoned (1926-1934) by Italy’s fascist state on account 
of his position as a communist2. As he observed: “Only in this way will the teaching of 
folklore be more efficient and really bring about the birth of a new culture among the broad 
popular masses, so that the separation between modern culture and popular culture of 
folklore will disappear” (Gramsci, 2000, p. 362). Gramsci argued that examining folklore and 
popular culture was important for the bridging of the gap between Italian intellectuals and 
the masses; for they were “something deeply felt and experienced” (Gramsci, 2000, p. 373). 
Examining this culture would also enable people to see how dominated classes can become 
hegemonic themselves, particularly by looking at how “popular culture forms [can be] raised 
into the dominant artistic literature” (Gramsci, 2000, p. 364).  
However even amongst popular culture, Gramsci indicated that there are both dominant 
and non-dominant forms. Not all novels or films are regarded as equally popular; “From this 
predominance one can identify a change in fundamental tastes, just as from the 
simultaneous success of the various types one can prove that there exist among the people 
various cultural levels, different ‘masses of feeling’ prevalent in one or the other level, 
various popular ‘hero-models’” (Gramsci, 2000, p. 370). Some types reflect a conservative 
and reactionary view, others a creative and progressive view, often showing a morality that 
is “in contradiction to or simply different from the morality of the governing strata” 
(Gramsci, 2000, p. 361). The MCU currently is an example of a dominant form of popular 
culture, on account of its dominance and tenacity at the global box office. This dominance of 
the MCU, and superheroes in general, has occurred as a response to social events such as 
9/11, reflecting Western society’s desire for a narrative of Good triumphing over Evil 
(DiPaolo, 2011). 
Gramsci’s positioning of folklore and popular culture in opposition to the governing strata 
suggests that they create a “conception of the world and life” that objects “to ‘official’ 
conceptions of the world” (Gramsci, 2000, p. 360). They act as a religion, a morality of the 
people, one that determines a “set of principles for practical conduct and of customs that 
                                                     
2 Gramsci would be moved from prison in 1934 to a hospital, where he would die in 1937 (Forgacs, 2000). 
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derive from them or have produced them” (Gramsci, 2000, p. 361). By positioning popular 
culture as taking on the role more commonly associated with religion, Gramsci was asserting 
a disenchantment with the Church as a traditional host of religion. This can be understood 
as being a result of the way, in his native Italy in particular, the Church had opposed 
communism and often chosen to support fascism as a consequence. Whilst popular culture 
does not necessarily supplant pre-existing religion or morality entirely, it nevertheless not 
only becomes a place for people to find the moral guidance that was traditionally 
considered to be the responsibility of the Church, but also as a site for mass resistance to 
fascism. By paralleling religion and popular culture, Gramsci suggests that consumers of 
popular culture can find moral guidance from the ideas that they are exposed to in popular 
film and literature, dismissing the idea that popular culture is just mindless entertainment. 
By associating the influence of religion with popular culture, Gramsci thus also implicated 
popular culture in the project of nation building, something that he saw as important for 
crafting a new hegemony. Italy did not have a common culture – as mentioned above, the 
high illiteracy rates divided the society – which Gramsci emphasised by contrasting the 
popularity of Italian literature with that of other European literature. He wrote that what 
other literature has and what Italian literature lacks, is that “in the overall production of 
each country there is an implicit nationalism, not rhetorically expressed, but skilfully 
insinuated into the story” (Gramsci, 2000, p. 371). It is also a consistent nationalism; 
Gramsci (2000) explained that whether it is a naval novel of Jules Verne or a geographical 
adventure, the French are consistently positioning themselves in opposition to the English, a 
historic rivalry going back generations. Italian literature, on the other hand, was  
incapable of satisfying the intellectual needs of all the people precisely 
because they have failed to represent a lay culture, because they have not 
known how to elaborate a modern ‘humanism’ able to reach right to the 
simplest and most uneducated classes, as was necessary from the national 
point of view, and because they have been tied to an antiquated world, 
narrow, abstract, too individualistic, or caste-like (Gramsci, 2000, p. 369).  
The nationalism of the MCU, a primarily American franchise – the heroes largely operate 
and live in America – is an interesting deviation from this idea: it is able to “reach right to 
the simplest and most uneducated classes” (Gramsci, 2000, p. 369), yet even the character 
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of Captain America does not necessarily engage in an implicit nationalism. When asked what 
the character represents for Americans, Chris Evans, the actor portraying Captain America, 
has said in an interview that  
His name is Captain America and he wears the red, white and blue, but I think 
you can find a guy like Steve anywhere. It’s just about doing the right thing 
and being a good person and putting yourself last, and I don’t think that’s 
necessarily relatable for only Americans, or solely an American quality. You 
can find that anywhere (McCabe, 2014, p. 49).  
Captain America is, in many ways, Simon Keller’s (2013, p. 253) worldly citizen; he views his 
“own local places and communities as special and important, but as placed in a much larger 
world”. In this way, the MCU asserts itself as having an ethos that extends beyond national 
borders, engaging audiences as an idea of globalism rather than nationalism. 
With his observations, Gramsci was attempting to articulate a practical solution towards the 
breach between the Italian upper and lower classes, with the intention that a hegemony 
would be created to supplant the fascist regime that was in place throughout his later life. 
Folklore and popular culture – particularly film and images – became a site of potential 
common culture, where literature had been incapable of breaching the social divide; 
folklore and popular culture acts as both a reflection of society and a place of gradual 
change, rather than the sudden nature of revolution. This idea, of the revolutionary 
potential of popular culture, implicates the MCU in a contemporary cosmopolitan 
conceptualisation of Gramsci’s work; the globalised viewership of the multiple films too 
becomes a site of common (global) culture, both reflecting society and encouraging a 
gradual change in social attitudes.  
The study of popular culture is consistently revisited in times of national unease. Gramsci 
was attempting to reconcile a long-term rift in Italian society, questioning what Italy should 
hope to look like in the years to come. In Britain, the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies was established in 1964, “in part related to the decline of the British 
Empire” (Seidman, 2008, p. 274). Across the globe, British colonies were pushing for 
independence, bringing to the fore questions about a national identity. The presence of 
Marxist thought in Britain was not inappropriate; Marx had spent much of his life in London, 
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including his final years, and the Centre followed Gramsci in a Marxist tradition of thought, 
although they too turned to the popular culture of the masses for answers. The Centre was 
interested in researching mass culture, disagreeing with the way that the subject was often 
“looked down on by academics, many of whom thought that their focus should solely be on 
“high” culture, what was regarded as the “best that has been thought and said”” (Hall, 2014, 
p. 1). The Centre promoted a particularly neo-Marxist attitude, believing in the potential of 
the non-dominant classes in society by examining their particular culture. This thesis follows 
a ‘Birmingham School’ attitude by choosing to look at the popular culture behemoth of the 
MCU, and extending this attitude by contrasting the MCU with the theoretical work of 
Kwame Appiah.  
Where earlier neo-Marxists like Gramsci were grappling with a society turning to modernity, 
the Birmingham Centre was witnessing a turn away from the grand ideas that characterised 
modernity. World War II saw soldiers bring American culture to the United Kingdom on an 
unprecedented scale, and as many of the British Empire’s colonies began to revolt against 
colonial rule, “questions about national identity, social values, and cultural imperialism took 
on a new urgency” (Seidman, 2008, p. 274). There was a notable shift from the modernist 
questions of who we can be in the future to the more post-modernist questions of what we 
are at the present. The Birmingham Centre’s establishment was therefore tightly linked to 
the social identity movements associated with post-modernity, and with addressing the 
multitude of identity questions that had arisen in the decades since Gramsci. The tensions 
between the grand narratives of modernity and the social identity movements of post-
modernity is an important balance that is argued for in the model of cosmopolitanism that 
this thesis argues for.  
Stuart Hall had a central role in founding the Birmingham Centre, and continued to examine 
popular culture throughout his career. The same year that the Birmingham Centre was 
established (1964), he released a book, The Popular Arts, co-authored with Paddy Whannel. 
Resonating with Gramsci’s belief in the power of visual mediums, the pair discussed the way 
that film has a history of reflecting popular tastes and attitudes, acting as a space where 
popular art can merge with mass culture (Hall & Whannel, 1964). Film, the authors asserted, 
has the benefit of being an accessible medium for audiences, and “can often by-pass some 
of the social and cultural barriers that cut off audiences from material in the more 
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traditional arts” (Hall & Whannel, 1964, p. 78). Popular culture was reasserted as something 
that can be shared across society, something that does not need to be stratified, and film is 
particularly important to this idea.  
Another of the Birmingham Centre’s founders, Raymond Williams, also contributed to the 
Marxist tradition of thought practiced at the Centre. Williams had been involved with the 
Communist Party of Great Britain whilst he attended university, and had retained socialist 
ideas throughout his life (Williams, 1979). Writing on film in 1971, Williams discusses the 
way that films can be used to provide “a vision of an underlying structure” in a modern 
urban landscape that has a lack of “social identity, … habitual belonging and relatedness” 
(Williams, 2013, p. 24). He understood the potential of film to combat the alienation that 
comes with modernity’s move away from small communities to large, anonymous, mobile 
cities, suggesting that people can be brought together by film. As Gramsci and Hall and 
Whannel had suggested, Williams also saw the possibility of film and popular culture to 
cross class boundaries and create common culture. This thesis uses the ideas of the MCU to 
this end, as it is a film franchise that is created with the intention to appeal to the broadest 
possible audience, and thus consumer base, both across the globe and across class 
boundaries. 
Whilst the Birmingham Centre’s founders were writing on the brink of post-modernity, Dick 
Hebdige (1988) wrote about the importance of popular culture at a time when post-
modernity’s emphasis on plurality and identity was coming to a head. This emphasis on 
plurality and identity is important to this thesis, as one of the key aspects of the model of 
cosmopolitanism argued for is the balance between individual identity and universal 
commonality. Hebdige considered closely the rise of American popular culture – of which 
the Hollywood blockbuster films of the MCU still are, despite their global audience – and the 
effect that it would have in Britain. In contrast to George Orwell’s (1939) modernity-based 
critique of American popular culture – a violent spectacle that sits in opposition to the more 
passive, conservative British works – Hebdige acknowledged the importance of a distinctly 
American popular culture in British cultural consumption, suggesting that a resurgence of 
negative critiques surrounding popular culture was the result of the British Empire’s fear of 
America’s growing presence in the world after World War II. Critics claimed that British high 
culture was being degraded by the influx of American popular culture, and Hebdige 
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suggested that these critics were perhaps too concerned with accusing “Americanisation” of 
the crime of “eradication of social and cultural differences” (Hebdige, 1988, p. 73). He chose 
instead to emphasise the potential of American popular culture, claiming that it “offers a 
rich iconography, a set of symbols, objects and artefacts which can be assembled and re-
assembled by different groups in a literally limitless number of combinations” by taking 
individual subjects “out of their original historical and cultural contexts and [juxtaposing 
them] against other signs from other sources” (Hebdige, 1988, p. 74). American popular 
culture was becoming global popular culture, and its assimilation into other national popular 
cultures reflected changing global environments; Marx and Gramsci had been concerned 
with how we can create a better society, and the virality of American popular culture was a 
reminder that it was becoming increasingly important to consider a society that did not end 
at national borders. As this thesis is being written from New Zealand, it too is implicated in 
this idea of a broader society.   
The shift from the concerns of modernity with grand narratives to post-modern concerns 
with social identity movements is a central point of interest for the model of 
cosmopolitanism that this thesis argues for. A balance needs to be struck between the 
grand narratives and the social identity movements, so as to ensure that the individual is 
neither lost within or held hostage to the universal and vice versa. This thesis argues that 
American popular culture, by becoming global popular culture, is an example of how to find 
this balance; if it does produce a variety of symbols and icons that can be combined to 
produce unlimited varieties of cultural scripts as Hebdige suggests, American popular 
culture can attend to both the idea of the universal whilst also making allowances for social 
differences. A new, global, empire is created, with regional differences occurring within a 
wider infrastructure and hegemony. The MCU, as global popular culture, moves past the 
notion of a strictly American empire; this thesis argues that a popular culture empire can 
thus be reimagined as a model of cosmopolitanism. 
The next section examines the tensions between modernity and post-modernity more 
closely. It highlights the influence of (American) popular culture and the potential of the 
ideas that are contained therein to contribute to a cosmopolitan ethos that encourages the 
pursuit of equality, speaking to this thesis’ concerns with how to best live together with our 
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various differences. It argues that an approach that addresses both grand narratives and 
social identity movements is required for a robust conception of partial cosmopolitanism. 
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The Place of American Popular Culture 
The influence of American popular culture was growing increasingly widely spread across 
the globe post-World War II. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, American culture 
itself began to succumb to an identity crisis. Following the end of the Cold War, how were 
was America to define itself without the Soviet Union sitting across the seas as an opposing 
‘Other’ (Gitlin, 1995)? What did it mean to be a nation? These questions brought about 
what has been termed the ‘Culture Wars,’ defined by James Hunter (1991) as opposing 
Orthodox and Progressive groups battling over the idea of moral authority and the right to 
determine the future trajectory of the country. Hunter suggests that the Orthodox camp 
believed in a transcendent moral authority, positioned against the Progressive camp which 
followed a “tendency to resymbolize historic faiths according to the prevailing assumptions 
of contemporary life” (Hunter, 1991, p. 44), where moral authority was determined by the 
individual. Hunter’s Orthodox group follow a belief in a larger, grand narrative, and his 
Progressive group chose to instead champion individual identity groups.  
The Culture Wars then become more than just a struggle over moral authority. They 
become a tension between between a modernist narrative of progression and a post-
modernist deep suspicion of any overarching narrative. Concerned with how America was to 
best define itself, the Culture Wars engaged in an examination of society; this included a 
continuation of decades worth of debate around the place of American popular culture, 
both abroad and at home, entrenching these debates within broader modernity / post-
modernity tensions.  
Edward Shils had cautioned against using popular culture to create identity. Three decades 
before the culture wars, Shils published an article concerning mass culture; the influence of 
literary critics such as George Orwell is evident in Shils’ attitude that the “persistence of 
traditional and orally transmitted culture [renders] fruitless the effort to diagnose the 
dispositions and outlook of a people by analysing what is presented to them through films, 
television and wireless broadcasts, the press, etc.” (Shils, 1960, p. 298). Shils was arguing 
that popular culture alone was not enough to displace the importance of religion and 
regional and class culture, whilst also claiming that most popular culture was “brutal,” 
lacking symbolic meaning and subtlety, with “a general grossness of sensitivity and 
perception [as] a common feature” (Shils, 1960, p. 292). Believing that popular culture is 
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inherently tied into economics, Shils argued that to keep production costs down, “it has 
been necessary to make the content of what is transmitted … as heterogeneous as the 
audience sought” (Shils, 1960, p. 296). He was suggesting that any impact popular culture 
may have is inherently diluted. He was also implicating popular culture in the emerging 
post-modern emphasis on identity and identity groups, by providing audiences with cultural 
scripts that are largely identical and thus limiting choice. Shils himself preferred the ideas of 
modernity and progress; he believed that the emergent post-modern focus on a fractured 
identity was impeding the country’s ability to move forward into a more just, fair, and 
unified society. Whilst this thesis disagrees that popular culture lacks symbolic meaning, it 
does agree that it is not enough in and of itself for an understanding of society; hence the 
contrast of the MCU alongside Appiah’s more theoretical work for a more convincing 
theorisation of cosmopolitanism. 
Shils’ dismissal of the usefulness of popular culture was not without opposition, even within 
those who shared his preference for the grand narratives of modernity. Born in Germany, 
Herbert Gans moved to America as a child in 1940 as a refugee from Nazism. His refugee 
status has had an evident impact on his thinking; the influence of having lived under Hitler’s 
rule suggests a reason as to why he is not so much interested in the post-modern focus on 
identity groups, but instead in how the masses can push back against those in power. Unlike 
Shils, he is not as wary of conceding too much influence to popular culture; he claimed that 
“several studies have shown that people choose media content to fit individual and group 
requirements, rather than adapting their life to what the media prescribe or glorify” (Gans, 
1974, p. 32). Gans saw popular culture as more than just a consequence of economic 
decisions, emphasising the power of the individual to challenge ideas presented in popular 
culture, which in turn indicates that mass media reflects society and sits within and 
reinforces, rather than strictly creates, a value system. This idea echoes Gramsci’s notion of 
consent, with the dominant class needing to make concessions so as to continue their 
dominance. Gans suggests that, by reflecting society, individuals are actually exposed to a 
wide variety of cultural scripts, “describing, both through fact and fiction, the different life-
styles, aspirations, and attitudes currently co-existing in the society” (Gans, 1974, p. 42); this 
provides a range of identity choices for an individual to take up and that, because of the 
control that individuals can have over their media, there is a revolutionary power in popular 
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culture. It becomes a space for the masses to push back against those in power, to shape 
their society on their own terms. The audience have an active hand in creating and shaping 
a mass consumerist identity, with consumption then being linked to identity capitalism 
through the impact of consumer choices on the economic decisions of producers. Popular 
culture blurs the boundary between grand narratives and social identity movements – it can 
be both revolutionary and focus on identity – which is a key aim of the model of 
cosmopolitanism argued for by this thesis.  
Gans’ position as an immigrant is important, as the immigrant is an essential aspect of the 
identity of American popular culture; as the amalgamation of a whole range of different 
ideas from different places, American popular culture is capable of intermingling with the 
cultural identities of other places – as Dick Hebidge (1988) pointed out – and challenges 
Shil’s dismissal of popular culture as being too heterogeneous. The way American popular 
culture combines all these different ideas is important to the question of an American 
national identity and the consideration of a national mythology; this in turn is important in 
the consideration of Appiah’s partial cosmopolitanism, where loyalty to the local and 
national is as important as loyalty to the global. American popular culture also has a broader 
reach; by becoming globalised as the MCU has done, it also becomes important to the 
question of a global identity and a global mythology as well.  
The importance of American popular culture on a national identity is explored by 
Christopher Hitchens. Writing on America as a British-born American, Hitchens (1996) 
explores how popular fiction can be used to create and reinforce the national myths that 
build up and embody the popular idea of America. He discusses how the American myth is 
constructed in opposition to an Other, and how the American myth typically situates itself 
as better than this Other, who is often portrayed as a caricature and in a typically racist 
manner. In a modernist conception of progression, Hitchens suggests in a later book that 
the whole is stronger than the sum of its parts; “The point is a simple one,” Hitchens wrote, 
“‘America’ is larger as an idea and as a geography than the fifty states of the Union” (2002, 
p. 103). In much the same way that Gramsci suggested that it would take a collection of 
non-dominant social classes to come together to form a new hegemony and overcome the 
dominant ruling class, Hitchens supported the idea of America as a collective, as opposed to 
a fragmented set of separate identities. As a globalised mythology, the MCU suggests that 
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Hitchens’ emphasis on the collective rather than the fragmented can be applied to a much 
larger scale than the United States.  
The importance of the collective is also emphasised by Robert Hughes, an Australian who, 
after living in the UK, died whilst residing in America. A believer in the ideas of modernity, 
for Hughes the post-modern emphasis given to individual identity groups actually threatens 
the idea of a collective identity, and he claims that what has resulted is a ‘culture of 
complaint’ (Hughes, 1993). Rather than Hitchens belief that identity groups can help inform 
the collective, Hughes has a less positive view of these groups. This culture of complaint 
prizes the idea of victim status, with different identity groups crying out for special 
treatment, refusing to negotiate over even small things (Hughes, 1993). It is not just the 
minority identity groups claiming the status of victim, Hughes suggests, but because “only 
the victim shall be the hero, the white American male starts bawling for victim status too” 
(Hughes, 1993, p. 7). The “cultural and educational needs of groups” are overriding “the 
need of any individual” (Hughes, 1993, p. 197), a situation that is in direct opposition to 
what he believes it means to be an American. The underlying claim in Hughes’ work is that a 
collective national identity cannot be found in post-modernity. A collective hegemony 
cannot be created by groups that refuse to cooperate, and with everyone in a society 
asserting victimhood, Gramsci’s integral leadership role (Ransome, 1992) appears 
impossible to fill. No one can move forward, Hughes suggests, unless everyone does. These 
are important points for this thesis because the heroes of the MCU are frequently victims 
before they are heroes: Tony Stark creates the Iron Man armour because he is first taken 
hostage by terrorists and Natasha Romanoff gains her skills from the mysterious Red Room, 
a soviet initiative to make assassins of young girls, for example. These heroes emphasise 
Hughes’ argument that group victim status can result in social stagnation, as they are 
required to move past their traumas before they can save the day. 
Continuing in the vein of examining how theorists have articulated a tension between 
postmodernity and a collective national identity, Todd Gitlin also finds post-modernity 
incapable of fostering the collective identity that is needed to create a national identity. He 
discussed how American popular culture is often made up of a diverse range of ideas from a 
diverse range of countries, writing that “in a world of ubiquitous images, of easy mobility 
and casual tourism, you get to feel not only local or national but global” (2001, p. 180). In its 
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attempts to appeal to the broadest range of identity groups, American popular culture takes 
away a national identity and replaces it with a global identity. Whilst Shils suggested that 
popular culture provides too few cultural scripts, Gitlin suggested that it provides too many. 
Popular culture, in Gitlin’s view, is not helping answer the questions that arose with the end 
of the Cold War. He suggested that an American identity is getting lost within a global 
identity; if every individual is situated as an Other, then a collective identity becomes harder 
to find.  
In his earlier work, Gitlin took an even stronger position against post-modern identity 
politics. In the early years of the Culture Wars, he accused identity politics of being a central 
cause of the tensions of the Culture Wars; he claimed that post-modern notions of pluralism 
are claiming “attention and resources, and often enough [succeed] by mobilizing small, 
visible, passionate groups against the very idea that commonality might be as important as, 
even more important than, difference” (Gitlin, 1995, p. 34). What is implicit in this idea, that 
the Culture Wars are being perpetuated by identity pluralism, is that if difference could be 
considered second to commonality, then the Culture Wars could be brought to an end. Like 
Hughes, Gitlin does not see a national identity forming in post-modernity. He wants 
something that is better for everyone, not just for separate identity groups. He goes so far 
as to claim (1995) that identity pluralism is actually inhibiting any sort of cosmopolitan 
vision, that people would rather fit themselves comfortably into an identity group than 
attempt to bring those identity groups together with a common cause. He is mourning the 
progressive nature of modernity, the desire for large scale social change that could be found 
in the works of thinkers such as Marx and Gramsci. What Gitlin is ultimately decrying is the 
notion of the individual who would retreat into multiculturalism out of convenience; this 
emphasises a limitation of Appiah’s model of cosmopolitanism, for as I will later discuss, 
Appiah provides little incentive for individuals to do anything other than what is, for them, 
convenient.   
The Culture Wars exemplifies some of the tensions that exist between modern and post-
modern approaches to how we can best live together. They struggle with the questions that 
modernity tried to answer and the questions that post-modernity turned away from. How 
does a nation define itself? How do we create a society which is just and fair? A society that 
does not seek to put one identity group above another, but also does not reject the identity 
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group all together? Tied into the debates on these questions is the place of American 
popular culture, which is seen as a reflection of popular views, and is frequently informed by 
the spirit of the immigrant. Ideas of modernity and post-modernity are often in a position of 
tension within these debates, as they are largely seen as incompatible and incapacitating to 
one other. It is acknowledged that this is a particularly Western conception of ideas, and 
that this thesis sits within these Western modernity / post-modernity tensions.  However 
the model of cosmopolitanism that this thesis ultimately argues for is a blurring of these 
theoretical boundaries, balancing modernity’s progressive narratives and post-modernity’s 
social identity movements within a wider western cultural and national expression. 
The next section of this thesis discusses why global universalism and multiculturalism are 
unconvincing approaches as to how we can best live together with our various differences. 
It then introduces the role that the models of cosmopolitanism of Appiah and the MCU play 
in the consideration of how it is that we can best live together. It also situates both Appiah 
and the MCU in relation to the neo-Marxist and modernity / post-modernity debates 
outlined in the previous sections. 
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The Cosmopolitan Project 
Partial cosmopolitanism is understood in this thesis as a model of cosmopolitanism which 
seeks to consider the place of a localised individual within a global context. Partial 
cosmopolitanism exists as an alternative to two opposing poles of a globalised universalism 
and multiculturalism as solutions to the question of how best can we live together. This 
thesis argues that these two positions are unconvincing and unrealistic answers as to how 
we can best live together with our various differences. A brief argument as to why is set out 
below.  
The globally universalising intent of what Appiah (2006) terms ‘toxic cosmopolitanism’ – a 
version of cosmopolitanism that involves a group “attempting to impose their own 
purportedly superior ways, often by the sword” (Appiah, 2005, p. 221) on the entire world – 
is unconvincing; it is difference that keeps life interesting, that offers new opportunities and 
ideas. I believe that it is unrealistic to demand that people give up the entirety of multiple 
generations’ worth of tradition to fit what would be a predominately Western model of a 
universal, a model that arises from a combination of classical-era cosmopolitanism, 
Christianity, and the Enlightenment. A global universal is also impossible to attain; there will 
always be dissenters, for example, and those that do indeed wish to leave behind their 
traditions are not always capable of doing so, as those same traditions often deny their own 
abolishment through the use of violence and abusive powers.  Even if it was possible to 
create a global universal, it is not necessarily desirable as significant aspects of variety would 
be lost, which could in turn lead to a negative impact on diverse, creative, and adaptive 
solutions to problems. It should be noted, however, that not all aspects of variety and 
tradition are conducive to a better society and instead contribute to this same negative 
impact; whilst a global universal is undesirable, so too is holding onto and valorising each 
and every tradition that currently exists.  
To expect the world to adhere to any given universal way of living – such as to follow the 
exact same traditions and speak the exact same language – would be monotonous and 
oppressive. It would also lack an ability to adapt, to change, and to evolve. If it were 
achievable, a state of global universality would still not guarantee a peaceful way of living. 
Without extremely strict enforcement – which can still incite rioting and revolution, and 
ultimately is a repression rather than an elimination of difference – or interfering on a 
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biological or neurological level, there is no way of eradicating difference. To create a 
universal where everyone agrees on the rules of engagement, where everyone values the 
same things, speaks the same language, follows the same moral code, everyone would have 
to be stripped of any agency they may have. The result would be an oppressive totalitarian 
global system, where fear and violence impose a way of existence that is the ideal of the 
few rather than the many. The ambitions of the Nazis that led to World War II are, for 
example, an attempt at a universal that was only an imposed universal; the collective 
response that it incited showed that it was hardly a global ideal. As we will see in the 
discussion of the MCU, to ensure the illusion of total and complete agreement, especially on 
a global scale, would require serious supervillain levels of power and ethical conduct.  
If the ideal of a global universal is ultimately unachievable, so too is retreating into an 
enforced and patrolled collective difference; a multiculturalism where group identities reign 
supreme. Whilst multiculturalism is relatively straightforward to legislate for (individuals 
opting into strategic essentialism is a significant way that any legislature decisions are made 
possible (Spivak, 1988)) it also pushes people into distinct and restrictive social and cultural 
categories. There is reluctance in multiculturalism to share ideas, to give up secrets, to be 
open to new ways of doing things (Salter, 2006). Multiculturalism inhibits cross-cultural 
innovations, with too much energy expended on protecting the traditions and interests of 
our particular culture. There is also little consideration of the internal intricacies of a cultural 
identity either; there is rarely one way to construct, perform, or take on any given identity 
and an outward unified identity can create friction between groups and between individuals 
within a group (Green, 1995; Waldron, 1992). There will be internal competing power 
dynamics, differing goals, or ideals; oppression can occur as frequently within identity 
groups as it does between them. Where global universalism suggests unrealistic 
compromises in agency, multiculturalism suggests that our agency is irrefutably tied to, and 
controlled by, our particular culture – by the dominant individuals in our particular culture, 
who are more likely to have a representative voice in conversations with the nation-state 
that shape any legislature.  
As with a global universal, I likewise find multiculturalism an unappealing resolution to the 
question of how we can best live together; for multiculturalism also imposes conformity 
onto individuals, as it encourages an unchanging social environment that lacks an ability to 
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sufficiently adapt to new issues that may arise. As both a global universal and a recession 
into differences are unable to provide an adequate response to the question of how we can 
best live together with our differences, I turn again to cosmopolitanism. In particular, I turn 
to the partial cosmopolitan models presented by Kwame Appiah and the MCU. 
The concern with how we can best live together is apparent in Appiah’s idea of a partial 
cosmopolitanism. Writing in an American, post-Cold War setting, Appiah, like Gitlin and 
Hughes, is wary of identity politics and of putting the identity group before the collective. It 
is not always all about the collective, however. Appiah comes to America with an immigrant 
identity akin to that of Hitchens and Hughes. Raised with a dual British and Ghanaian 
identity, he looks upon America with a distinct awareness of the fractured state of the 
country. His work on cosmopolitanism is an attempt at a dialectic synthesis of post-
modernity’s claim of identity and modernity’s push for a better society. He suggests various 
ways to mitigate the tension between the issues of modernity and post-modernity identity, 
including, for example, a reconsideration of what is classified as a human right: countries 
should not be expected to conform, and punished if they do not, to requirements that they 
have no hope of meeting (2005). It is a sentiment that echoes Gramsci’s claim that “no 
society sets itself tasks for whose accomplishment the necessary and sufficient conditions 
do not either already exist or are not at least beginning to emerge and develop” (Gramsci, 
2000, p. 200).  
Gramsci himself was wary of the dangers of cosmopolitanism (Gramsci, 2000), however his 
idea of cosmopolitanism was that of the universal without nations, a “pseudo-
internationalist” notion (Forgacs, 2000, p. 392). Appiah’s partial cosmopolitanism, with its 
attention given first to universality but attention also given to locality, difference, and the 
responsibilities of the nation-state, would perhaps have appealed to Gramsci. Gramsci’s 
belief that in a non-revolutionary environment, a society cannot breakdown or “be replaced 
until it has developed all the forms of life which are implicit in its internal relations” 
(Gramsci, 2000, p. 200) is also considered by Appiah. Appiah believes that the necessary 
conditions for his partial cosmopolitanism already exist; partial cosmopolitanism in this 
sense is not an end game, but a continuous, evolving journey.  
Appiah also engages with the tension between modern and post-modern thought, a tension 
which is symbolic of the Culture Wars. Where Hughes sees the “fundamental temper of 
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America” as being able to have “equal rights to variety, to construct your life as you see fit, 
[and] to choose your travelling companions” (1993, p. 12), suggesting that identity groups 
take away some of the freedom that should be afforded to the individual, Appiah would 
probably agree; individuals need to be able to decide for themselves which parts of their 
identities should be considered important and which parts should be considered hindrances 
(Appiah, 2005). Appiah does not seek to deny these identities, however, but to integrate 
them into the collective. It does not need to be one or the other, he suggests; there is the 
possibility that it can be both. 
This thesis asks what Appiah offers to these debates. How can his partial cosmopolitanism, 
influenced by his own cosmopolitan identity and taken from a tradition of liberal thought 
going all the way back to the Cynics, cross the divide that sits at the heart of American, and 
to an extent Western, culture?  
While Gitlin (1995) claims that identity politics are inhibiting a cosmopolitan vision, Appiah’s 
partial cosmopolitanism agrees that the universal is important, but that difference cannot 
be neglected. Society cannot be expected to exist within a framework that focuses solely on 
the commonality, enforcing a dominant discourse with no room for individual expression. 
Appiah wants to negotiate a suitable place for difference in the discussion. Identity groups 
can make it easier for a national government to cater to the needs of its people; it is near 
impossible to cater to each person as an individual, and Appiah shows that he understands 
this (2000). Identity groups pushed for the change of law that allowed him to marry his 
husband in New York, after all. They are not without their benefits. But they cannot be the 
end of the conversation. Appiah seeks a way to bring the fractured identity groups together, 
to treat people as individuals first; to create a universal where the whole is greater than the 
sum of its parts. What he seeks to do is to open up the conversation, to move past the 
arguments of the Culture Wars, and move forward together. His partial cosmopolitanism is 
thus an ethical model of partial cosmopolitanism. 
Is Appiah’s model of partial cosmopolitanism capable of beginning this conversation 
however? Does it have any relevance in contemporary society? Or is it just another idea, 
floated around by another academic, which will ultimately be little more than a book on a 
shelf? To test this, to test the strength and relevance of Appiah’s ethical cosmopolitanism, I 
propose a turn to popular culture. If, as Gramsci and many others have suggest, popular 
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culture is a reflection of society, a reflection of mass ideas and thoughts, then it should be 
capable of providing a critique of Appiah’s ideas. Applying partial cosmopolitanism to 
popular culture has the potential to highlight any problems that there may be with a 
practical application of the idea and to consider how it currently sits within the 
contemporary social environment. 
With a society so entrenched in the Culture Wars, this thesis looks at an aspect of popular 
culture that is just as much a part of those tensions. The Marvel Cinematic Universe is 
currently the world’s highest grossing film franchise. Twelve films have been released so far, 
with Marvel Studios announcing future films planned until at least until 2028, with an 
average of at least two a year. A return to modernity, where science is the true way 
forward, does not seem to be enough for contemporary audiences, and the popularity of 
the superheroes of the MCU are testament to that. They are the quasi-gods of 
contemporary society; more than man but still just as flawed. To engage with the popularity 
of these quasi-gods, perhaps we are to remember that, in response to the rise of a society 
he labelled Technicity and the resultant uprootedness of late modern humanity, Heidegger 
claimed that “only a god can save us” (2010, p. 57). What, then, does it mean for these 
superheroes to take the place of gods? What can they tell us about ourselves? The 
characters of the MCU, whilst god-like in their abilities, are also just as guilty of Hughes’ 
accusation of victimhood as the post-modern society he aims those accusations at. In the 
MCU, a hero is not made until a character is at their most vulnerable. They cannot be a hero 
unless they are first a victim.  
By creating these characters, the MCU speaks to an audience that grew up during the 
Culture Wars. The characters are both victim and hero, struggling with the question of what 
it means to be. The struggle that Hunter positions at the heart of the Culture Wars can also 
be seen in the films. Hunter sees the Culture Wars as “ultimately a struggle over national 
identity - over the meaning of America, who we have been in the past, who we are now, and 
perhaps most important, who we, as a nation, will aspire to become in the new millennium” 
(1991, p. 50). It is through this struggle that the MCU situates itself as the latest expression 
of the Culture Wars. Captain America, for example, is the literal man-out-of-time, struggling 
to reconcile living during the Depression and World War II with living in contemporary, post-
9/11 America; he is trying to reconcile the values of the “greatest generation,” with the 
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values of the “Miley Cyrus generation” (Joe Russo, quoted in McCabe, 2014, p. 48). Iron 
Man questions the place of America on the world stage and the consequences of military 
capitalism. Thor, Black Widow, Hawkeye, and the Hulk are all wrestling with what it means 
to be a hero and who deserves to have that title. Hunter claims that because America “was 
never rooted in a millennia of tradition,” it compensated by constructing “great myths about 
its origins and even loftier versions of its calling in the future” (Hunter, 1991, p. 61). The 
MCU is a continuation, an elaboration, of those myths. They too enter the debate about 
what it means to be. 
Central to this thesis is the question of how do we move forward, entrenched in the Culture 
Wars and arguments against post-modernity’s identity politics? How do we resituate the 
grand ideas and progressive aims of modernity in an environment that favours identity 
politics? Can we do either of those things? The MCU is currently one of the most popular 
reflections of Western society, and Appiah’s theories are rooted in centuries of liberal 
thinking. By using the MCU to contrast and expand upon Appiah’s notion of an ethical 
partial cosmopolitanism, this thesis looks to explore high and low brow models of partial 
cosmopolitanism to consider how we can best live together with our various differences.  
As the model of cosmopolitanism that this thesis argues for is in part a reconceptualization 
of the model presented by Appiah, the next section will present a brief biography of Appiah 
so as to understand his unique position in society. It will then examine Appiah’s theoretical 
influences, tracing his intellectual heritage back to the Cynics of Ancient Greece and 
following it through a liberal tradition of thought that includes thinkers such as Immanuel 
Kant and John Rawls, so as to gain a better understanding of where his particular ideas on 
cosmopolitanism have emerged from. This will then be followed by a thematic and a 
contextual analysis of Appiah’s model of ethical cosmopolitanism. 
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Kwame Anthony Appiah 
Personal Background 
Kwame Anthony Appiah is himself a cosmopolitan project. Born in London in May 1954 to 
Enid Margaret Appiah (née Cripps) and Joseph Emmanuel Appiah, he is the eldest child and 
only son of both British and Ghanaian elite. His mother was the daughter of a prominent 
British Labour politician and through his father, Appiah is related to the royal Ashanti line; 
their marriage made news headlines around the world due to both the social status of their 
families and the marriage’s interracial nature. 
Appiah’s parents are important figures in their own rights. Enid Appiah was the daughter of 
Sir Stafford Cripps and Dame Isobel Cripps; Stafford Cripps was a lawyer and a prominent 
politician both as the leader of the Labour party and as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 
United Kingdom (November 1947 – October 1950). Enid Cripps involved herself in 
international aid work after having travelled widely in her youth with her father, serving as 
his secretary in Moscow during World War II. She worked for the British Army in Iran before 
moving back to London to study art history (Anon, 2006). During her time studying in 
London, Enid Cripps met Joseph Appiah at a meeting of the West African Students Union, 
and the pair married in 1953. An event of public interest, the marriage was, according to a 
friend of Joseph Appiah, a “marriage of equals at the highest levels of their societies” as 
“she was to the manor born and he was an aristocrat related to the King of the Ashanti” 
(Brozan, 2006, p. 1). After moving to Kumasi in 1954 with her young family, Enid Appiah 
involved herself in the community, writing books to help children learn to read. Upon 
Joseph Appiah’s death in 1990, she had no intention of leaving the country; she had 
purchased the burial plot next to her husband’s when he died. She then had the plot 
covered with concrete to ensure that no one else would be buried there first, and she 
voiced her dissatisfaction with any attempts by government officials to deport her in the 
interim; Appiah’s husband has commented that “she said the airport was a long way away 
and she would kick and scream every inch of the way. Fearful of the publicity that would 
engender, they backed down” (Brozan, 2006, p. 1). Enid Appiah refused to let anyone else 
determine where she would live or determine how she would be defined, which is 
something that Appiah has prized in his work. The individual is central, Appiah insists; they 
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should be provided with the ability to choose which parts of their identity define them, and 
they should also have the ability to set aside that which they choose not to be defined by.  
Appiah’s father also influenced many of his ideas on cosmopolitanism; Joseph Appiah had 
left Appiah and his three sisters a handwritten, unfinished note when he died, urging them 
to remember that they “are citizens of the world,” and that they should try to leave the 
world “better than [they] found it” (Appiah, 2005, p. 213). Joseph Appiah, born in Kumasi in 
1918 to members of Ashanti imperial aristocracy, was related to the royal Ashanti line 
(Williams, 2007, p. xxxiii). He studied Law at West Temple in London, where he joined the 
West African Students Union, a student group of which he went on to be appointed 
president. The group had a strong focus on self-governance and liberation for British 
colonies in Africa, and it was here that Joseph Appiah met and befriended the future 
Ghanaian President, Kwame Nkrumah. Whilst reading for the Bar, Joseph Appiah was 
appointed as Nkrumah’s representative in London whilst Nkrumah pushed for the liberation 
of Ghana from British governance. It was not until Nkrumah began to push for a 
centralisation of power in West Africa in 1955 that Joseph Appiah began to distance himself 
from his friend. Groups opposing Ghana’s post-colonial government claimed that a 
centralisation of power was dictatorial; they believed that the tribal leaders that Nkrumah 
had been gradually removing from power should be reinstated as key officials, as they were 
more capable of being aware of and attending to problems on a local level (Berry, 1994). 
Joseph Appiah sided with this opposition and was ultimately imprisoned for opposing 
Nkrumah’s Prevention of Terrorism Act (Anon, 2006). When Nkrumah was eventually 
ousted in a military coup in 1966, Joseph Appiah remained in politics, serving as Ghana’s 
representative in the United Nation and as a government minister until he retired in 1978 
(Pace, 1990). Appiah picks up on his father’s aversion to a centralised government, rejecting 
the notion of a global government and following the argument that local needs are best 
addressed through local governance. From his father’s experiences, Appiah also takes care 
to emphasise the responsibility of the government to protect its citizens and their 
autonomy, supporting the idea of a democratic government that is attentive to its people.   
It was amidst this post-colonial upheaval that Appiah received his early education before 
returning to England to study at Clare College, Cambridge University, gaining both a B.A. and 
a Ph.D. in philosophy. He has since taught at many prominent American universities, such as 
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Yale, Cornell, Harvard, and Princeton, and is currently employed as a Professor of 
Philosophy and Law at New York University. He has also received many honorary degrees 
throughout his career, including honorary Doctor of Laws degrees from both Harvard 
University and the University of Edinburgh in 2012 and 2013 respectively, indicating the 
international level of respect for Appiah’s work in his chosen fields. Appiah travels widely to 
present lectures in his fields, which include multiculturalism, global citizenship, identity, and 
cosmopolitanism, so as to encourage the global dispersion of knowledge, whilst residing 
primarily in the United States with his husband, editorial director of the New Yorker 
magazine, Henry Finder (Appiah, 2015).  
Appiah’s identity as both an English-African and as a gay man have impacted his work. He 
discusses American culture as an outsider and, by virtue of his link to royalty through his 
family lineage, Appiah’s position as an English-African living in America is situated differently 
from that of a Black American. His ties are to elite culture in both Ghana and England rather 
than to slavery, and whilst the racism he may encounter may not be explicitly different from 
that which a Black American may encounter, the reception will be different. It is a different 
experience, a different way of being. Appiah’s sexuality, whilst acceptance for diverse 
sexualities is growing, is also something that will have positioned him as an outsider 
throughout his life – after all, the American Psychiatric Association did not declassify 
homosexuality as a mental disorder until 1973, when Appiah was only nineteen. Appiah has 
lived a life of difference, and his work explores how to understand the possibilities and 
limitations of those differences.  
 
Appiah’s Theoretical Background 
This section examines the theoretical influences on Appiah’s model of cosmopolitanism. 
Appiah’s partial cosmopolitanism is an ethical cosmopolitanism. It celebrates “universality 
plus difference” (Appiah, 2008a, p. 92), but does so on an individual level, not so much 
concerned with a universal human race as it is with a universal human being. Appiah is 
himself concerned with how an individual can lead a successful life, how they can be helped 
to live that life autonomously, and what that individual can do to give other people those 
same opportunities. He focuses on the worth of the individual as a human as opposed to an 
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individual living within a distinct identity group; underneath the various identities that we 
take up, Appiah suggests we are all the same. We are all, at the most basic level, human and 
we should all be treated as such.  
It is in this idea that the impact of Appiah’s position as an English-African living in America 
and a gay man becomes apparent. Appiah seeks to push past the idea of determining a 
person’s worth based on the particulars of their identity, and to determine it based on their 
humanity. By the content of their character, so to speak. The universal human needs to 
come first, Appiah urges, and individual differences need to be secondary. His 
cosmopolitanism seeks to transcend difference, to centralise the universal human, and to 
champion the individual. He turns back to the grand progressive narratives of modernity and 
believes that the best way forward, for humanity, is together.  
On account of being a model of cosmopolitanism that emphasises the importance of 
universal individuals – as opposed to a collective of individual identities – Appiah’s 
cosmopolitanism reveals a liberal attitude in the same tradition as that of prominent 
thinkers such as John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, and Immanuel Kant, tracing as far back as the 
Cynics and the Stoics of Ancient Greece and Rome. Appiah refers to these thinkers 
throughout his work, and their influence on his thinking is evident. 
For instance, the letter left for Appiah and his sisters by their father reminds them to think 
of themselves as “citizens of the world” (Appiah, 2005, p. 213). Joseph Appiah in this 
instance quotes the Cynic Diogenes of Sinope, who is famous for having replied, when asked 
where he came from, that he was a “citizen of the world” (Laertius, Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers 6.2.63). Diogenes rejected the notion of the polis, the notion of the city state 
that was central to the Ancient Greek (male) identity, both denying it his allegiance whilst 
also denying himself any of the help that a polis is expected to provide for its citizens. He 
was challenging the exclusivity of polis membership, offering instead the alternative option 
of belonging to a much larger, more encompassing polis. The Cynic’s world citizens were not 
to be held to the conventions of traditional social membership; instead they were free to 
live according to nature, suggesting that “human affiliation ought to be to humanity rather 
than a single state” (Piering, 2015, p. 1). Diogenes argued that because humans are rational 
creatures, there was no need for them to be ruled by law or convention, that “nature offers 
the clearest indication of how to live the good life” (Piering, 2015, p. 1). Diogenes himself 
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was committed to his ideas; he was known to have rejected social conventions and instead 
chosen to live in a pithos – a large jar – and to have eaten and masturbated in the 
marketplace without shame. Through his rejection of polis affiliation and standard social 
conventions, Diogenes was embodying the Cynic ideas of “the unconditional supremacy of 
the moral will, in the determination of life” and “the independence and responsibility of the 
individual as the unit of morality” (Rendall, 1898, p. xxxvi). The emphasis was on the rational 
individual, a key figure in Appiah’s cosmopolitanism.  
Appiah creates a further connection to Ancient thinkers when he mentions that his father 
would keep both the Bible and Cicero beside his bed (Appiah, 2006). Cicero has been linked 
to the broader philosophical ideas put forward by the Stoics of Ancient Rome, and Murray 
Rothbard (2006, p.22) has claimed that Cicero was “the great transmitter of Stoic ideas from 
Greece to Rome.” The Stoics evolved out of Cynic thought, particularly after the ideas had 
been brought to Rome. A key difference between the two schools of thought is found in 
their interpretations of the idea to live life in agreement with nature. Where the Cynics took 
the idea quite literally, with Diogenes in his pithos, the Stoics chose to reject the implied 
“reversion to animalism, and the reduction of man’s needs to the level of the beasts” 
(Rendall, 1898, p. xlvi). They again put forward the notion of a rational individual, and 
believed that to live in agreement with nature was to live rationally; human beings are 
naturally rational the Stoics proposed, and one could live in agreement with that nature and 
live rationally, or they could not and therefore they would live irrationally. To live rationally, 
in agreement with nature, would raise people out of isolation and promote “conscious 
brotherhood” (Rendall, 1898, p. xlvi). Cicero explored this further, stating that each person 
has two personae: one is a personal persona, distinguishing each individual, and the other is 
a universal persona, indicating that every person is a human being and has that factor in 
common (Holowchak, 2008). Cicero was distinguishing between an individual identity and a 
universal human identity, which Appiah – and subsequently this thesis – also pushes as 
integral to thinking about how people interact with one another.  
The Stoics pursued the idea of a common humanity further with the notion of each 
individual having membership to two separate commonwealths. The first is the local 
commonwealth, the polis, and the other is the commonwealth that encompasses both gods 
and men. The Stoics did not reject the idea of local loyalty in the way that Cynics like 
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Diogenes did. They instead situated those local loyalties alongside an allegiance to the 
global; the Roman Emperor and noted Stoic, Marcus Aurelius, for example, believed that 
“his ‘city’, insofar as he is the particular person he is, is Rome, but, insofar as he is a human 
being, is the world. Being a part of two cities, his good is what is good in both cities” 
(Holowchak, 2008, p. 74). Appiah too follows this line of thinking, recognising the 
importance of the local, which is emphasised by his father’s experiences as well. Belonging 
to a global does not have to mean a rejection of the local; the Stoics suggest that the two 
can co-exist. 
The Stoics continue to show the endurance of their ideas when the ideas of Stoic 
philosopher and Roman statesman Seneca the Younger are considered. “It is required of a 
person that he should benefit other humans,” Seneca suggested, “many, if he is able; if not 
many, a few; if not a few, those nearest; if not those nearest, himself” (Holowchak, 2008, p. 
186). Appiah reiterates this idea centuries later when he writes that “whatever my basic 
obligations are to the poor far away, they cannot be enough, I believe, to trump my 
concerns for my family, my friends, my country; nor can an argument that every life matters 
require me to be indifferent to the fact that one of those lives is mine” (2006, p. 165). It 
draws on the concept of dual commonwealths discussed above, where local loyalties are 
not strictly rejected in favour of universal loyalties. There is an implied obligation for an 
individual to do what they can to better the world, and even if an individual is unable to do 
this on a global scale that does not necessarily mean that it cannot be done nor should not 
be attempted. Do what you can, the Stoics and Appiah both suggest. “If we revere the 
whole”, the Stoics believe, “the parts are sacred” (Holowchak, 2008, p. 96). 
Appiah is also largely influenced by Enlightenment thinkers. His work on cosmopolitanism is 
concerned with questions of modernity and he draws on the work of thinkers such as 
Immanuel Kant, who has also considered the ideas of the Cynics and the Stoics. Kant’s work 
is humanist at its core, questioning “above all things else, human nature and the human 
condition” (Ferrone, 2015, p. 96). He has appropriated the moral core of Stoic ideas to this 
end, ideas such as “a kingdom of free rational beings, equal in humanity, each of them to be 
treated as an end no matter where in the world he or she dwells” and “that we have a duty 
to promote the happiness of others, and […] this entails constructive engagement with 
political life” (Nussbaum, 2010, pp. 33, 35). Appiah also engages with these ideas, believing 
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in the idea of a rational human being and the importance of politics to ensuring the 
protection of the individual. Like Kant, Appiah (2006) too believes in the ongoing 
development of humanity, that throughout history humans have been becoming 
increasingly more morally mature and that this will one day lead to a more enlightened 
world. Both see human life as an ongoing trajectory, with each generation building on the 
work of the ones that had come before, to move towards a “universal cosmopolitan 
existence” (Kant, 2010, p. 24). Kant does urge his readers to consider that the idea of an 
achievable utopia is perhaps unwise however; a world without discord is one that cannot 
achieve anything further, cannot grow, and will become stagnant and meaningless, which 
resonates in Appiah’s work. Appiah (2006) does disagree with Kant’s positive suggestion 
that the cost of war will eventually become too much and too apparent for nations to 
accept, and that this will lead to other nation-states being “forced by their own insecurity to 
offer themselves as arbiters […] so that they indirectly prepare the way for a great political 
body of the future, without precedent in the past” (Kant, 2010, p. 24). Appiah is on the 
other hand quick to caution against the notion of a global government. 
Where both Appiah and Kant reject the notion of a transcendent moral authority and 
position the government as responsible for protecting the freedom of its citizens, Kant 
reminds his readers that it is not always an easy thing to guarantee. “While man may try as 
he will,” Kant writes, “it is hard to see how he can obtain for public justice a supreme 
authority which would itself be just, whether he seeks this authority in a single person or in 
a group of many persons selected for this purpose. For each one of them will always misuse 
his freedom if he does not have anyone above him to apply force to him as the laws should 
require it. Yet the highest authority has to be just in itself and yet also a man. This is 
therefore the most difficult of all tasks, and a perfect solution is impossible” (Kant, 2010, p. 
21). Appiah (2006) answers this problem with the notion of democracy; the responsibility of 
monitoring and ensuring the justness of a government is given to the rational masses. The 
government answers to the people and the people can remove it if they need to.  
Both Kant and Appiah place a lot of faith in the idea of rationality and the figure of the 
rational human individual; they agree that the obligation to uphold heritage traditions rests 
on the individual, for example, and that the individual should be given the opportunity to 
approach those traditions how they see fit. Kant believes (2013, p. 7) that future 
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generations should have the opportunity to dismiss past practices “as unauthorized and 
criminal” if they feel it is appropriate. Appiah follows this line of thinking; as we should 
ideally have the ability to dismiss the practices of the people who came before us, we 
should not expect that our practices be upheld without question, that “the decision of 
whether to uphold ‘tradition’ is for them to make, not us” (2005, p. 150). 
However, whilst much of Appiah’s thought is in line with Kant’s, he does not follow Kant’s 
notions of cosmopolitanism completely. Kant focuses on a moral cosmopolitanism where 
attention is given to notions of allegiance to a grand universal and the consideration of the 
part that individuals are required to play in the continuous project of making the world a 
better place. Appiah diverts from this path, instead championing a more ethical style of 
cosmopolitanism; the individual is central and the focus is on how the individual can live the 
best life, not only in terms of helping others, but also in a large part for themselves. Appiah’s 
(2005) focus on the worth of the individual and the recognition of the individual as an end in 
and of itself, as opposed to the means to some form of global project, draws attention to 
the influence that thinkers that are concerned with notions of liberty have had on his own 
thoughts. 
Mill was influenced by Benjamin Constant, a theorist who understood liberty as “the 
triumph of individuality – as much over the authority that would govern through despotism 
as over the masses who claim the right to enslave the minority under the majority” (quoted 
in Young, 2002, p. 34). This autonomous individual is a central figure in the work of both Mill 
and Rawls, and also for Appiah. Rawls uses this individual to explain what he considers to be 
the three key elements of liberty: “the agents who are free, the restrictions or limitations 
which they are free from, and what it is that they are free to do or not to do” (Rawls, 1971, 
p. 202). Rawls prizes autonomy, believing that when a person’s actions are “chosen by him 
as the most adequate possible expression of his nature as a free and equal rational being” 
(Rawls, 1971, p. 252), that person is engaging in the project of creating a good life. It is in his 
adoption of this idea that Appiah moves away from Kant, who focuses on the idea of 
creating a better global world, to a more liberal interpretation, where there is a focus on 
creating a better life for the individual.  
Appiah follows the tradition of liberal thinkers through history to Mill, whose work Shaun 
Young (2002) suggests marks a turning point between classical and modern liberalism. This 
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turn shifted the emphasis from individual self-preservation to individual self-fulfilment; no 
longer was the government expected to limit themselves to the protection of the liberty of 
its citizens, but it was also expected to provide an environment within with those citizens 
could flourish. Tied into this idea are notions of pluralism and tolerance, both of which 
Appiah stresses in his work through ideas on identity creation and diversity. Mill’s ideas of 
pluralism and tolerance suggest that, because there are multiple definitions of what makes 
a life good, no one person – or state – should be able to decide what is good for another 
(Young, 2002); Mill does, however, follow Kant in the belief that an individual’s freedom 
should only be protected insofar as it does not impact on the freedom of another individual. 
“Acts, of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others,” Mill suggests, 
“may be, and in more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the 
unfavourable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference of mankind” 
(quoted in Young, 2002, p. 34). Appiah (2006) agrees, believing that individuals should be 
allowed to make their own autonomous choices, as long as those choices do not negatively 
impact the choices of other autonomous individual; your freedom ends where the next 
person’s freedom begins. 
A liberal influence also shows through in Appiah’s work with the emphasis on the 
responsibilities of government which informs his particular model of cosmopolitanism. He 
does not retain the Cynic idea of a world without local allegiance, nor does he want to 
pursue Kant’s notion of a global governing body. He instead chooses an approach more in 
line with the liberalist tradition, following the ideas of thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, 
Baruch Spinoza, and John Locke, in that they considered it unacceptable for a government 
to do more than protect the “individuals’ lives, liberty and property” (Young, 2002, p. 31); if 
the government failed to fulfil its responsibilities to its citizens, then those citizens should be 
capable of replacing that government, by whatever means are necessary. The idea of 
replacing the government is implicit in Appiah’s work; he endorses the idea of citizens 
encouraging their governments to help other people, but he does not explicitly suggest 
what to do if a government chooses not to listen. The political liberal tradition that Appiah 
follows provides the answer for him. If the government does not listen, then they should be 
replaced, whatever it takes. This is the basis of the United States’ second amendment, the 
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right to bear arms, which further links Appiah’s work with the US, where he writes much of 
his work. When Young states that  
the goal of liberalism has not been to secure a homogeneity of cultural, or 
religious, or moral beliefs, but rather to develop a governance framework 
than can achieve and preserve a socio-political order within which conflict 
between competing beliefs is minimized and tempered, and the inevitable 
plurality of views is allowed to co-exist, if not flourish (Young, 2002, p. 43),  
Appiah is likely to agree.  
Appiah’s ethical cosmopolitanism, therefore, is a cosmopolitanism influenced by thousands 
of years of thought. From the Cynics, he has taken the idea of the rational individual, an idea 
that has been elaborated on in the work of Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant. From the 
Stoics, he has borrowed the notion that humans can exist in two worlds – the local and the 
global – and that allegiance to one does not have to diminish allegiance to the other. He 
takes from Kant an emphasis on the ongoing nature of the project that is humanity. From 
liberal thinkers such as Rawls and Mill, the importance of the rational and autonomous 
individual, and the responsibilities of government and its accountability to its citizens. 
Appiah takes all of these ideas and weaves them throughout his ethical model of partial 
cosmopolitanism. The autonomous individual is the central figure, and Appiah seeks to 
explore how a wide variety of individuals can come together in the ongoing pursuit of a 
shared humanity.  
 
An Ethical Model of Cosmopolitanism 
In this section, an examination of Appiah’s ethical model of partial cosmopolitanism will be 
undertaken using first a thematic analysis, followed by locating this particular model in its 
social context. The themes that appear in Appiah’s work on cosmopolitanism are: 
universality, diversity, obligations, autonomy, and narratives. 
Appiah’s ethical cosmopolitanism is a model that treats cosmopolitanism as an ideal state 
for society to reach. He focuses primarily on the autonomous universal individual, and how 
that universal individual can live the best possible ethical life for themselves. The individual 
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is assumed to belong to a universal collective, and that the best ethical life for the individual 
includes a rational desire for what is best for that collective. It should be noted, however, 
that whilst Appiah’s idealised individual is capable of rationality, he does not assume that 
we are rational all of the time, suggesting instead that we should continuously be doing our 
best to be so.  
 
Themes 
Universality - Diversity 
Appiah describes the heart of his ethical model of partial cosmopolitanism as being the idea 
of “universality plus difference” (2008a, p. 92). He puts more weight on the importance of 
universality; he sees every individual as having something in common, an even ground that 
can be called upon to give people something with which to start a conversation. Appiah 
essentialises this commonality, suggesting that it is based in biology; every individual shares 
a “universal human biology” (Appiah, 2005, p. 252), and it is through this shared biology that 
we can begin to consider notions of things such as fundamental human rights (Appiah, 
2005). Through the globalisation of the world, with trade and expansive networks of 
information being shared, we now have the “knowledge about the lives of other citizens … 
and the power to affect them” (Appiah, 2008a, p. 87), making global similarities easier to 
recognise. It is these similarities, these things that everyone has in common despite all our 
various differences, that is key to beginning Appiah’s cosmopolitan conversation. What 
Appiah does not emphasise, however, is that globalisation has also made our differences 
easier to recognise; at times, the unavoidable realisation of these differences is stronger 
than the contrasting similarities, and this thesis argues that it is careless to think that the 
similarities will always trump the differences.  
To explore his idea of a human universal, Appiah turns to art. He discusses the way that art 
does not have to be in its place of origin to be understood or admired, believing that people 
anywhere can look at great works of art and think “these things were made by creatures like 
me, through the exercise of skill and imagination. I do not have those skills, and my 
imagination spins different dreams. Nevertheless, that potential is also in me” (2006, p. 
135). He emphasises the idea of art being a human universal when he considers the art work 
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of ancient cultures. This artwork, he believes, should be shared around the world, not just 
confined to the country wherein it was found. He suggests that Ancient Malian art is simply 
art that was “made on territory that’s now part of Mali” (Appiah, 2006, p. 124); it is not the 
artwork of Mali, because Mali as it is now did not exist when the artworks were made. The 
same can be said of Nok artefacts, Appiah continues, in that Nigeria was not a country when 
they were created, so they should not be considered as Nigerian artefacts. The Elgin 
marbles are also included in his explanation; they should belong to Athens, if they are to 
belong to anyone. They were created when Athens was a city-state, before Greece as we 
currently understand it came into being. If they are going to be returned home, then they 
should be returned to Athens. However, Appiah argues that there is little reason why they 
cannot be displayed elsewhere; they were created by a people long since dead, why should 
the people who inhabit the land where they are found inherit them? Appiah suggests that 
they should instead be inherited by humankind.  
Appiah’s discussion does not significantly consider art that was created by artists of a pre-
modern culture that still exists. In a New Zealand context for example, any newly discovered 
Māori taonga tuturu3 is considered to be the property of the Crown, which is then 
compelled by law to find an appropriate owner for the object. They do this in conjunction 
with the Māori Land Court, and potential owners are required to submit a claim to the 
object which cannot solely rest on the “virtue of ownership or occupation of the land from 
which the taonga tuturu was found or recovered” (New Zealand Government 1975, s. 11, ss. 
2). In line with what Appiah suggests, simply inhabiting the land where the objects are found 
is not enough. The taonga tuturu can be held by authorised public (New Zealand) museums 
who, acting as the object’s guardians, are tasked with consulting with local (or regional) 
Māori to determine the appropriate display and care of the object. This can include 
establishing a link with the whānau (family) that the object links to, and establishing how 
the object came to be in the museum’s possession (Museum of New Zealand Te Papa 
Tongarewa, 2001). Under the Protected Objects Act 1975, ownership of historic Māori 
artefacts is determined with consideration of the direct descendants of the original creator; 
                                                     
3 “An object that (a)  relates to Māori culture, history, or society; and (b) was, or appears to have 
been (i) manufactured or modified in New Zealand by Māori; or (ii) brought into New Zealand by 
Māori; or (iii) used by Māori; and (c) is more than 50 years old” (New Zealand Government 1975, s. 
2, ss. 1). 
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tight export restrictions4 mean that, on the one hand, the object may belong to the nation – 
or humankind – and on the other, they very much belong to families and individuals.  
Whilst there are organisations, such as UNESCO, pushing for the return of ancient Malian art 
to contemporary Mali, Appiah believes that the people of Mali would actually benefit more 
if some of the art was shared around the world. Selling certain pieces could finance the care 
and the maintenance of the remaining pieces, allowing for better preservation, and would 
also open up the opportunity to receive artwork from other places in return. They would be 
able to experience the skill and imagination of elsewhere, and the skill and imagination of 
the ancient Malian art would be able to be experienced by people all over the world. For 
Appiah himself, the idea of art being displayed outside of its supposed country of origin 
takes on another dimension; artworks and artefacts had been stolen from his hometown of 
Kumasi long before his birth, during the process of British colonisation, and some of it has 
recently been returned (Appiah, 2006). He does not think that all of the artworks should be 
returned:  
I actually want museums in Europe to be able to show the riches of the 
society they plundered in the years when my grandfather was a young man. 
I’d rather that we negotiated as restitution not just the major objects of 
significance for our history, things that make the best sense in the palace 
museum at Manhyia, but a decent collection of art from around the world. 
Because perhaps the greatest of many ironies of the sacking of Kumasi in 1874 
is that it deprived my hometown of a collection that was, in fact, splendidly 
cosmopolitan. … Many of the treasures in the Aban were no doubt war booty 
as well (Appiah, 2006, p. 133).  
This idea, however, lacks a consideration of the totemic value of an object. The restrictions 
set out in the New Zealand Protected Objects Act 1975 compensate for this; where Appiah 
suggests that some cultural artworks be displayed internationally, this thesis argues that it is 
perhaps in these restrictions that a balance can be found. The art can be displayed 
                                                     
4 The Protected Objects Act 1975 places tight restrictions on the export of taonga tuturu, including 
that an object may not be permanently exported, or exported for a period longer than six months, 
from New Zealand. 
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elsewhere, but still very much belongs to the people and culture that it is intrinsically linked 
to. 
Art, Appiah argues, is more than just an issue of cultural patrimony, though he is assuming 
that the peoples of any given culture will take up the rational argument that sharing their 
art will allow for more cosmopolitan collections around the world; that the totemic value of 
an object can be weighed against this rational argument is perhaps easier said than done. 
However, Appiah follows that if the peoples who created the art, and provided the context 
for its creation, no longer exist, then the artworks arguably become the property of 
everyone. The government of the place where the artwork is found has a particular duty 
towards the preservation of the art, but they should be doing so for everyone. Appiah uses 
the example of the Nok artefacts once more, suggesting that “whilst the government of 
Nigeria reasonably exercises trusteeship, the Nok sculptures belong in the deepest sense to 
all of us” (Appiah, 2006, p. 120). He points out that this idea is expressed in the preamble of 
the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict from 
1954, providing a quote from the preamble: “Being convinced that damage to cultural 
property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all 
mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world…” (Appiah, 
2006, p. 121). Appiah expresses a belief in a world cultural heritage, a cultural heritage that 
is common to everyone, everywhere. His cosmopolitanism does not just have a moral 
commonality, but a cultural one as well.  
He does address one of the issues that arise from that preamble; it suggests that a cultural 
contribution is made by a people, rather than a person. This suggestion becomes an issue 
when considering the idea of private ownership. If someone buys a piece of art created by 
an artist who goes on to be considered one of the nation’s great artists, does that art then 
belong to the nation, under the idea of cultural patrimony, or does it still belong to the 
person who paid the artist for it? Appiah suggests that the best way to approach this 
question is not in the national perspective, but in the cosmopolitan perspective. We should 
instead be asking “what system of international rules about objects of this sort will respect 
the many legitimate human interests at stake” (Appiah, 2006, p. 127). There are multiple 
parties who have a stake in this question: the nation, who wishes to preserve its culture for 
future generations; the individual, who, having legally acquired the artwork, has a claim to 
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be allowed to enjoy living with it; and the global, who wish to look at the skill and 
imagination and be awed by the human potential it suggests. Appiah is suggesting that we 
think about more than cultural patrimony and private ownership; we need to start to also 
consider how decisions around art – ownership, exportation, repatriation – affect our global 
cultural heritage.  
Appiah’s discussion of art indicates his belief in what he calls a universal humanity. There is 
something in all of us that is the same, regardless of where we come from. It is this similarity 
that he suggests is central for beginning a conversation with someone who is vastly different 
from ourselves. “I am human,” Appiah writes, quoting ancient Roman playwright Publius 
Terentius Afer, “nothing human is alien to me” (Appiah, 2006, p. 111). If you share nothing 
else with someone, you will always share the fact that you are both human. It is this idea 
that Appiah suggests as being a good starting point to begin conversations as the centre of 
his solution to how we can best live together. The recognition and respect of a universal 
humanity, both in oneself and in others, is vital. “If my humanity matters,” Appiah believes, 
“so does yours; if yours doesn’t, neither does mine. We stand or fall together” (2008b, p. 
203). Violence against you is violence against me. With this as a caveat, we can sit down and 
talk. Of course, Appiah is again assuming that we will make the rational decision that being 
human is enough; that the people we are talking with are willing to agree that our biological 
commonalities hold the same value, and that those commonalities are worth putting above 
our differences. 
Appiah is not interested in a cosmopolitanism that solely focuses on the universal, however. 
He has no desire to form a global government, or to discard all local loyalties. If “moral 
universalism can carry a uniformitarian agenda” (Appiah, 2005, p. 220), then Appiah is right 
to caution against what he terms “toxic cosmopolitanism” (Appiah, 2005, p. 221). He ties 
this toxic cosmopolitanism to radical social movements, saying that whilst these movements 
may have a utopian agenda, it is frequently aggressive, ruthless, and can be considered 
malignant. “They would never go to war for a country,” Appiah (2006, p. 137) writes, “but 
they enlist in a campaign against any nation that gets in the way of universal justice.” 
National loyalty is discarded in favour of a universal, enlightened culture; however, anything 
other than their particular universal will not be tolerated. It is this lack of tolerance, this 
inability to accept other ways of living, which becomes dangerous: “Universalism without 
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toleration, it’s clear, easily turns to murder” (Appiah, 2006, p. 140). Radical fundamentalists, 
regardless of their creed – Appiah (2006) uses the example of the Muslim (neo) 
fundamentalists of Al Qaeda – create a model of cosmopolitanism that is problematic, 
where difference has no place. 
He also cautions against liberal cosmopolitanism, critical of its “rigorous abjuration of 
partiality, the discarding of all local loyalties” (Appiah, 2005, p. 221). Whilst liberal 
cosmopolitanism may agree that difference between people is important, it is still stringent 
on the notion that everyone matters equally. The idea of complete impartiality is a logical 
conclusion to come to if one believes that we are, at a biological level, the same; if we are all 
worth as much as one another, then “what could justify favouring members of your 
particular groups of others?” (Appiah, 2005, p. 221). A logical conclusion is not capable of 
dismissing the reality, however. Appiah presents, and rejects, the situation described by 18th 
century philosopher William Godwin:  
Godwin gave us the locus classicus of this posture in An Enquiry Concerning 
Political Justice, where he wrote, “What magic is there in the pronoun ‘my,’ that 
should justify us in overturning the decisions of impartial truth?” and 
contemplated, with equanimity, the prospect of rescuing the venerable 
Archbishop Fenelon from a fire and leaving his valet (insofar as his life was less 
valuable) to burn. “Suppose the valet had been my brother, my father or my 
benefactor,” he continued. “This would not alter the truth of the proposition.” A 
few people seem to find heroism in the moral austerity, and the bodenlosig 
rhetoric, that accompanies such barrel-proof cosmopolitanism; but most of us 
find the smell of burning friends and relations distinctly off-putting (Appiah, 
2005, p. 221). 
It is perfectly acceptable to privilege those closest to you, Appiah claims. To try and discard 
all local loyalties is impractical. 
Local loyalties allow a space for diversity, which Appiah positions as a vital component of his 
partial cosmopolitanism. It is perhaps not as important as the recognition of a universal 
humanity; it is “universality plus difference” (Appiah, 2008a, pp. 92, emphasis added), after 
all. Difference is included in the discussion, nonetheless. Difference, Appiah believes, is 
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inescapable and an important part of healthy discussion that is the lynchpin of being able to 
live together despite our differences. 
The difference that Appiah supports is a difference that is focused on the liberal idea of the 
autonomous individual. It is “a matter not so much of cultures as of identities” (2005, p. 
117), he says, pointing to the various identity groups that are implicated in post-modernity’s 
identity politics. He positions these identities, often associated with cultures, as identities 
that are malleable, able to be taken up and put aside as the individual chooses. He places 
this ability to choose at the centre of American culture; “For so many who have loved 
America, in part, exactly because it has enabled them to choose who they are and to decide, 
too, how central America is in their chosen identity” (1997, p. 633). He does not claim that 
there is a common culture that centres Americans, but he does believe that there is still a 
common culture. It does not drive everything that they do, and not everyone relates to it in 
the same way or with the same intensity, but it is there nonetheless. It is the freedom to be 
involved with a variety of common cultures. What Appiah is suggesting is a cosmopolitanism 
that recognises the diversity that exists within the universal. 
The notion of a shared humanity is put forward as a reason to respect diversity; someone 
may be different from you, but there is still something about you that is the same. Because 
of that commonality, difference can be tolerated. “As long as these differences meet certain 
ethical constraints,” Appiah suggests, “we are happy to let them be” (Appiah, 1997, p. 621). 
If difference is unavoidable – and to try to push difference away for the sake of the universal 
is unwise and totalitarian, as was shown with the idea of a toxic cosmopolitanism – then the 
idea of a commonality can be drawn on to give people a reason to sit down and begin a 
cosmopolitan conversation. Appiah suggests that it can be something as simple as a 
conversation between two individuals (2006). In the face of all their differences, perhaps 
they both like to fish. They can sit down and talk about fishing and can use that common 
ground to begin building a relationship. They may find they have more in common than they 
first thought.  
Coming together is the first step; Appiah draws on Gordon Allport’s contact hypothesis to 
explain that “contact between individuals of different groups makes hostility and prejudice 
less likely if it occurs … on terms of equality” (Appiah, 2008a, p. 91). If we come together in 
commonality, we can begin to work together, despite our differences. It is the working 
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together that becomes difficult. Appiah believes that we do not always need to agree as to 
why something has to be done, just as long as we agree that it must be done (2005); we do 
not need to agree as to why the child needs to be pulled out of the lake, what is important is 
that we both agree that the child needs to be pulled out.  
Appiah does not suggest what we do if we do not agree that the child needs to be pulled out. 
He assumes that the safety of the child is paramount, but does so from a particular cultural 
standpoint; an Asian man in 1996 allegedly prevented lifeguards in Dubai from rescuing his 
drowning daughter because he believed that “if these men touched his daughter, then this 
would dishonour her” (AFP, 2015, p. 1). This man would not agree with Appiah that the child 
needs saving, though it is important to note that others might, given that the man was 
subsequently arrested for hindering the lifeguards and allowing his daughter to die. 
However, this case does recognise that coming to the agreement that a child needs to be 
saved will not always guarantee that the child will be saved; a tradition of honour and purity 
would have needed to be overcome, in the name of a universal human value, to save this 
particular girl’s life. Appiah stays with the assumption that we want to save the child and 
suggests that “what’s morally appropriate for me to do from my point of view is different 
from what’s morally appropriate for you to do from your point of view” (2006, p. 11); we are 
not questioning whether or not that child needs to be pulled out of the lake, we are 
questioning how to pull the child out of the lake. Thus it is important, Appiah presses, that 
we do our best to remember that “when we disagree, it won’t always be because one of us 
just doesn’t understand the value of what’s at stake” (Appiah, 2006, p. 59). We can agree 
that the child needs to be saved, but we are not always going to agree on how, and that is 
not because one of us values the child less, Appiah suggests.  
The Dubai situation suggests that one of us may indeed value the child less, however. It also 
brings the notion of upholding and enacting tradition down to an individual level; many 
onlookers disagreed with the father’s actions, and he was subsequently taken to court for 
letting his daughter drown, showing that there is a variety of ways for individuals to 
understand and interpret the common traditions of a culture. What we have in common can 
get us into a conversation, but that commonality will not always overshadow what makes us 
different.    
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Important to Appiah’s cosmopolitanism is the notion that difference plays a part in an ethical 
existence. We cannot realistically expect people to reject the potential for diversity for some 
utopian goal. However, whilst diversity can open up multiple identities for an individual to 
choose from – allowing for a variety of identity scripts that can be taken up and put aside as 
desired – there is no need to value diversity for diversity’s sake. Appiah takes this idea to its 
logical extreme; “we don’t need to treat genocide or human rights abuses as just another 
part of the quaint diversity of the species, a local taste that some totalitarians just happen to 
have” (2008a, p. 88). Whilst Appiah’s cosmopolitan accepts that there are always going to be 
people who hold views and opinions and beliefs that are different from their own, 
allowances do not have to be made for people who would wish to limit the freedom – the 
liberty – of others. “Cosmopolitanism values human variety for what it makes possible for 
free individuals,” Appiah believes, narrowing in on the liberal, autonomous individual once 
more, “and some kinds of cultural variety constrain more than they enable. In other words, 
the cosmopolitan’s high appraisal of variety flows from the human choices it enables, but 
variety is not something we value no matter what” (1997, p. 635). Difference can be set 
aside for the universal, he insists, and it should be when the freedom of the individual is at 
stake. The girl in Dubai should have been saved, and it was an appropriate response to 
punish the father. 
Given that diversity cannot therefore be the ultimate attainment for Appiah’s partial 
cosmopolitanism, he makes space for the idea of homogeneity. The liberal and autonomous 
individual should be free to choose uniformity over diversity; if a group of individuals choose 
to shape their life around a single, identical set of values, then they should not be denied 
that decision. Appiah suggests that the concern over homogeneity is because of the way it 
has in the past been enforced; “Freely chosen homogeneity, then, raises no problems for 
me: in the end, I would say good luck to them. But what British Tories and Hindu chauvinists 
and Maoist party bosses want is not a society that chooses to be uniform, but the imposition 
of uniformity” (Appiah, 1997, p. 635). Homogeneity does not have to be a bad thing, it does 
not have to detract from diversity, but it must be chosen freely. As with diversity, the 
freedom of others must be considered, and if an existence of uniformity impacts that 
freedom negatively, then steps should be taken to dismantle it.  
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Appiah has described his cosmopolitanism as “universality plus difference” (2008a, p. 92). It 
is not a totalitarian concept of cosmopolitanism; there is no desire to form a global 
government or to push an aggressive utopia onto people. It is not an entirely liberal concept 
of cosmopolitanism either; it shares the idea of diversity, but does not believe that that 
diversity can, or should, be considered impartially. It is a partial cosmopolitanism, believing 
in a universal humanity and the idea that difference is important, and that partiality is a 
realistic feature of human life. The partial cosmopolitan’s allegiance is first to the universal, 
but they will not deny their allegiance to the local, to their family and their friends. Appiah’s 
cosmopolitanism claims that humans lead better lives when they live on a smaller scale, and 
that “we should defend not just the state but the county, the town, the street, the business, 
the craft, the profession, the family as communities, as circles among the many circles 
narrower than the human horizon that are appropriate spheres of moral concern” (1997, p. 
624). It is not a question between the universal and the local, between homogeneity and 
diversity. It is a hybrid, a synthesis. We should not just consider one or the other.  
Obligations - Autonomy 
Central to Appiah’s partial cosmopolitanism is the idealised rational, autonomous individual. 
It is thus an ethical cosmopolitanism, concerned with what individuals can do to make their 
own life better. If the individual is trying to live a better life, then it follows that they are 
subsequently making life better for others. If we do not want, in our identity, to be a 
murderer, then we will not murder (Appiah, 2005). Our motivations and intentions then 
become where we find our values; Appiah explains that morality is not situation dependent 
– things such as genocide are bad, regardless of the situation – but ethics are the opposite in 
that they rely heavily on motivation, particularly in how those motivations tie in to the kind 
of person that an individual wishes to be (Appiah, 2005). It is something else that we all 
share; we all are engaged in the ethical project of shaping good lives for ourselves. 
In his cosmopolitanism, Appiah suggests that moral questions can, and perhaps should, be 
approached from an ethical standpoint. He turns to the notion of charity, and what it is that 
we are obliged to do for one another, to discuss this idea. You could, hypothetically, give all 
of your money to charities that support starving children in a third world country, Appiah 
supposes. It would leave you with nothing, however. You would be in a worse position to 
engage in the ethical project of constructing your own life. Appiah believes, then, that it is 
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unwise to put yourself in a bad situation just to momentarily remedy someone else’s. There 
is a balance that must be found, between what is morally praiseworthy and ethically 
obligatory. The cosmopolitan does not have to be impartial; “Whatever my basic obligations 
are to the poor far away, they cannot be enough, I believe, to trump my concerns for my 
family, my friends, my country; nor can an argument that every life matters require me to 
be indifferent to the fact that one of those lives is mine” (Appiah, 2006, pp. 165, emphasis 
added). What is needed is a mixed theory of value, one where local loyalties are reconciled 
with global obligations.  
Engaging with life ethically does not mean that moral obligations are automatically negated, 
however it is not the case that “the obligations of universal morality must always get 
priority to ethical obligations” (Appiah, 2005, p. 233). Partial cosmopolitanism distinguishes 
itself from so-called toxic or liberal cosmopolitanism in this way, as the global is not always 
deemed the most important, and local allegiances are not rejected. Distance becomes an 
important part of the discussion, but finding the balance between local and global 
obligations is not easy.  
Appiah (2006) presents the idea of being able to kill an old mandarin in China from far away 
to exemplify the challenge that distance poses. The mandarin is old, dying, and you will 
never meet them. If you killed the mandarin, the philosophical puzzle promises you will be 
made extremely wealthy. With just a thought, you could be rich. The mandarin would also 
be dead. Appiah then introduces another philosophical puzzle, once again questioning the 
limits of the moral imagination. He quotes philosopher Adam Smith, taking the idea of killing 
strangers for personal profit to its logical extreme: 
If he was to lose his little finger to-morrow, he would not sleep to-night; but, 
provided he never saw them, he will snore with the most profound security over 
the ruin of a hundred millions of his brethren. … To prevent, therefore, this paltry 
misfortune to himself, would a man of humanity be willing to sacrifice the lives 
of a hundred millions of his brethren, provided he had never seen them? Human 
nature startles with horror at the thought, and the world, in its greatest 
depravity and corruption, never produced such a villain as could be capable of 
entertaining it. But what makes this difference? (Appiah, 2005, p. 156). 
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If local obligations are always the most important, then the mandarin will die. Hundreds of 
millions of strangers will die.  
It still stands that we cannot be realistically expected to care about each one of those 
strangers in the same way that we care about those close to us, however. The insistence in 
moral cosmopolitanism that we should care about each and every person on the planet in 
the same way has received criticism. Appiah cites Robert Sibley, who suggests that it is a 
nice idea, but not possible; it “strains to extend our concrete realities to include some 
distant and generalized ‘others’ who, we are told, are our global neighbours. […] The idea 
might give you the warm-and-fuzzies, but it’s nothing for which you’d be willing to go to 
war” (Appiah, 2006, p. 157). However, whilst we cannot be expected to care about everyone 
to the same extent, it does not negate the fact that we still have moral obligations to 
strangers. It is simply important, Appiah insists, that we recognise that those obligations will 
be different from the ones we have to those closest to us. 
What, then, are our moral obligations? Philosophers such as Peter Singer and Peter Unger 
suggest that we must do for others whatever we can. It is not just about a passive attitude – 
not killing someone – but an active approach. Appiah discusses the way that Singer presents 
the problem mentioned above of saving a drowning child; if you see the child drowning, 
then you should wade in and save the child out, even if you damage your clothing in the 
process, Singer suggests. Unger takes the idea to its extreme, suggesting that you should be 
giving away as much as you can to children in need. “You’d have to liquidate your assets and 
empty your coffers until you could be sure that your losing a hundred dollars was worse 
than thirty kids’ dying,” Appiah (Appiah, 2006, p. 159) writes, following Unger’s ideas. 
Appiah identifies a simple principle for considering such situations, based on Singer’s and 
Unger’s logic: “If you can prevent something bad from happening at the cost of something 
less bad, you ought to do it” (Appiah, 2006, p. 160). It is an uneasy conclusion, Appiah 
suggests, as how would you be able to judge what was less bad? Should you leave the child 
to drown in the pond, if it means you are able to save two other children? Should those two 
children die to save thirty others? Moral obligations are not about doing whatever you can, 
Appiah decides. We should be wary of giving everything away to save thirty kids from dying, 
wary of being “willing to accept for ourselves, our families and friends, lives that are barely 
worth living” (Appiah, 2006, p. 165).  
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Knowing that we must not hugely disadvantage ourselves does not provide any further 
clarification of what our moral obligations are, however, nor does it clarify how we can 
ensure that those obligations are met. It is in this that Appiah turns towards government. 
Already having established that he is not interested in a global government, Appiah suggests 
that governments of nation-states are in the best position to ensure that obligations – and 
entitlements – are met. It is something that would not work with a global government; a 
global government would be ill-equipped to deal with local, regional needs, and faces the 
potential of amassing too much power, which could in turn be uncontrollable and unwieldy 
(Appiah, 2006). Ideally, the nation-state government would instead “balance external rights 
and internal constraints” (Appiah, 2005, p. 78), allowing it to protect both the people it 
governs and the world in general. The government of the nation-state should be capable, 
Appiah believes, of attending to both local and global obligations. By rejecting a global 
government and accepting a nation-state government, we are “accepting that we have a 
special responsibility for the life and justice of our own; but we still have to play our part in 
ensuring that all states respect the rights and meet the needs of their citizens” (Appiah, 
2006, p. 163). 
The rejection of a global government also allows for multiple political arrangements and 
experiments. As each nation-state government will have different resources, and need to 
meet different needs, Appiah suggests a reconsideration of the notion of human rights. 
Whilst he believes that there are human rights that each and every person on the planet is 
entitled to, he sees the “glory term” (2005, p. 261) – human rights – to be over-used. If 
every person is entitled to basic human rights, then they should be things that governments 
are capable of providing. They should be considered “constraints or conditions on the 
achievement of social goods, rather than those goods in themselves” (Appiah, 2005, p. 261); 
it is often easier for a government to prohibit something than it is to provide something, and 
by emphasising negative rights, there is less confusion that just because a government 
ought to provide something that it actually can. “That is why negative rights to do 
something,” Appiah claims, “where other people have the obligation not to hinder me if I 
choose to do it – are so prominent in the basic human rights instruments: abstaining from 
action if almost always possible” (Appiah, 2005, p. 262). It is important to note that Appiah 
does not deny the importance of things such as education and social services, and that 
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people should have access to these things. He is simply suggesting that the language of 
human rights obscures what is realistically possible for some governments to provide; “not 
every good needs to be explained in the language of human rights, a language that makes 
most sense if it is kept within bounds” (Appiah, 2005, p. 263). 
The basic obligation not to hinder an individual in something that they are pursuing 
emphasises another key component of Appiah’s partial cosmopolitanism. In line with the 
idea of an ethical cosmopolitanism wherein the individual should not only consider their 
friends and family but themselves as well, Appiah puts great importance on the autonomy 
of the individual. Laws should be created under the consideration of what “would be good 
for individuals” (Appiah, 2001, p. 112). As long as the (rational) individual does not infringe 
on the autonomy of another, then they should be largely left to make their own choices, 
though Appiah neglects to mention at what age an individual should be recognised as a 
rational and autonomous individual capable of making those choices, nor does he provide 
any guidance in regards to those whose health keeps them from being able to make those 
choices for themselves. What results is the idea of an ideal autonomous individual as being 
of paramount importance. It is a figure that gets placed above the collective throughout 
Appiah’s works.  
The most important facet of the rational individual is that they have the power of choice. 
The individual, in Appiah’s framework, is able to choose their own identity, choose how they 
are defined. Tied to this is the notion that the individual is allowed to choose what does not 
define them. Even a culture that is on the brink of extinction should not be saved if the 
individuals of that culture do not freely choose to save it (Appiah, 2005). Culture, in this 
way, becomes a creation not an imposition, something that is able to be set aside if one 
should choose.  
The power of choice of the individual is emphasised further by Appiah when he puts 
forward the commonly held so-called Golden Rule of global ethics: “What you wish done to 
yourself, do to others” (Appiah, 2006, p. 60). He goes on to suggest that it is a 
fundamentally flawed principle; it infringes on the autonomy of others. Consider Jehovah’s 
Witnesses. They believe that receiving blood leads to damnation. The Golden Rule would 
disregard this; you may think that having a blood transfusion is not an issue, and if you were 
in an accident, would have no problem receiving one if it would save your life. If you wish it 
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done to you, then, logically, you would have no problem doing it to the Jehovah’s Witness. If 
the situation was reversed, and it was up to the Witness, then you would not get the blood 
transfusion. They would not want one, so they will not give you one. They want to save your 
soul; you want to save their life. Either way, one of you loses. The Golden Rule is thus 
intrinsically flawed. It cannot respect the autonomy of an individual, because it fails to 
recognise that everyone has different values and beliefs, or, at the very least, fails to clarify 
whose values with which you are supposed to make the decision.  
The idea of choice belonging to the autonomous individual however offers possible answers 
to some of the more controversial topics that the law of a nation-state – as opposed to an 
individual – is expected to regulate, such as euthanasia and abortion. If the individual is 
entitled to autonomy and free choice, then it should be up to the individual to make a 
decision regarding their health care. It is not a moral decision in this instance; it is an ethical 
one. Appiah draws on Ronald Dworkin’s endorsement constraint to explain that “you cannot 
make someone better off by forcing her to do something she does not herself endorse as 
valuable” (Appiah, 2005, p. 150). As with the Jehovah’s Witness above, you cannot expect 
the Witness to thank you for giving them a blood transfusion; that is not their idea of better 
off. Appiah reasons that, as long as what a person is doing does not affect anyone else 
negatively or impact their own expression of autonomy, they should be allowed to continue 
with what they are doing. The individual – who is assumed to be of an appropriate age and 
to have the capacity to engage in autonomous rational thought, as Appiah provides no 
mention of the individual being otherwise – has an entitlement to choice, and so “the right 
way to express my concern for her is not to force her to do the right thing, but to try to 
persuade her she is mistaken” (Appiah, 2008a, p. 93). Appiah draws once again on the idea 
of conversation; he is encouraging a dialogue, where both sides get to explain their values 
and, ideally, come to an agreement on the best way to move forward. What is important to 
remember is that perhaps it is not she that is mistaken.  
Beginning the conversation is a good start. It encourages people who have little in common 
to start to get used to one another, to find things that they may not realise they have in 
common. However, central to the idea of autonomy, and implied in Appiah’s work, is that 
you do not have to begin that conversation if you do not want to. Even if you do start it, you 
are still entitled to walk away from it. Appiah follows the idea that a rational individual will 
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want the conversation, will not reject an opportunity for betterment. If the conversation is 
more than just a conversation between two individuals, a conversation between nation-
states for example, then those nation-state governments have an obligation to continue the 
conversation, to protect the autonomy of their citizens.  
Appiah makes clear that one of the issues that arise when considering moral and ethical 
obligations is the obligations of the individual and the obligations of the nation-state 
government. They are not the same, he suggests. Where the government needs to ensure 
fair and equal treatment for all its citizens, those citizens cannot be expected to be held to 
those same standards (Appiah, 2005). Where the individual can walk away from the 
conversation, the government cannot. The government should protect the autonomy of its 
citizens, and those citizens should be allowed to construct their lives however they see fit – 
as long as they do not infringe upon another citizen’s ability to enact autonomy, however. It 
ties back into the idea of accepting that individuals are rarely impartial, that they often care 
more about those closest to them than strangers. Individuals cannot be expected to care 
about each person equally; on the other hand, the government can and should meet that 
expectation. They should not discriminate amongst their citizens, and ensure that equal 
employment and space in the public sphere are available to all (Appiah, 2000).  
Appiah positions a democratic system as the ideal form of nation-state government. Whilst 
the idea of a global government is rejected by Appiah because, among other things, it does 
not allow for a “variety of institutional experimentation from which all of us can learn” 
(Appiah, 2006, p. 163), Appiah suggests that democracy is rational and capable of infringing 
upon a citizen’s autonomy to protect them or others if necessary (Appiah, 2005). 
Cosmopolitans should do what they can to “defend the right of others to live in democratic 
states, with rich possibilities of association within and across their borders” (Appiah, 1997, 
p. 624), widening the range of available identity scripts which they can use to encourage 
diversity amongst their own nation-state. The change in language he suggests for talking 
about human rights is tied into this idea; for Appiah, human rights are “embodied in legal 
arrangements within and between states rather than … somehow [existing] as antecedents 
or are grounded in human nature or divine ordinance” (Appiah, 1997, p. 620). The 
protection of human rights is an international issue, with citizens of democratic nation-
states encouraged to pressure their governments into protecting those rights not only for 
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them, but for others as well. The advantage of a democratic system is that, if the 
government refuses to listen to its citizens, they should be able to remove that government 
from power. It is not a monarchy; they can be voted out. Appiah acknowledges that this is 
not always easy or straightforward, quoting American statesman and political theorist James 
Madison “in framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable government to control the governed; and in the 
next place oblige it to control itself” (Appiah, 2005, p. 165). 
Appiah recognises a tension in his partial cosmopolitanism between moral and ethical 
obligations. What results is a cosmopolitanism that is more concentrated on the ethical 
obligations of the individual, where the individual should not be considered impartial and 
should be allowed the autonomy to construct the life that they choose for themselves. The 
moral obligations of the individual are unclear; Appiah suggests that individuals can fulfil 
these obligations by urging nation-state governments to do more for the protection of the 
basic human rights of others. To this end, Appiah also suggests a reconsideration of the 
language we use for human rights; Appiah believes that “once we conceive of human rights 
as constraints of the pursuit of social ends, we should not include among them demands 
that states cannot meet” (Appiah, 2005, p. 262). By adjusting our conceptions to fit this 
idea, we can make the basic idea of human rights more palatable to all nations and cultures 
(Appiah, 2005). Appiah positions democratic nation-state governments as the ideal system 
to ensure the protection of these human rights; he also insists we remember that 
government obligations and individual obligations are not identical, in neither the ethical 
nor the moral sphere.  
Narratives 
Throughout his work, Appiah remains confident of the importance of narratives in the 
ethical project of creating our lives. He suggests that we use narratives to structure and 
make sense of our own lives, and also to communicate those lives to one another. 
Narratives become important in how we understand people that are different from 
ourselves; they can help us create a collective “thick” language, where we have common 
understandings of values and are able to establish a common “moral vocabulary” (Appiah, 
2008b, p. 156). Appiah also implicates narratives in the project of creating an identity – both 
of the individual and of the collective – as they provide a variety of identity scripts that 
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individuals can attempt to either emulate or reject as they see fit. These identity scripts 
encourage diversity within the universal; they allow for the autonomous individual to freely 
choose diversity or, alternatively, homogeneity.  
In his discussion of narratives and identity scripts, Appiah once again emphasises the 
importance of the autonomous individual. The collective is tasked with providing the 
individual a variety of identity scripts with which they can begin to construct their sense of 
self; this is frequently tied into ideas of collective contestation, as it is often in the debate 
about which discourses should determine the identity of a collective that the variety of 
identity scripts available within that collective are actually exposed (Appiah, 2005). There is 
not one way to be gay or straight, or male or female, Appiah stresses. Contestations within 
collective identities are able to provide different scripts for individuals to draw from.  
Identity scripts are also to be found in other areas of social life, beyond that of the collective 
identity group. Appiah (1994, p.20) claims that his “identity is crucially constituted through 
concepts (and practices) made available to [him] by religion, society, school and state, and 
mediated to varying degrees by the family.” Education becomes a key point of transmission 
for these concepts; Appiah argues that the nation-state is obligated to provide examples of 
different concepts and practices in schools, so as to expose children to other ways of 
thinking and structuring their lives. Education should leave you “not only knowing and loving 
what is good in the traditions of your sub-culture but also understanding and appreciating 
the traditions of others” (Appiah, 1994, p. 16); exposure to other ways of thinking and other 
traditions will not necessarily mean we will be inclined to agree with them, but “it will help 
us get used to one another” (Appiah, 2006, p. 78). Children should be exposed to cultural 
traditions other than those that are generally considered to be their own; Appiah proposes 
that there are parts of the history of individual social groups that arguably also belong to the 
history of humankind – or, at least, to the citizens of the United States – such as the 
Underground Railroad and Ellis Island, or the Chinese Exclusion Act (Appiah, 1994). The 
migrant nature of the United States is implicated in this idea; the social history of one 
identity collective will have an impact on the social history of the others. In a New Zealand 
context, the government sanctioned Dawn Raids, occurring from 1974 to 1979, is an 
equivalent example; these raids on Pacific Islanders who had overstayed their visas were a 
result of the nation’s wider social and economic tensions (Anae, 2012), and were 
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consequential in the creation of the Citizenship (Western Samoa) Act of 1982 (Spoonley, 
2012) – which stopped Western Samoans from being counted as natural New Zealand 
citizens due to their position as British subjects – which is still currently active.  
Appiah does not only focus on the lived narratives of individuals or of collective identities. 
He also believes that fictional narratives are of central importance; they too can provide 
diverse identity scripts and can be useful tools in discussions of difference. “Evaluating 
stories together is one of the central ways we language-users coordinate our responses to 
the world” (Appiah, 2008b, p. 158); fictional narratives can provide a middle ground, a place 
for conversation to start.  
Appiah suggests that fictional narratives are of more use than traditional philosophical 
thought experiments when considering how people respond to complex problems. Thought 
experiments have very strict parameters, and Appiah uses the trolley experiment to 
exemplify this: this experiment asks the individual to consider a situation where there is a 
trolley speeding down a track towards five people, and there is another track where there is 
only one person, and then determine whether or not they should switch the trolley to the 
second track. The thought experiment is too narrow, Appiah argues, whereas a film or novel 
displaying the same problem would allow for a much more nuanced take on the situation. 
“In the real world,” Appiah writes, “situations are not bundled together with options. In the 
real world, the act of framing – the act of describing a situation, and thus determining that 
there’s a decision to be made – is itself a moral task” (Appiah, 2008b, p. 196). The thought 
experiments provide the individual with a range of options to choose from; the narrative 
makes an important distinction in that it first encourages the individual to decide what 
those options actually are.  
Whilst they can provide a representation of responses to complex problems, fictional 
narratives can also take on an etiological function. They “provide models for telling our 
lives” (Appiah, 2005, p. 22); frameworks that can be drawn upon to structure and make 
sense of our life stories, much in the same way that collective identities can. Fictional 
narratives, however, can introduce an individual to frameworks that exist outside of their 
own collective identity groups. They can be an easy way to expose people to other ways of 
being – other traditions and other values – in a relatively safe space; people can retreat into 
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the knowledge that it is fictional, into a belief that it cannot affect them, or into an 
argument that it is unrealistic. 
The idea that an individual can reject the message of the fictional narrative is in line with 
Appiah’s rejection of the claim that there is an implicit cultural imperialism in film. He 
quotes Herbert Schiller, one of the critics making this claim: “[it is] the imagery and cultural 
perspectives of the ruling sector in the center that shape and structure consciousness 
throughout the system at large” (Appiah, 2006, p. 108). Appiah then goes on to refute this 
claim, laying out an assortment of research that has been undertaken by various researchers 
looking at how global audiences respond to American television dramas. He writes that 
these researchers have found a number of interesting results: “The first is that, if there is a 
local product […] many people prefer it, especially when it comes to television. […] The 
second observation that the research supports is that how people respond to these 
American products depends on their existing cultural context. When the media scholar Larry 
Strelitz spoke to those students from KwaZulu-Natal, he found that they were anything but 
passive vessels” (Appiah, 2006, pp. 109-110). Whilst Appiah does not make the direct 
connection, the idea is much the same as that of Stuart Hall’s encoding and decoding theory 
(Hall, 1980): an individual can reject the intended and encoded message of a fictional 
narrative, and can decode the narrative in ways that are oppositional to what may have 
been expected. The individual retains agency and is able to critically evaluate the identity 
scripts that the narrative provides. Appiah uses examples from one of Strelitz’s participants 
to demonstrate this: 
What’s more, after watching the show, Sipho “realized that I should be allowed 
to speak to my father. He should be my friend rather than just my father.…” One 
doubts that that was the intended message of multinational capitalism’s ruling 
sector. 
But Sipho’s response also confirmed what has been discovered over and over 
again. Cultural consumers are not dupes. They can resist. So he also said, “In 
terms of our culture, a girl is expected to enter into relationships when she is 
about 20. In the Western culture, the girl can be exposed to a relationship as 
early as 15 or 16. That one we shouldn’t adopt in our culture.” (Appiah, 2006, p. 
110) 
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The individual is able to both accept and reject the identity scripts that the fictional 
narratives provide. The claim of cultural imperialism through American television and film is, 
by Appiah, therefore dismissed. Appiah does not however, in this instance, mention the 
gendered response that is shown in this example: Sipho responds that the Western cultural 
tradition of entering relationships five years earlier than his own should not be adopted, 
whereas a female may hold the opposite view, and the desire by some to maintain tradition 
and by others to maintain autonomy would then sit at odds with one another.   
In his discussion of cultural imperialism, Appiah does make a brief comment on the position 
of the Hollywood blockbuster. He claims that, in many countries, the film industry requires 
subsidies from the government, and that in France in particular people prefer to watch 
American films (Appiah, 2006). He rejects the claim that this is an instance of cultural 
imperialism – “No army, no threat of sanction, no political saber rattling, imposes 
Hollywood on the French” (Appiah, 2006, p. 107) – and instead suggests that it is more likely 
the reverse:  
The Hollywood blockbuster has a special status around the world; but here, as 
American movie critics regularly complain, the nature of the product – heavy on 
the action sequences, light on clever badinage – is partly determined by what 
works in Bangkok and Berlin. From the point of view of the cultural-imperialism 
theorists, this is a case in which the empire has struck back (Appiah, 2006, p. 
109). 
Hollywood blockbusters are global creations, shaped by international markets as well as 
local tastes. Given that research has shown that people prefer locally produced content, for 
the blockbuster to appeal to the widest possible audience, and thus to make the highest 
economic return possible, it becomes necessary that it takes on a cosmopolitan attitude. 
The content is made to elevate, rather than reduce, and in this way the blockbuster 
becomes a global myth. Globalisation and cosmopolitanism converge, representative of 
global capitalism and consumption. Shaped by global tastes and trends, the blockbuster is 
perhaps film at its most cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitanism, then, is centrally linked to 
capitalism; as with Joseph Schumpeter’s “gale of creative destruction” (1994, p.   84), we 
consume cosmopolitan films and in turn, those films remake us. 
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The suggestion that Hollywood blockbusters are influenced by a global audience, not just by 
an American audience, is important for Appiah’s discussion of the importance of fictional 
narratives as providers of identity scripts. To appeal to a global audience – which is 
necessary if a blockbuster is to be financially successful – a film needs to show a diverse 
range of identity scripts. People need to have something relevant to them, something that 
they can enjoy. By showing this range of scripts, audience members are exposed to ideas 
and values that are not necessarily aligned with their own; as with the case of teaching 
various social histories in schools, the exposure to difference can help people “get used to 
one another” (Appiah, 2006, p. 78). Appiah touches on the idea that, due to its global 
nature, the blockbuster can reveal to us “values we had not previously recognized or 
[undermine] our commitment to values we had settled with” (Appiah, 2008b, p. 158); we 
can begin to work towards establishing what Appiah terms a shared “moral vocabulary” 
(Appiah, 2008b, p. 156). 
The next section will place these themes and the ideas that they contain in the social 
context that they emerge from. It then addresses the implications of this particular model of 
cosmopolitanism, and begins to introduce the limitations of Appiah’s ethical 
cosmopolitanism. 
 
Context 
The question that underpins Appiah’s work on cosmopolitanism is straightforward; however 
it is one that does not have a straightforward answer. From a philosophical and ethical level, 
he is concerned with  not only how we can best live together as humans, but also with how 
we can do this whilst acknowledging and maintaining some level of our diversity as 
individuals. Difference, he asserts, is important for us to live lives that are satisfying on an 
individual level and to enable growth and progress on a universal level. He views difference 
as a positive thing, something to generally be celebrated rather than denied, however he 
does believe that our differences must come second to the idea of a universal humanity; 
what we share, given to us by our human biology, is stronger than that which we do not. 
Inspired by Enlightenment notions of the rational individual, Appiah is concerned with what 
we as individuals are ethically and morally obligated to do for one another, and with what 
position the nation-state should play in the pursuit of a better world for everyone. 
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Appiah, in his cosmopolitanism, is rightly responding to the threat of the current social 
hegemony. This threat is an internal one, which deals with social structures and institutions 
both created by and continuously creating an environment that in his critique is inhibiting 
our ability to construct our individual ethical lives alongside one another. He sees the 
(white) patriarchal power structure of society, particularly Western society, as detrimental 
to the wider population; he would have it so that each individual would be seen first as a 
human, and then as a chosen identity. This would allow individuals to define their own 
identities, picking and choosing what they would like the world to see them as. However, his 
belief that the structures and institutions maintained by hegemonic social forces  can be so 
easily transcended belies the fact that the people this hegemony most disadvantages are 
denied the resources necessary to challenge it. Therefore, there is an internal contradiction 
in what Appiah theorises. 
Appiah’s ethical cosmopolitanism comes from a position that has a high level of cultural 
capital attached, afforded to Appiah both by his position as an educated academic working 
within some of the world’s highest regarded tertiary institutions and by his ancestry, with 
both sides of his family having accumulated high social capital through both blood and 
position. What Appiah’s work achieves in theoretical depth is, as a consequence, inhibited 
by an inability to experience the limitations that those without such privileges are restricted 
by. His idea that differences can be set aside for the sake of the universal – implicit in his 
argument that our commonalities are enough to get us to sit at the same table – is not a 
possibility for many people; it requires social and economic capital that most people simply 
do not have access to and there is no realistic strategy in Appiah’s solution that would 
enable those without such capital to gain it (and so logically be able to set aside social 
minority attributes).  
As to how to realise Appiah’s cosmopolitanism, the notion of education plays an important 
role. As a body of work that exists within the academy, it is in an essential position to be 
able to educate those who do have the necessary social and economic capital on the 
benefits of a cosmopolitan existence; this suggests that it is those people who have the 
most responsibility to work towards a cosmopolitan society. As such, Appiah’s 
cosmopolitanism becomes a top-down approach, with the people who are already in power 
being educated with the intention of creating a better existence for those who do not have 
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the same advantages. In short, this is cosmopolitanism for governments, diplomats, policy 
makers, and global elites.  
This better existence is focused on the universal individual; how can the individual live the 
best life. Appiah explicitly suggests a partial – or ‘rooted’ – model of cosmopolitanism, 
wherein the focus is more on the universal individual at a local level as opposed to a global 
level. He treats cosmopolitanism as a state of individuals who do their own thing, as 
something that ‘you’ and ‘I’ can do rather than what ‘we’ can do. He is concerned with how 
the individual can respond to a threat and what that individual is obligated to do for the 
universal collective. The nation-state government also plays an essential role in Appiah’s 
cosmopolitanism; it is the essential provider and protector of public space within which the 
individual can perform a cosmopolitan identity. Appiah seeks to establish a state and an 
existence within which the cosmopolitan attitude has a constant presence.  
It is this universal individual that holds Appiah’s focus. He stresses the importance of the 
universal, insisting that it is the universal that all individuals share regardless of their cultural 
differences. It is not so much a universal collective as it is a universal type; a universal 
identity that exists under the umbrella term of ‘human,’ that is available to each of us that is 
not reliant on the decision of any other individual of whether or not to take it up. Appiah is 
careful to also assert the importance of difference – we are not, nor should not be, all the 
exact same – however he does position this difference as secondary to the universal. The 
universal that we all share as individuals, Appiah believes, is more important than our 
differences. If necessary, we can set these differences aside for the sake of the universal. 
The issue with Appiah’s work here is that we cannot, or perhaps more importantly do not, 
realistically set these differences aside whenever we want to. Nor are we purely individuals; 
never acting as totally and primarily rational autonomous individuals in and of ourselves, we 
instead decide and act as a member of a group, whether that is a family group, a cultural 
group, a religious group, or another form of social collective. The ideas and opinions of 
others impact our choices and often our dedication to the collective trumps our dedication 
to the universal. As such, Appiah’s top-down cosmopolitanism becomes unrealistic; he 
provides little incentive beyond an appeal to rationality that would convince the powerful 
cohort to relinquish any significant measure of their control.  
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These issues are reflected in the effects Appiah’s cosmopolitanism has on agency. Appiah’s 
work follows an essentialist conception of agency, wherein every individual automatically 
possess agency on the virtue of being biologically human. It is not the case that some 
individuals have agency and others have none, it is that some individuals have more limits 
on how they can apply their agency than others. Appiah’s ethical cosmopolitanism suggests 
that the individual must willingly limit their own agency in the pursuit of a new and 
improved ideal in return for the provision of public space in which to enact a cosmopolitan 
identity as granted by the nation-state. It is a reductive model of agency, where those with 
the most privilege must sacrifice the most for the ‘greater good’. As he is largely speaking to 
academics and policy makers/legislators in his work, the notion of a reductive model of 
agency sits well with his top-down cosmopolitanism; it is his audience that, through 
education on a cosmopolitan existence, have agency that can endure restrictions for the 
benefit of others. 
By suggesting this reductive model, Appiah suggests that the individual needs to consider 
their own differences – their individuality, their faith, and their cultural traditions – as 
something that is worth less than a shared universal,  an idea that neglects the strength of 
difference and the influence it has on, and the power it has over, the individual. The rational 
individual, which Appiah believes we should be trying to be, would perceive this reduction in 
their agency as a necessary and amicable sacrifice, equalising agency between individuals by 
reducing the agency of those who currently hold the most. As we cannot be rational 
individuals all of the time – Romantic notions of emotionality hold just as much sway over 
our actions – those who refuse to limit their own agency stand in a position to hold even 
more control as those around them willingly acquiesce to the rational sacrifice. Further 
inequality and totalitarian situations are a logical realistic extension and are unintended 
consequences of this idea and thus Appiah’s model of ethical cosmopolitanism.  
As the model of cosmopolitanism that this thesis argues for is also a reconceptualization of 
the model presented by the MCU, the next section will present a brief history of 
superheroes and Marvel Comics so as to understand the influence that social context has on 
the popularity of the medium. It will then briefly introduce the MCU to show why this 
particular franchise was chosen for this thesis and to re-emphasise the importance that 
social context has on the ongoing success of these films. This will then be followed by a 
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thematic and a contextual analysis of the MCU’s model of cosmopolitanism, as it sits in 
relation and contrast to Appiah’s model of cosmopolitanism.  
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The Marvel Cinematic Universe 
A brief history of superheroes and the rise of Marvel Comics 
In 1938, Superman was introduced to the world. He was a type of character not previously 
seen in comic books; god-like in his abilities and dressed in blue with a red cape and a giant 
‘S’ stuck to his chest, Superman swooped in to save the day. Readers of comic books had 
seen funny characters, had seen adventure and mystery stories, but Superman was their 
first glimpse of a superhero. He was featured on the cover of the first issue of Action Comics, 
a new book that the owners of Detective Comics, Inc., Harry Donenfeld and Jack Liebowitz, 
had released alongside their already successful title, Detective Comics. The character was so 
popular that within a year, Superman had received his own self-titled book; it was “the first 
book title devoted to a single character” (Wright, 2003, p. 9), and it sold in record numbers.  
Even though World War II would not begin until 1939, a year after Superman’s debut, 
tensions in Europe were coming to a head when the first Action Comics hit the newsstands. 
Beginning two years before Superman’s debut, the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) had 
emphasised the tensions between communism and fascism; most countries officially 
remained neutral during this war, though many were unofficially involved (Alpert, 1993), 
and the extent of the war added to the “growing instability that developed across Europe 
across the 1930s” (Little, 2011, p. 184). Whilst Superman was established in this first 
appearance as an alien, he did not fight other aliens, instead defending humans from other 
humans as a “champion of the oppressed” (Seigel & Shuster, 1938, p. 1). What Superman 
represented was the triumph of Good over Evil. He was a hero that was superior to both 
man and environment. In the face of the crisis rising in Europe, Superman was an opposing 
force, a saviour. If we do indeed look for a deliverer in times of crisis, as Roger Rollin (1970) 
suggests, then Superman was that deliverer. Whilst war brought uncertainty, superhero 
comics came with a sense of security for readers; the hero would always win, Good would 
always triumph over Evil.  
In response to the new craze that Detective Comics, Inc. had started with Superman and his 
growing cohort, other publishers began to release superhero comics. One of the most 
notable of these publishers was Martin Goodman, a pulp magazine publisher. Goodman 
purchased two characters, the Human Torch and the Sub-Mariner, and when the anthology 
66 
 
book they were published in started selling better than most other superheroes on the 
market, Goodman went looking for more. He chanced upon Joe Simon and Jack Kirby who, 
like Superman’s creators Jerry Siegel and Joe Shuster, were both sons of Jewish immigrants. 
The pair made a conscious decision to bring the “working-class values of the urban Jewish 
immigrant” (DiPaolo, 2011, p. 21) to their work, and in 1940, Goodman published what was 
to become Simon and Kirby’s seminal creation: Captain America.  
The war in Europe was raging, but the United States was keeping out of it. Captain America 
was a conscious political response to this; whilst the country held back, a soldier bearing its 
name and wearing its colours was punching Adolf Hitler squarely in the face. Simon and 
Kirby were using the Captain “to wage a metaphorical war against Nazi oppression, 
anticipating the real American war that they believed was inevitable” (Wright, 2003, p. 36); 
the sheer number of issues that would sell throughout the war emphasised the importance 
of social relevance in comics. Even though, by 1941, most of the other superheroes across 
various publishers had followed the Captain into the fighting (Genter, 2007), Captain 
America continues to remain the “definitive comic book entry into the culture of World War 
II” (Wright, 2003, p. 30). Superheroes were a contemporary salvation myth; when America’s 
response to the war was not enough, Captain America rushed onto the battlefield, shield 
first.   
Simon and Kirby would eventually leave Goodman’s Timely Comics5 over payment disputes. 
Goodman needed a new in-house editor and writer (Jones, 2004) and, given that most of 
the work was contracted out, he turned to the only person left in the office. The 17-year-old 
Stanley Lieber was the cousin of Goodman’s wife – nepotism was alive and well – and had, 
until that point, been an errand boy for Simon and Kirby. One of those errands was the task 
of writing a story to accompany two panels of illustration for Captain America. In his 
attempt to distance himself from the world of superheroes and comic books, he had signed 
the story as ‘Stan Lee’; he had had great intentions of being a published novelist, and comic 
books at the time were looked down upon in much the same way that pulp magazines had 
been. The name ‘Stan Lee’ would stick with Lieber for the rest of his life.  
                                                     
5 Goodman’s publishing company went by many different names throughout the years, allegedly to 
manipulate tax laws. During this initial foray into superheroes, it is best known as Timely Comics, and would 
become Marvel Comics in the early 1960s (Howe, 2012; Jones, 2004). 
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Whilst the company grew under Lee’s direction, superheroes became less profitable after 
the war. There was a lack of Axis power enemies to pit them against and the dedicated 
readership that had been guaranteed with large numbers of active U.S. servicemen had 
dried up (Howe, 2012). The entire superhero industry saw a massive downturn, and a lot of 
the smaller publishers went under. Soon all that was left of the industry was Lee, still 
working for Goodman, and Detective Comics, Inc., who were miraculously still publishing 
Superman and Batman titles. It had proven too difficult to pull the heroes out of the war, 
and audiences had lost interest in witnessing a fight that had already been won.  
Detective Comics, Inc. scrapped through the post-war years with only their biggest heroes. 
Those heroes were then, in 1960, put together to create the ‘Justice League,’ a revamp of 
the company’s earlier ‘Justice Society.’ For the first time in years, interest in superheroes 
began to rise. Stand-alone heroes were not enough to sell comic books, but a team of 
heroes was. The ensemble cast was a draw card for readers, with a range of heroes bringing 
a range of identity scripts to the books. Still interested in jumping on the biggest payday, 
Goodman instructed Lee to create a superhero team for his company. In response, Lee then 
did something with superheroes that had rarely been done before: he made them human. 
The focus of the new book was “not only upon the wondrous abilities of its characters, but 
also upon the lived reality of the superheroes themselves, that is, upon the ways in which 
the mundane problems of human existence interfered with their crimefighting abilities” 
(Genter, 2007, p. 954).  
Not only was the new team relatable because of the emphasis on their lived reality, The 
Fantastic Four books were also instilled with Cold War themes. The team’s origin story 
spoke to a generation of readers witnessing the space race between the United States and 
the Soviet Union; the pressure to be first into space was the reason the four titular 
characters took an unprepared rocket into space, which ultimately exposed them to the 
cosmic radiation necessary for them to develop their superpowers.  
The Cold War themes would continue throughout the string of superhero titles that 
followed. The Hulk came next, with a communist spy starting the military test that would 
expose Dr Banner to gamma radiation, leaving the doctor to be forever plagued by a 
Jekyll/Hyde condition. Iron Man was the alter ego of a “military industrial complex 
billionaire protagonist” (DiPaolo, 2011, p. 27) who created a suit of armour after he was 
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taken hostage by communists due to his position as a weapons manufacturer. These new 
heroes, under Goodman’s publishing company which would from then on be known as 
Marvel Comics, spoke “to the anxieties of a culture in an atomic age” (Genter, 2007, p. 954). 
They had moved past World War II and into the Cold War.  
Marvel Comics continued to utilise the lived reality aspect of superheroes and did what they 
could to keep the stories they were telling socially relevant. The X-Men titled was released 
in 1963, and it merged Cold War themes with Civil Rights themes. The superhero team 
featured in this title were the result of atomic radiation, characters born with varying 
mutations struggling to find equal ground with non-mutants. The two lead characters, 
engaging notions of identity politics, echoed the philosophical stances of Martin Luther King, 
Jr. and Malcom X, and were surrounded by a new cast of characters for audiences to relate 
to. Central to the ongoing popularity of the X-Men is the team’s ability to be at the 
“forefront of the many teams that suffer from intra-group conflicts” creating a situation 
wherein “X-Men comics interleave fantastical action with soap operatics” (Newman, 2000, 
p. 1), drama that cannot be resolved quickly within a stand-alone issue. Audiences were 
required to commit to multiple issues to complete the story. “What we have here is not the 
anomaly of a single masked or caped man hovering over humankind,” Kim Newman (2000, 
p. 1) writes about the X-men specifically, but applicable to the new superheroes of Marvel 
Comics more generally as well, “but a thorny crowd of extranormals who have sprung from 
our midst and never left behind the problems that made them human before they were 
superhuman.”  
This new batch of superheroes was arriving during a time of larger societal ontological 
change. As with what would eventually be the Culture Wars, the return of Captain America 
in 1964 began to deal with broader questions of what it meant to be an American. Marvel 
Comics interestingly chose to bring the Captain back from his apparent death, rather than 
choosing to just re-boot the character and start him over from scratch. This created a 
tension between the values he had been given at his conception, values from the 1930s and 
1940s, and the values of the world that he was waking up into. The world had changed. 
There were no longer any Axis armies for him to fight and a large part of his character was 
devoted to his man-out-of-time status, struggling to negotiate and reconcile two distinct 
periods in time. The Captain kept his political underpinnings and revolutionary nature, 
69 
 
questioning what it meant to be wrapped in the American flag, and by the 1980s, he had set 
the uniform aside after becoming too disillusioned with the government he was answering 
to – which none too coincidentally coincided with the Watergate scandal (DuBose, 2007). 
His new identity, that of the superhero Nomad, kicked off an industry-wide trend to 
question the “political underpinnings [of] superhero actions” (DuBose, 2007, p. 933), and he 
began to emphasise notions of moral relativity, recognising opinions as opinions. The 
Captain had moved away from the flag-waving patriot that he was at times perceived as, 
and “even explicitly anti-American villains [were] not berated by Captain America for their 
ideals but for their execution of those ideals” (DuBose, 2007, p. 929 emphasis added). As 
society changed, so did the superheroes.  
Whilst superheroes may have made their debut with Detective Comics, Inc., at the close of 
the twentieth century it was Marvel Comics that maintained the primary position as a 
publisher of superhero comic books. Fluctuations of sales figures within the industry have 
implicated the importance of social relevance for the continued interest in superheroes, and 
Marvel Comics had carved out a space for themselves in the industry though their focus on 
not just the super aspect of their characters, but also of the human aspect as well. By 
negotiating historical ontological transitions, the company has found success through its 
“historical progressiveness” (Howe, 2012, p. 352), and the writers and artists creating the 
stories, at least, seem to understand this. The evolving nature of the superhero comic book 
and the way in which it reflects social climates and events are key contributors to the 
reactive model of partial cosmopolitanism that the MCU presents, a model that contributes 
to the synthesised model that this thesis argues for. 
The next section examines the transition of the Marvel superhero from comic book to the 
silver screen. It considers the part that the social climate played in the success of Marvel 
Studios, and the way that the films have had to evolve and adapt to society’s changing 
concerns. 
 
Marvel Studios 
Despite the progressiveness of Marvel Comics overall, comic book storylines are not always 
explicitly created to address social questions that exist within a society. There are instances 
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when titles are created for the singular purpose of selling merchandise (Howe, 2012). The 
Secret Wars storyline from the mid-1980s, for example, was one such storyline. As many 
characters as possible were packed into the twelve large cross-universe issues, and the toys 
that were able to be manufactured and sold as a result laid the groundwork for a larger 
operation: selling film production rights to various studios.  
Whilst different studios would acquire the film rights to different characters over the years, 
none of these films would make it past early production stages. During the late 1980s 
interest in superheroes was once again waning – rising cover prices and oversaturation were 
part of the reason – and most film studios were unwilling to take such a financial risk. In an 
attempt to make their offers more attractive to production studios, Marvel changed their 
tactics away from simply selling off character rights. The older film section of the company 
was rebranded as Marvel Studios and they began to offer package deals: a script, director, 
and actors would be supplied for bigger studios to complete any film they might purchase 
the rights to (Howe, 2012). The new structure proved effective, and Blade was successfully 
released by New Line Cinema in 1998, followed by X-Men in 2000, and Spider-Man in 2002, 
released by Fox and Sony respectively. Interestingly, two of these films are heavily implicit 
with post-modernity’s social identity movements: Blade featured an African American lead 
and X-Men was underpinned by gay rights sentiments. 
These films brought new readers to the comic books, which created a new issue for Marvel 
Comics to contend with. New readers were struggling to break into storylines that had 
decades worth of backstory. As an answer to this growing problem, the Ultimates line of 
comics was released; fifty years’ worth of character history would be set aside and the 
characters would be approached anew. Each character would be revamped, with their origin 
story revisited (Howe, 2012). Readers would not have to trace half a century worth of story 
arcs to understand the characters that they were seeing on the silver screen; in this way, 
Marvel Comics was conceding long-standing traditions for the sake of an expanding 
readership and, as a result, larger profits. This move also shifted the comics into a space of 
universality, with the works existing in and of themselves and no longer necessarily 
requiring the reader to have knowledge of the lore and traditions that the characters were 
originally involved in. 
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The newly reimagined characters made a definitive transition, with grittier origins and 
motivations taking over the optimism that had defined many of the characters in their 
previous incarnations. The new Ultimates comics would serve another purpose as well. They 
became the storyboards for new films, films that Marvel Studios would release themselves, 
having seen the profits rolling in from films produced elsewhere (Howe, 2012). Superhero 
films had finally proven popular, and it was time for Marvel Studios to cash in.  
In much the same way that comic books have to remain socially relevant to ensure any 
chance at success, superhero films too are tied to their social context. The director of Iron 
Man – Marvel Studios first successful release using the Ultimates structure – has 
“speculated that 9/11 set the stage for the current superhero craze. He observed that, in 
the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks, American audiences craved escapism, and 
movie storylines that featured easily identifiable heroes and villains […] He indicated that, as 
deceptively simple and provocative as those films were in their iconography, they still 
featured tortured heroes wrestling with issues of power and responsibility that helped 
audiences work out their own feelings about the current state of the world without 
speaking directly to those fears” (DiPaolo, 2011, pp. 18-19). This idea goes back to Roger 
Rollin’s (1970) belief that superheroes in popular culture serve a purpose, that people turn 
to superheroes because they crave a sense of security and wish to see Good triumph over 
Evil. “In times of crisis we look for a deliverer” (Rollin, 1970, p. 89): in these films, the 
superheroes are our deliverers. In the face of Heidegger’s (2010) technicity and 
uprootedness, we turn to new myths – created and expressed both through technicity and 
capitalism – for a sense of security, for a hero that is more than human to save us.  
The reimagining of character origins that begun in the Ultimates comic line has been 
important for keeping the Marvel Studios films relevant. No longer is Iron Man facing down 
a communist threat; he instead confronts terrorists from the Middle East. The Hulk is not 
created with the help of a communist spy; a neo-liberal attitude sees Bruce Banner with 
now only himself to blame, with military officials who had a hand in the accident denying 
any responsibility. Given that Marvel Studios plans many more years of film releases, they 
need to ensure that they stay relevant to remain successful. It has been over a decade since 
the 9/11 attacks. As when the comics had to change from the clear notions of Good and Evil 
they portrayed during World War II to the more ontological-based questioning of the 1970s 
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and 1980s, the films that Marvel Studios are releasing have also been undergoing a 
metaphysical shift.  
Phase One of the MCU began with Iron Man in 2008, before following various characters on 
solo adventures, before culminating with the team film, The Avengers, in 2012. In this 
Phase, the heroes knew who the villains were; the films were working with the dualist 
concepts of Good and Evil that had been laid out in the successful superhero films that had 
been released since the 9/11 attacks. As mentioned above, Iron Man is created out of a 
hostage situation in the Middle East. The primary antagonist in The Incredible Hulk (2008) is 
a Russian, working for the United States military. Thor faces down his brother, Loki, 
unwilling to kill him but understanding the importance of stopping him in Thor (2011). 
Captain America is pitted against the Red Skull and his Hydra agents in the WWII-era film 
Captain America: the First Avenger (2011). In The Avengers (2012), Loki is once again pulling 
the strings, with a larger alien threat at his disposal. The villains are obvious. The heroes 
know where to focus their energy. There is a Good, and there is an Evil. 
Phase Two shakes things up. Beginning with Iron Man 3 in 2013 and ending with Ant-Man in 
2015, this Phase plays with the notion that the Bad Guy is not always so easy to spot. The 
villain becomes the central plot twist; the hero chases after one villain only to realise that 
the real threat is closer to home. The Middle Eastern terrorist Iron Man tracks down in his 
third feature turns out to be the film’s central twist: the ominous threat is nothing more 
than a British actor, hired as a diversion by a colleague that Stark had humiliated years 
earlier. In Thor: the Dark World (2013), Loki sacrifices himself as Thor’s ally, only to be 
revealed to the audience as alive and well, sitting on the Asgardian throne, suggesting that 
he has killed their father. Captain America puts a dent in the MCU when he uncovers that 
Hydra, the organisation that he died to defeat at the end of his first film, has secretly 
infiltrated the covert defence agency SHIELD at the highest levels. Guardians of the Galaxy 
(2014) introduces a range of new characters to the MCU and, as such, uses the same pattern 
of obvious villains as in Phase One films, as does Ant-Man (2015). However, it is in The 
Avengers: Age of Ultron (2015) that the pattern shifts again. The villain is not the obvious 
(foreign) threat of Phase One. It is not the plot twist of Phase Two. Age of Ultron chooses to 
move the villain even closer to home: the threat is this time directly created by the heroes 
themselves.   
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The MCU currently stands as the highest grossing film franchise of all time, having grossed 
over $3.5 billion (US) over its twelve films6. The studio has films assigned release dates 
through to 2019, with further films being planned up until 2028 at least, at roughly three 
films a year. By the end of this decade, there will have been another fourteen Marvel 
Studios films released. As of the close of Phase Two, the MCU has moved through various 
paradigm shifts, reflecting a changing audience. Using both clear cut villains and hidden 
villains to drive the action, the films have ultimately ended up questioning the role of the 
superhero itself. Are superheroes humanity’s biggest threat, Age of Ultron asks, or is it 
humans themselves? Ultron was, after all, created by Stark and Banner so that they can 
retire from the hero business. The films have moved away from the dualistic separation of 
them vs us, and are now beginning to question just what it is that does, if indeed anything 
actually does, separate them and us. This idea of a perhaps false dichotomy becomes 
central to the MCU’s reactive model of partial cosmopolitanism.  
 
A Reactive Model of Cosmopolitanism 
In this section, an examination of the MCU’s reactive model of partial cosmopolitanism will 
be undertaken in relation and contrast to Appiah’s ethical model of partial cosmopolitanism. 
This will be done first with a thematic analysis, followed by locating this particular model 
into its social context. To facilitate the comparison and a contrast to Appiah’s ethical model 
of cosmopolitanism, the themes that will be looked at are: universality, diversity, 
obligations, autonomy, and narratives. To support this discussion, plot descriptions of the 
films of the MCU can be found in the appendix of this thesis. 
The reactive model of partial cosmopolitanism of the MCU is a model that treats 
cosmopolitanism as an act, as a response to a wrong. Individuals come together to form a 
collective – often to protect a universal – and once they have overcome the (physical) 
threat, they go their separate ways once more. It is only in the coming together that 
cosmopolitanism is realised; the individuals retreat into their differences, having little to do 
with one another in their day to day lives.  
                                                     
6 As of the close of 2015. Deadpool, released in early 2016, does not constitute part of the Marvel Cinematic 
Universe as the film rights to the character are currently owned by 20th Century Fox, rather than Marvel 
Studios.   
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Themes 
Universality – Diversity 
In regards to universality and diversity, the MCU largely agrees with Appiah: there is 
something that we all share, something worth protecting and fighting for. Yet we are all 
different. We bring to the conversation a wide variety of different experiences. We are not 
always going to agree. 
The structure of the MCU lends itself well to articulating Appiah’s idea of “universality plus 
difference” (2008a, p. 92). Each phase begins with individual character films, culminating in a 
team film. For example, Phase One consists of Iron Man (2008), The Incredible Hulk (2008), 
Iron Man 2 (2010), Thor (2011), Captain America: the First Avenger (2011), and culminates in 
The Avengers (2012). Individual characters are established first; we are shown how they 
come to be considered ‘super’ through origin tales that provide both motivations and 
aspirations. We see their triumphs alongside their flaws and their faults. Then they are 
thrown together in The Avengers (2012), whereupon different personalities are expected to 
put aside a whole lifetime’s worth of differences to overcome a common threat.  
This is best articulated in The Avengers (2012) through Tony Stark and Steve Rogers; Rogers 
knew Stark’s deceased father better than he ever did. “That’s the guy my dad never shut up 
about?” Stark remarks when Rogers is out of earshot, “I’m surprised they didn’t just keep 
him in ice.” The two characters immediately conflict with one another: Stark is an ex-
weapons manufacturer, trying to make the world a better place through sustainable energy 
sources; Rogers was a soldier in World War II, frozen in time and awoken to a world that 
holds a whole new set of ideals and fears. Their differences are highlighted throughout the 
film – “We are not soldiers,” Stark snaps at Rogers – and it is those ingrained differences that 
the narrative expects them to overcome.  
Where Appiah would have them set aside these differences to find their commonalities, 
Stark and Rogers instead work with their differences. They do not overcome their 
differences; instead they go into the final battle of the film with their differences intact. 
Rogers is ever the wartime Captain, issuing orders and leading from the front. Stark is the 
reckless rogue, going off on his own to deal with the primary antagonist. What is crucial for 
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the narrative is that this strategy works. They do not have to ignore their differences to save 
the day. It is the differences that actually make them stronger.  
What ultimately makes the Avengers a capable team is that each one of them is different. 
They work as team because they do not come together despite their differences, but 
because of them. It is not just the difference between the individual members, however; 
what brings them together is that they are also different from everyone else. The six 
Avengers share something that others do not have. They have a commonality – a 
universality – between them that comes from their position as superheroes. That 
commonality suggests something that Appiah does not. Appiah writes about difference as 
being a discussion about individuals, rather than about cultures (2005). He also suggests that 
we think on a local level, of the “circles among the many circles narrower than the human 
horizon” (Appiah, 1997, p. 624). The MCU takes those thoughts a step further. The Avengers 
team suggests, as does Appiah, that smaller communities exist within larger ones, but it also 
suggests that cultures, not just individuals, can work towards the benefit of the universal. 
The Avengers are Appiah’s universality plus difference, just on a smaller scale. The Avengers 
slot in amongst other groups, other cultures, and create a larger and stronger whole, albeit 
one that exists to complete a particular project or task, coming together as events 
necessitate rather than as a permanent state. The rational individual, The Avengers suggests, 
is not enough. The film suggests that we look at cultures as well. 
To emphasise the idea of the Avengers being part of a larger whole, another team of 
superheroes exists within the MCU. Guardians of the Galaxy (2014) does not have the 
individual character films lead up that The Avengers (2012) has, but it does continue the 
theme of a group of people coming together for the benefit of the whole. Set this time in 
space, rather than on Earth, the so-called Guardians begin the movie as adversaries; they 
ultimately team up to escape prison and to collect the bounty from an orb they had been 
fighting over. Though once they realise the scale of destruction the orb could cause, their 
motivation shifts from individual monetary interest to keeping the orb out of the hands of 
the film’s primary antagonist. It is only by coming together that they can overcome the 
threat.  
The Avengers and the Guardians of the Galaxy exist within the same universe. They are both 
examples of smaller scale versions of Appiah’s universality plus difference. Both exemplify 
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the idea that differences are important, but it is that which is shared that brings them 
together. What they show is that groups – groups whose members share things that others 
do not have – are just as important as individuals are when it comes to creating and 
protecting a better world. They also show that perhaps the universal humanity that Appiah 
discusses is not strictly tied to biology. Where Appiah finds a universal human biology, Thor 
from the Avengers and all but one of the Guardians of the Galaxy are not human. Yet they 
still share something in common with their teammates. Humanity loses its tie to (biological) 
humans in the MCU, and becomes something more than a biological universal; it becomes “a 
common cultural basis on which particular (kinds of) identities can be constructed” (Lechner, 
1984, p. 80). 
Yet this does not mean that the individual is not ignored in the MCU, however strong the 
collective may prove to be. It is the combination of individuals that create the collective. 
Where the first phase of the MCU is set up to create the Avengers team, the second is to 
show the audience that the characters are not locked into that team. They come together, 
and then they go their separate ways. When it is necessary, they come together again. What 
results is an expression of partial cosmopolitanism that is task-orientated. They are able to 
focus on their commonality when they need to, but they are still able to retain their 
individuality and can move back and forth between the two states. They come together 
when a situation arises that they cannot handle alone. This is not even necessarily a global 
extinction event; Thor: the Dark World (2013) threatened to destroy the Earth, and Captain 
America: the Winter Soldier (2014) targeted the lives of each one of the Avengers, and both 
of those films remained individual character films. Partial cosmopolitanism becomes, then, 
an act that individuals undertake, rather than a state of being.  
Appiah’s notion of the partiality of the individual is also important in the MCU, particularly 
for Steve Rogers. In Captain America: The First Avenger (2011), a super-serum-powered 
Rogers does not get to singlehandedly wage war against the Nazi forces in World War II. He 
is instead initially relegated to selling war bonds, performing across the country, and 
eventually heads to Europe to promote morale amongst serving American soldiers. He is 
performing his routine for a base just outside of Germany when he hears that his audience is 
“what is left of the 107th,” the unit that his best friend had been assigned to. Rogers ignores 
his orders to stay put; he takes off into enemy territory and, despite the fact that it was his 
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first time in battle, he makes it into the Nazi base and successfully tracks down his missing 
friend. Along the way, he manages to rescue dozens of other POWs but, as Appiah would 
suggest, it is his motivations that are important. He does not risk everything to save 
strangers; he does it for his friend. There is nothing impartial in his decision. Rogers is the 
partial cosmopolitan, unwilling to set aside his allegiance to those closest to him. 
Rogers represents more than just the partiality of the partial cosmopolitan. His story arc is 
also a question about a universal. After being discovered frozen in the arctic, he tries to 
reconcile WWII era values with the 21st Century world he wakes up into; if everyone he loves 
is dead, then why should he care about someone trying to kill thousands of people? Yet he 
does. There is something universal that travels across time, something that motivates him to 
help others regardless of the situation he finds himself in. When Appiah discusses American 
culture, and rejects the idea that there is a common culture that centres all Americans, he 
suggests that “what [Americans] desire centrally, what shapes their lives, is what the 
American freedoms make possible” (1997, p. 628). Rogers fights for that freedom; “This isn’t 
freedom; it’s fear,” he says to Nick Fury in Captain America: The Winter Soldier (2014), 
pointing to the three flying warships Fury is authorising in the name of global security and 
protection. For Rogers, there are things that transcend time, things that everyone shares and 
that, for that reason, should be protected. What his actions and motivations suggest is that 
the universal that we share is an idea. Where Thor suggests that humanity is not strictly tied 
to human biology, Steve Rogers extends the idea, suggesting that it can also be an intangible 
idea, a motivating force.  
In regards to establishing and acknowledging this commonality, what is important to 
Appiah’s partial cosmopolitanism is the idea of conversation. He suggests that the 
conversation can begin between two individuals; it does not necessarily need to be a big 
discussion about morals and truths. In Captain America: the Winter Soldier (2014), there is 
one such conversation. The film opens with Rogers, still a fish out of water and finding his 
feet in a new world, having a conversation with ex-pararescue officer, Sam Wilson. The 
conversation is at first light and easy. Then, “Must have freaked you out, coming home after 
the whole defrosting thing,” Wilson says. Rogers shuts the conversation down. He has had 
this discussion before. He is about to walk away when Wilson says “It’s your bed, right?” It 
catches Rogers off guard and he turns. “Your bed, it’s too soft. When I was over there, I slept 
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on the ground and used rocks for pillows, like a caveman. Now I’m home, lying in my bed 
and it’s like…” “Lying on a marshmallow,” Rogers finishes for Wilson. The conversation picks 
back up. They have found common ground. It is a common ground that ultimately lands 
Wilson a spot in the Avengers team. Whilst a bed may not be quite the intense conversation 
starter of fishing that Appiah provides, it is a start. In the MCU, a conversation between two 
individuals as an expression of partial cosmopolitanism makes sense. Where the MCU 
extends Appiah’s idea, however, is that Rogers and Wilson explicitly find common ground 
because of their differences; they are part of an exclusive club of returned servicemen, 
finding commonality in what separates them from the general population. 
Appiah also suggests that conversations do not always have to lead to agreement; Tony 
Stark and Steve Rogers articulate this idea in Avengers: Age of Ultron (2015). Whilst Stark 
believes that creating a sentient artificial intelligence is an obvious next step in global 
protection, Rogers disagrees. The two get into an argument. They almost come to physical 
blows. Conversation, it seems, does not fix everything; in fact, a conversation that escalates 
to disagreement can be that which causes the expression of differences and conflict. It is not 
even as though one of them is irrational; both provide reasoned arguments for their 
positions, both agree on the underlying moral idea of protection, so Appiah’s idea of 
disregarding the irrational party does not hold. It is more than just a conversation that is a 
disagreement – it becomes a fight. Appiah does not suggest what to do if the conversation 
turns sour and common ground cannot be found; whilst Appiah uses an example of the two 
fisherman using a shared interest to find common ground, it remains an idealistic example, 
neglecting to mention that even the simple act of fishing can create arguments and 
disagreements, regarding sites, tackle, and methods. Stark and Rogers’ ethical positions are 
simply incompatible. What ultimately ends the argument is a third party; Thor pushes the 
two aside and decides on a course of action. Whilst how he came to his decision is perhaps 
dubious – he receives magic visions induced by a telepathic villain – his actions suggest an 
answer to how to deal with conversations that become arguments. The introduction of a 
third party, whether as mediator or to take charge, has the potential to provide a way 
forward, past a stalemate.  
The MCU also raises the point that even conversations that lead to agreement are not 
always a good thing. In The Incredible Hulk (2008), General Thaddeus Ross and Royal 
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Marines Commando Emil Blonsky find agreement on both a moral and ethical level. Both 
agree that the Hulk is dangerous and needs to be stopped to protect the lives and property 
of civilians. Both agree that aggressive force is a suitable way to accomplish this. Ross 
suggests and Blonsky agrees to take a variant of the serum that turned Bruce Banner into 
the Hulk in the first place. The two agree on everything, and can provide rational reasons for 
what they intend to do. The issue is that they are the film’s antagonists. That their 
conversation leads to agreement is not necessarily a positive thing; it ultimately ends badly 
for the pair of them.  
Ross and Blonsky are also an example of something else the MCU suggests repeatedly 
throughout the different films: there is still a bad guy. The films all have at least one 
antagonist, though often multiple. As Appiah suggests, there are opinions and attitudes that 
are wrong. Diversity for diversity’s sake is not appropriate. Variety is supposed to enable 
choice, not constrain it; “toleration requires a concept of the intolerable” (Appiah, 2006, p. 
144), after all. In Guardians of the Galaxy (2014), the primary antagonist intends to commit 
genocide; that, the film declares, is intolerable. The antagonist is allowed his opinion, up 
until he infringes negatively upon the lives of others.  The MCU and Appiah are on the same 
page:  “we don’t need to treat genocide or human rights abuses as just another part of the 
quaint diversity of the species” (Appiah, 2008a, p. 88).  
Obligations – Autonomy 
The MCU recognises many of the tensions that Appiah considers in his work around moral 
and ethical obligations and notions of autonomy. The films question the obligations of those 
who have more power than others do, asking whether, if you have the means to do 
something, are you obligated to put others above yourself. They too hold government and 
ruling authorities to high standards, and consider how much interference these authorities 
are allowed to have in an individual’s life. The autonomy of the individual and freedom to do 
as they please comes into question in the MCU as well; they consider the understanding of 
who should be considered irrational, and how they should be dealt with. 
A question that arises again and again throughout the MCU is about obligations. With great 
power comes great responsibility, after all. Are the superheroes of the MCU obligated to 
help people, to save lives, purely because they have the power to do so? Similar to Appiah’s 
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questioning of the ethical obligations of those in power, do the moral obligations of the 
superhero trump their individual ethical obligations? 
Tony Stark would say no. In Iron Man 2 (2010), Stark comes under governmental pressure to 
hand over the Iron Man technology that he has created. He faces two arguments as to why: 
on the one hand, it is an unknown and wild threat to the citizens of the United States of 
America; on the other, the government want to utilise the technology for the military, to be 
used in international conflicts. Stark does not care. He has enough economic, and social, 
capital to tell the panel that he is not even remotely interested in handing over one of his 
suits. The government could use the technology to end wars and save lives. However Stark 
sees the risk as being too great; he has no interest in letting the government have that level 
of power. He has seen first-hand what effect providing the military with high tech weapons 
can have: the Iron Man technology was developed because those high tech weapons had 
fallen into the hands of terrorists. Stark invokes his entitlement to autonomy, to the 
ownership of his personal possessions and intellectual property. He keeps the Iron Man 
armour for himself, though of course he only has this option because of his pre-established 
access to significant actionable agency. 
Steve Rogers, on the other hand, has a harder time balancing moral and ethical obligations. 
He loses everything to save the world; after being defrosted, Rogers joins up with the 
(secret) international defence agency SHIELD in an attempt to find a purpose for himself. 
Over the course of events in Captain America: the Winter Soldier (2014), Rogers’ childhood 
best friend, James Barnes, reappears. Barnes, presumed dead when he fell off a train in 
Captain America: the First Avenger (2011), initially comes into The Winter Soldier as an 
antagonist; having lost his memories and having been brainwashed by Nazi-affiliated agency 
HYDRA, Barnes had been turned into a living weapon used primarily for political 
assassinations. His primary mission in the film is to kill Steve Rogers. Understandably, this 
causes Rogers a fair amount of distress; he blames himself for Barnes’ apparent death and 
to have the hollow shell of his best friend trying to kill him is jarring. It would be hard to 
fault him for choosing partiality, to put trying to save his best friend above trying to save the 
world. Yet he does not. Rogers stays on task, systematically bringing down the flying 
warships – helicarriers – that threaten the lives of millions of people worldwide. He 
physically goes through Barnes to do so, after trying to talk it out does not work. It is only 
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once he has ensured that the final helicarrier will be destroyed, that Rogers takes off his 
mask. He stands aboard the doomed warship, facing his amnesiac best friend, and gives up; 
he allows Barnes to attack him, getting beaten bloody without fighting back. The Captain 
and his best friend go down with that ship, crashing into the Potomac River. Whilst he 
ultimately survives – Barnes is slowly regaining his memories and pulls Rogers, unconscious, 
from the river – Rogers, even in such a situation, chose to put his moral obligations above 
his ethical obligations. What is important in this idea to this thesis in particular is that Rogers 
chose to make that decision for himself.  
As previously discussed, Appiah (2006) uses the story of a drowning child to question the 
obligations of the individual to save that child. If you have the power to save the child, 
should you, even if it would ruin your suit? Are you obligated to? The MCU uses examples 
that have arguably higher stakes; more lives at risk, more sacrifice required. The general 
premise remains the same however. There is no easy answer, the MCU agrees. It instead 
suggests the answer is situation-dependent. Whilst Tony Stark may not willingly give his 
technology over to the government, he is not beyond sacrificing something for the greater 
good. At the end of The Avengers (2012), Stark chooses to make the sacrifice play. He grabs 
a hold of a missile the government had launched at New York City – to destroy an invading 
alien army – and forces it into the sky, up into the wormhole that had been opened over the 
city to allow the invasion to occur. He recognises that there is a distinct possibility that he 
will not make it back to Earth; the missile may explode, or the wormhole might close, 
trapping him inside. “I’ve seen the footage,” Steve Rogers says to Stark earlier in the film. 
“The only thing you really fight for is yourself. You’re not the guy to make the sacrifice play, 
to lay down on a wire and let the other guy crawl over you.” Stark proves him wrong; he 
knows the consequences, and yet he still flies into space. His moral obligations in this 
instance were stronger than his ethical obligations. Whilst Stark survives, falling unconscious 
back through the wormhole and slowed in his descent by his teammate, the Hulk, what is 
important is that he was allowed to make that choice, that he had the freedom to decide 
which set of obligations to prioritise in different situations. Stark’s actions suggest that we 
should carefully consider the potential outcomes, both positive and negative, of a situation 
before being forced to make that decision. We are not obligated to always put the moral 
above the ethical, nor are we expected to always put the ethical above the moral. 
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In addition to this, the MCU suggests that the ability to prioritise either ethical or moral 
obligations should not be impacted by governments or ruling authorities. Ant-Man (2015) 
begins with a scene set a few decades before the events of the film take place. In this scene, 
Hank Pym stands before three high-ranking SHIELD officials – including two of its founders – 
and angrily tells them that he will not hand over the his research, or the resulting Pym 
Particle. The Pym Particle is the key to the Ant-Man technology; a particle that is used to 
create the Ant-Man suit which enables its wearer to shrink to the size of an ant, complete 
with all of an ant’s strength. SHIELD wants to weaponize the particle. In an echo of Tony 
Stark’s refusal to give the military his Iron Man armour, Pym verbally acknowledges the 
danger that his research poses and is adamant that it will never be used. Whilst one of the 
SHIELD officials becomes aggressive, threatening to take the research regardless of Pym’s 
fears, another steps in and assures everyone that they will not take from Pym that which is 
not freely given. SHIELD is not the government, but it is a ruling authority. It could take the 
research by force if it wanted to. Nonetheless, Pym’s autonomy is respected. He is given the 
space to make a decision as to what he is obligated to do – or not do. 
SHIELD does not always show such respect for the individual, however. In Captain America: 
the Winter Soldier (2014), SHIELD puts three helicarriers into the sky, each one set to target 
and kill millions of people worldwide. These people are a threat, SHIELD argues. Some of 
them will become a threat in the future. The helicarriers are about protecting the security 
and freedom of the world. As mentioned above, Steve Rogers disagrees. He sets out to 
destroy the helicarriers before they can be launched; in turn, SHIELD sends out its best 
agents to bring him back and put him in a cell. With some help, Rogers gets into the 
communications room of the helicarrier base and gets his hands on the announcement 
system:  
Attention all SHIELD agents, this is Steve Rogers. You’ve heard a lot about me 
over the last few days. Some of you were even ordered to hunt me down. But I 
think it’s time to tell the truth. SHIELD is not what we thought it was. It’s been 
taken over by HYDRA. Alexander Pierce is their leader. The STRIKE and Insight 
crew are HYDRA as well. I don’t know how many more, but I know they’re in the 
building. They could be standing right next to you. They almost have what they 
want. Absolute control. They shot Nick Fury. And it won’t end there. If you 
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launch those helicarriers today, HYDRA will be able to kill anyone that stands in 
their way. Unless we stop them. I know I’m asking a lot. But the price of freedom 
is high. It always has been. And it’s a price I’m willing to pay. And if I’m the only 
one, then so be it. But I’m willing to bet I’m not. 
Rogers issues a call to arms. The ruling authority has over stepped its bounds. As Appiah’s 
liberal tradition would suggest, Rogers intends to remove them from power by any means 
necessary. The film – and the United States’ second amendment – supports him in this, with 
many of the other SHIELD agents coming to his aid. The citizens have spoken. The corrupt 
government had to go. 
The ruling authority is answerable to the autonomous individual in the MCU; Appiah’s work 
agrees with this prioritisation of the autonomy of the rational individual. However, what if 
the individual is not rational? Appiah’s work implies that we either are, or should try our 
best to be, rational; Iron Man 2 (2010) indicates that we are not rational all the time, that 
we make bad decisions. Should the government step in if this is the case? Is it obligated to, 
for our own protection? In the film, Tony Stark hosts his own birthday party; he gets drunk 
and ends up in a fight with his best friend, the pair of them in different versions of the Iron 
Man armour. Stark’s living room is destroyed and his guests are left fearing for their lives. 
Stark’s best friend, James Rhodes, is a military officer. His superiors had requested that he 
bring them one of the Iron Man suits; if Stark would not hand one over to them, then they 
would take one from him. Rhodes, as a proxy for the ruling authority, takes Stark down – he 
is not drunk – and takes off in the suit. He gives it to his superiors the next day. On the 
surface, it seems like a justifiable case of the ruling authority intervening in the life of a 
citizen for his own protection, and for the protection of those around him. However, the 
film criticises Rhodes for his actions. He is ultimately proven to be in the wrong, when the 
military uses the technology to create a corps of suits controlled by the film’s antagonist. 
The film shows a distrust of the ruling authority – both in this instance and in the instance 
mentioned earlier wherein Stark refused to hand over his technology – and the actions of 
the citizen are justified. The MCU suggests that the ruling authority has no excuse for 
interfering in the autonomous lives of its citizens, regardless of whether they are deemed to 
be rational or otherwise. Appiah’s notion of an ideal democratic system is rejected, seen as 
unrealistic and unobtainable. The MCU does agree with Appiah in his quote from James 
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Madison, however. They agree that “you must first enable a government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself” (Appiah, 2005, p. 165). 
In the example mentioned above, Rhodes judges Stark as irrational and so incapable of 
correctly exercising his entitlement to autonomy. Appiah suggests that this is not 
unwarranted; that “if we are coercing people who are unreasonable, we have no obligation 
to provide justifications that satisfy them. We must merely offer reasons that they would 
accept if they were reasonable” (Appiah, 2005, p. 93). This raises the question, then, of who 
gets to decide whether or not someone is unreasonable. Does that decision fall to Rhodes? 
In his position as a proxy of the ruling authority? In his position as Stark’s best friend? The 
film suggests that it does not matter that, in that moment, at that party, that Stark was 
unreasonable. What the film suggests is that Rhodes should have followed the decisions 
that Stark made when he was reasonable. What is considered reasonable falls to the 
individual who the decision affects.  
What if both parties are reasonable, and neither are under the influence of alcohol, as Stark 
was? In Avengers: Age of Ultron (2015), both Stark and Steve Rogers are of sound mind. 
They both are capable of providing rational arguments as to why the sentient artificial 
intelligence Ultron should – or should not – be created. Whose argument gets priority? It is 
a higher stakes version of Appiah’s Jehovah’s Witness situation. Is the Jehovah’s Witness 
irrational, for believing that a blood transfusion leads to damnation? What makes someone 
qualified to decide that? From their perspective, it is a rational belief. The same can be said 
for Stark and Rogers.  
It is not as simple as Appiah may suggest, where the individual should be allowed to make 
whichever decision they choose to so long as it does not impact on the autonomy of 
another individual (Appiah, 2008a). The tension between Stark and Rogers highlights the 
fact that there are very few, if any, decisions that affect only one person. Stark sees Ultron 
as protection for the world; Rogers sees Ultron as a threat to the world. It is not just an 
argument that affects the two of them, or even just the Avengers team. It is a decision with 
global consequences.  
The MCU brings that dilemma down to a more personal level as well. The end of Captain 
America: the First Avenger (2011), set in World War II, puts Steve Rogers in the cockpit of a 
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plane that is carrying a bomb. He is over arctic waters when he makes the decision to put 
the plane in the water, long before it has a chance to crash into a populated city. Over the 
radio, he is talking to the love of his life; she tries to convince him to wait, to give them a 
chance to find him a safe landing site. “There’s not enough time,” Rogers replies, “This 
thing’s moving too fast and it’s heading for New York. I gotta put her in the water.” One 
could argue that Rogers is not, in that moment, reasonable. His best and oldest friend had 
died a few days earlier; he is grieving. Yet the decision remains with him. The film respects 
his autonomy. He is not the only one who is affected by the decision, however. There are 
people who care about him, who will be devastated at his loss. They are, in fact, devastated 
at losing him; as far as everyone is aware, he died when the plane crashed in the arctic. It is 
not until the film’s final scene, set in the present day and played after the credits, that the 
audience discovers that he survived the crash, frozen in ice for seventy years. If it is, as 
Appiah suggests, the cosmopolitan’s obligation to step in because “the wrong someone is 
doing harms others” (2005, p. 93), then someone should have stopped Rogers. Appiah 
suggests that if an individual chooses to do a wrong that only affects them, then they should 
be free to do so. Is it possible to do a wrong that only affects one person, the MCU asks in 
return. Even if it is not a global threat, there are still people who will be affected by the 
decisions of any given individual. Appiah’s cosmopolitan should be stepping in more often 
than they do not. Rogers’ situation suggests that even if this is the case, even if he should be 
stopped, he is also entitled to reject any intervention. He may know that his decision will 
negatively affect others, but it is his prerogative to make that decision. 
If there are actions that an individual can undertake that only affects them, then Appiah 
suggests that “the right way to express my concern for [them] is not to force [them] to do 
the right thing, but to try to persuade [them they] are mistaken” (2008a, p. 93). The MCU 
proposes that the idea of persuasion can also be useful when the decision affects other as 
well. In Captain America: the Winter Soldier (2014), Steve Rogers and Nick Fury get into an 
argument when Fury reveals SHIELD’s plan to launch the three helicarriers. Fury is a firm 
believer that using the helicarriers is a necessary course of action; “These new long range 
precision guns can eliminate a thousand hostiles a minute. The satellites can read a 
terrorist’s DNA before he steps outside his spider hole. We’re gonna neutralize a lot of 
threats before they even happen,” Fury advocates. Rogers is taken aback. “I thought the 
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punishment usually came after the crime,” he says, and Fury brushes him off. Both of them 
are working towards the same goal; they both want to protect people. “When we disagree, 
it won’t always be because one of us just doesn’t understand the value that’s at stake,” 
Appiah (2006, p. 59) writes. The film takes Rogers’ side in this argument; he is ultimately 
able to persuade Fury that he is wrong. The film rejects the contemporary attitude towards 
fear and risk – the film has echoes of whistle blowing and extensive public surveillance, and 
it brings to mind public figures such as Edward Snowden, for example – and promotes the 
classical liberal values that Rogers represents. Both Fury and Rogers find themselves 
obligated to protect people, and the film suggests an appropriate way for them to do this.  
Narratives 
The notion that collective identities are a central provider of frameworks with which to 
construct an individual identity is reflected in the MCU through the Avengers team. The 
Avengers come together because of what they share; a common goal and a way to achieve 
that goal that others do not have. That shared identity encourages different ways of being. 
The team’s collective strength comes from their individual differences; they all bring 
something unique to the table. As Appiah (2005) indicates with the constructions of race 
and gender – that there is not just one way to be black or white, male or female – there is 
not just one way to be an Avenger. The collective identity gives way to individual 
interpretations of that identity. In an instance of strategic essentialism, the collective 
identity can then be drawn on when necessary; the differences can in turn make that 
collective identity stronger, with each individual bringing with them different strengths that 
can be utilised in the project of the collective. 
The collective identity can also cause issues, as the MCU demonstrates in Thor (2011). 
Thor’s brother Loki discovers that he is, essentially, a stolen child early in the films; he is 
unable to put aside his assumptions of what it means to be from Jötunheim, despite having 
been raised in Asgard. He instinctively makes judgements on the values and traditions of the 
Jötunn’s, and finds it difficult to separate his own identity from that collective identity. Even 
though he has grown up with an Asgardian identity, he begins to be seen – both by others 
and by himself – with traits he associates with Jötunheim. He is not allowed the autonomy 
to choose which identity scripts he takes up; they are instead forced onto him. This is at 
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odds with Appiah’s suggestion that individuals are able to choose which identity scripts 
define them. There are some aspects of our identities that are not so easily set aside.  
This idea is shown over and over throughout the MCU. In Captain America: the First Avenger 
(2011), the idea that identity scripts can be imposed upon a person without their input is 
highlighted in a number of different ways. Steve Rogers begins the film as a sickly young 
man, rejected time and again from war enlistment booths despite his determination. His 
rejection is not unfounded; it would indeed be unwise to send someone with such a list of 
ailments to fight on the front lines. Rogers is however offered a position in a research 
project and whilst he is not the best soldier in the project, he is ultimately the one chosen to 
go through the procedure to receive the super-soldier serum. Throughout the selection 
process, few people are convinced of Rogers’ eligibility as a candidate. As with Loki, Rogers 
is not given the autonomy to choose an identity script for himself; he cannot prevent others 
from inflicting a particular way of being onto him.  
Whilst Appiah insists that there is not just one way to be male or female, Iron Man 2 (2010) 
and The Avengers (2012) suggest that that is not something that is often explicitly realised 
when interacting with other people. Natasha Romanoff uses popular assumptions of what it 
means to be female to her advantage in both these films; she emphasises her femininity, 
often taking on the damsel in distress role to distract her opponents and causing them to 
underestimate her abilities. Whilst Romanoff is an example of Appiah’s belief that there is 
not just one way to be female, showing a multiplicity of identity options throughout the 
films, the responses she receives from others suggests that varied identity scripts within a 
collective identity are often ignored or overlooked. The individual’s autonomy to decide 
which identity scripts they will use to shape their life is disregarded in favour of the 
collective identity; whilst the individual may endeavour to construct their identity in a 
certain way, outside factors will influence and at times impede decisions that the individual 
makes. Concepts and practices may be made available to the individual to choose from 
(Appiah, 1994), but that does not guarantee that those choices will be recognised.  
Appiah moves his discussion away from collective identities as providers of identity scripts 
to the place of fictional narratives as providers of identity scripts. The MCU itself is an 
example of a set of fictional narratives wherein varied identity scripts can be discovered. 
Both The Avengers (2012) and Guardians of the Galaxy (2014) rely on the combination of a 
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range of identities to fulfil the requirements of their plots. Whilst the individual character 
films endeavour to provide a diverse range of characters, it is these team films that use that 
diversity to drive the plot forward. Importantly, it is the team films – The Avengers (2012) 
and Avengers: Age of Ultron (2015) in particular – that drew the biggest crowds to theatres 
(Mojo, 2015b); the diverse range of characters and the identity scripts that they bring with 
them are part of what makes these particular films so successful. 
This idea of diverse options also ties into the emphasis Appiah places upon fictional 
narratives rather than on more traditional philosophical thought experiments. Tony Stark 
provides perhaps the best articulation of this idea. In The Avengers (2012), Steve Rogers 
accuses Stark of not being the “guy to make the sacrifice play, to lay down on a wire and let 
the other guy crawl over you.” Rogers implies that there are only two options: to lay down 
on the wire, or to not. He is working with the same strict parameters as the thought 
experiments. Stark pushes past those parameters; “I think I would just cut the wire,” he 
replies. Rogers presents the thought experiment; Stark rejects it and suggests that reality is 
not quite so simple. The fictional narrative remains open to other options. 
The Avengers (2012) celebrates diversity of options at the film’s close, as well. The film 
shows a news story which covered the destruction of New York City that the Avengers had, 
in part, caused; it provides various responses, varied scripts, from the city’s citizens. Some of 
the citizens are outraged; these so-called superheroes had just destroyed a large part of 
their city, their homes and livelihoods. Others are grateful for their new heroes. The film 
presents varied responses to the event. The MCU as a whole, however, suggests that whilst 
people as individuals can react however they like, the Avengers will always reconvene in the 
face of a threat. They will always engage in the cosmopolitan response when they need to, 
regardless of what people think of them; an example of Appiah’s idealised elite individuals 
who feel a sense of duty to act in a cosmopolitan fashion for the common good. When 
Natasha Romanoff sits in front of a national security committee at the end of Captain 
America: the Winter Soldier (2014), the committee questions why she should not be 
arrested for her part in the destruction of the three helicarriers.  
“You’re not gonna put me in a prison,” she replies. “You’re not gonna put any of 
us in a prison. You know why?” 
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“Do enlighten us.” 
“Because you need us. Yes, the world is a vulnerable place, and yes, we helped 
make it that way. But we’re also the ones best qualified to defend it. So if you 
want to arrest me, arrest me. You’ll know where to find me.” 
The Avengers are not always on active duty; they spend most of their time apart. Romanoff 
makes clear that, despite what everyone else may think of them, they will be there – 
together – when they are needed. 
That notion of coming together in the face of a crisis sits at the heart of both The Avengers 
(2012) and Avengers: Age of Ultron (2015). These films take the characters from the 
individual films and suggests that it is the diversity of those characters that make them 
stronger when they come together. The internal diversity of the films also allows for wider 
audience appeal; Appiah suggests that the Hollywood blockbuster is, by necessity, a 
cosmopolitan film because it is influenced by global tastes and trends and, as such, has a 
global appeal. The MCU demonstrates this; The Avengers (2012) and Avengers: Age of 
Ultron (2015) have been more successful at the box office than any of the individual 
character films, both within the United States and globally (Mojo, 2015b). The team films 
offer a wider range of identity scripts than the character films and, as such, reach a wider 
audience. There is a stronger response to this internal diversity; to the team that comes 
together in the face of a crisis, to the narrative that allows for varied ways of being. 
It is important to remember, however, that not every country saw the same cut of some of 
the films. This is not necessarily a negative thing; as is encouraged with a partial 
cosmopolitanism, local tastes were at times put above global tastes. Iron Man 3 (2013) 
embraced the idea of locally-focused content, with the Chinese release of the film showing 
an extra four minutes of footage that was not seen in any other release. The extra footage 
featured extra characters with prominent Chinese actors, including Fan Bingbing and Wan 
Xueqi, tasked with undertaking life-saving surgery on Tony Stark. Along with changing the 
primary antagonist from the Chinese stereotype that is found in the comic book source 
material that was in every release of the film, providing the extra footage meant that the 
film saw more than $121 (US) million at the Chinese box office. To put this number in 
context, South Korea had the next highest box office taking (outside the USA) at $64 million, 
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just over half the Chinese gross takings, and the United Kingdom after that with just over 
$57 million (Mojo, 2015a). The idea of locally-focused content thus becomes important for 
international releases, and suggests that audiences have a stronger response when there is 
something in a fictional narrative that they can relate to on a personal, rather than just a 
universal, level. 
Captain America: the Winter Soldier (2014) took this idea and applied it on a broader scale. 
At the beginning of the film, Steve Rogers is shown with a list of things to look into; 
important historical moments, objects, and movements that he will have missed while he 
was frozen in the arctic. Different countries saw different lists. The film was tailored to 
where it was being shown. The United States release showed things such as “Steve Jobs” 
and “Berlin Wall (Up and Down)”. In Russia, the list had “Yuri Gagarin” and “Moscow doesn’t 
believe in tears”. The United Kingdom release had “The Beatles” and “World Cup Final 
(1966)”. The Australian list suggests Rogers looks into “Steve Irwin” and “Tim Tams”. Mexico 
saw “Chilean Miners” and “Octavio Paz (Nobel Winner)”. South Korea, Italy, France, Spain, 
and Brazil all have other variations. The list features subtle changes, but is intended to 
reflect what each audience believes is important and significant to their country’s social 
history. Even though the lead character is called Captain America, the film shows an 
understanding of the global nature of the Hollywood blockbuster, and actively 
demonstrates the notion of putting the local before the universal. This is an example of 
glocalization; creating a connection at a local level so as to encourage the consumption of 
global ideas. Treating people equally, the film – and the MCU – suggests, does not always 
necessarily mean treating them the same. 
The next section will place these themes and the ideas that they contain in the social 
context that they emerge from. It then addresses the implications of this particular model of 
cosmopolitanism, and begins to introduce the limitations of the MCU’s reactive 
cosmopolitanism. 
 
Context 
The MCU implicitly deals with the concern with difference from a different angle than 
Appiah: the perspective and position of pop-culture. It does this with a focus on emotionally 
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driven characters and narratives, which resonates with the counter-Enlightenment ideas of 
Romanticism. Faced with threats from World War II era Nazi Germany to alien invasions to 
artificial intelligence, the MCU questions how we can best organise our lives together so as 
to peacefully co-inhabit this planet. The MCU narratives do not want to subsume diversity; 
they often explicitly indicate that difference is an unavoidable facet of human existence and 
of existence more generally, and that at times difference can seem insurmountable. The 
MCU narratives are concerned with how we can compensate for this difference in a broader 
social environment.  
It is in response to an external threat that the MCU asks these questions. The resulting 
cosmopolitanism of the MCU is reactionary, something that can only exist as a response. It 
becomes an act as opposed to a continuous state of existence; within the narratives of the 
MCU the cosmopolitan act is undertaken as a reaction to imminent external physical 
threats. There is little consideration of how to respond to internal threats and oppressive 
social structures; notions of hegemony are all but ignored in the narratives – the narratives 
do not question, for example, that the apparent brightest scientists are all white and 
typically men – which positions the cosmopolitanism of the MCU as an unrealistic and 
underdeveloped model. The cosmopolitanism offered by the MCU would be a stronger 
model if it were able to relate its participatory model to internal threats as well as external 
threats, addressing the issues of everyday differences, internal inequity, and discriminatory 
social institutions.   
The MCU does have the benefit of a wide and varied audience. It is highly accessible, with 
millions of people having watched the various theatrical instalments into the series. 
Through simple and easy to understand ideas and thematic tropes, the films are able to 
disseminate a model of cosmopolitanism to a broad audience. This simplification of ideas, 
however, has the disadvantage of being at times too basic, too under-theorised. The films of 
the MCU suffer theoretically from the perception of their position as fantasy, as escapist 
narratives that have little impact on reality. They are created as entertainment, rather than 
as a philosophical consideration of how we can live alongside one another, thus it can be 
considered that the implicit model of cosmopolitanism within the films is unrecognisable on 
an explicit level to most viewers. While many viewers may understand the basic concepts 
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that are being portrayed, there is no guarantee that they would or could piece them 
together as an understanding of the larger concept of cosmopolitanism.  
The larger concept of cosmopolitanism that the MCU suggests is a reactive cosmopolitanism 
that is undertaken by a group, by a collective, as opposed to one that is undertaken by an 
individual. The individual, reacting in the face of an external threat, joins forces with other 
individuals; this is done not by setting aside any differences that may exist, but by working 
through those differences to create a stronger whole. It is a collective of individuals, as 
opposed to Appiah’s individuals of the universal. For the MCU, differences are not able to be 
taken off, nor should we want them to be; it is our differences that make us stronger and we 
are at our best when we bring our differences with us to the table rather than leaving them 
at the door. This perspective is reminiscent of Anderson’s (2004) ‘cosmopolitan canopy’ in 
his discussion of Philadelphia’s Reading Terminal Market, where it is through our differences 
that we can both make up for one another’s shortcomings and find ways to complement 
each other. Cosmopolitanism, for the MCU, is a collective response, and we should not and 
do not need to ignore our differences to form that collective.  
The collective cosmopolitanism of the MCU is driven by the civilian (civil society, the ‘third 
estate’) rather than by the nation-state. It is the civilian that creates the spaces to cultivate 
and ensure that there is space for a cosmopolitan attitude to flourish; the nation-state is 
often kept at arm’s length in the films, treated as a repressive and constrictive force to be 
sceptical of. For the MCU, a cosmopolitan state is not necessarily the goal, instead favouring 
the notion of cosmopolitan acts, of a society wherein cosmopolitan responses to events are 
possible. As such, it is easy to assume that the MCU takes a grass roots approach to agency; 
however this is not the case. As with Appiah, there is an assumption of an inherent agency 
within each individual; it is the extent to which that agency can be actioned that is where 
the inequality lies. The majority of civilians within the films are unwitting bystanders, 
waiting for a collection of costumed superheroes to save them. It is the superheroes and 
espionage experts – the elite, and those who are made so – that are capable of effectively 
expressing and utilising their agency.  
For these heroes and experts, the participation in cosmopolitan acts is an expression of an 
agency that is already there. Where Appiah suggests giving up agency in a reductive 
approach, the MCU declares that we elevate our agency as an active, rather than passive, 
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collective response. It is not presumed that a significant level of actionable agency is a 
normal state of existence, and we need to be proactive in expressing it. It is, however, not a 
bottom up approach. The characters with any significant actionable agency are guaranteed 
this agency regardless of whether they are saving the world; Tony Stark inherited his 
father’s multibillion dollar company and Thor is the crown prince of Asgard. It is those who 
already possess significant actionable agency that are able to grant the possibility of agency 
to others, to the civilians that need saving; even Steve Rogers has his ability to utilise his 
agency granted to him by top tier scientists. The MCU suggests that we all have agency, 
however we need someone else to give us the space to express it; if it is given, then the 
MCU suggests that it is done so as a response to a threat – Captain America was created to 
fight off armies in World War II, for instance. It is only those in power that have the ability to 
elevate those without power, done so through collective cosmopolitan responsive acts. In 
this focus on the cosmopolitan collective, the MCU also misses the importance of the 
cosmopolitan individual; it neglects a consideration of how the individual is best to 
construct an ethical life without the external threat required to bring together the 
collective.   
The next section of this thesis will closely examine the limitations of the models of 
cosmopolitanism put forward by Appiah and the MCU. It will argue as to why they are 
insufficient models in and of themselves, indicating that a reimaging is required to approach 
the question of how it is that we can best live together with our various differences.  
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Insufficient Models of Cosmopolitanism 
Having considered the competing models of partial cosmopolitanism presented by Appiah 
and the MCU, I believe that whilst they both offer sound components, they are both overall 
insufficient approaches as to how we can best live together whilst maintaining some level of 
our various, and at times incompatible, differences. Appiah’s ethical model and the MCU’s 
reactive model are different in many ways, however they suffer from similar flaws. This 
section will argue first that they are both largely theoretical models and as such are difficult 
to realise, and second, that they both have the potential to be adversely manipulated, as 
they rely heavily on the commitment and intentions of those who have high social and/or 
economic capital and high levels of actionable agency. 
Both models are limited in their capacity to be engaged with as anything other than 
theoretical models. Appiah’s model may be engaged with, as an academic text, by policy 
and law makers, and the MCU’s model may be recognised by its broad audience, though 
neither is capable of bringing into being the cosmopolitan state or reaction that they are 
arguing for. There are two reasons for this: firstly, that the models of cosmopolitanism that 
both present are largely inaccessible to the average person, and secondly, that their 
audiences either cannot, or simply will not, make best use of the material that they are 
presented with. 
These models of cosmopolitanism are largely inaccessible to the average person because 
they are, at their centre, top-down elitist models. Appiah’s ethical model relies heavily on 
the nation-state government; it is the essential provider and protector of space within which 
the individual can perform a cosmopolitan identity. He argues that a global government 
cannot hope to respond to localised needs efficiently, placing much more emphasis on the 
integral role of the nation-state in the pursuit of a cosmopolitan state. His model is also one 
that requires individuals to have high levels of actionable agency to participate. Appiah’s 
work follows an essentialist conception of agency, wherein every individual automatically 
possess agency on the virtue of being biologically human; it is not the case that some 
individuals have agency and others have none, it is that some individuals have more limits 
on how they can apply their agency than others. Appiah argues that it is those who have 
more freedom with their agency that need to consider how they can best utilise that agency 
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for the benefit of others, thus making the cosmopolitan act the act of only those who can 
realistically operate and limit their own agency.  
The reactive model presented by the MCU also suffers from being a top-down model. Whilst 
Appiah suggests that individual agency needs to be limited for the ‘greater good,’ the MCU 
suggests a cosmopolitan act is an expression of individual agency, which is facilitated by high 
levels of capital. The Avengers team, who engage in the cosmopolitan reactive acts, is made 
up of individuals with high levels of capital; Tony Stark, for instance, has inherited his 
father’s multibillion dollar company, and Thor is the crown prince of Asgard. The team 
members who have not been born into their positions have instead had their agency and 
social capital elevated by those with significant levels of their own; the sickly Steve Rogers 
becomes the strong Captain America on the whim of an eminent World War II scientist, for 
example, and it is only through this elevation that he is able to engage in cosmopolitan acts. 
A further instance of the reactive cosmopolitanism of the MCU being inaccessible to the 
average person is that any engagement with cosmopolitan acts requires there first to be a 
physical threat. The collective that comes together does so as a reaction to a threat, and 
without that threat, there is no incentive to participate in the cosmopolitan collective that 
the MCU’s model expounds.  
The second reason that the models of cosmopolitanism that Appiah and the MCU suggest 
remain theoretical is the limitations that emerge out of their audiences. Appiah’s audience, 
whether intended or otherwise, largely consists of other academics; they are often working 
within universities, though his work may branch to those in policy and law making. There is 
a certain level of contradiction in Appiah’s application to public policy; he focuses on the 
universal individual, and how the individual can live a suitable ethical life, as opposed to a 
collective of individuals, which policy and law is constructed to best consider. Appiah, both 
in the academy and with those involved in policy, finds an audience that consists of people 
who already have access to the high levels of actionable agency that his model of 
cosmopolitanism requires. His audience has agency that they can realistically limit for the 
benefit of others without assured extensive detrimental effect to themselves. That Appiah’s 
model of cosmopolitanism finds an audience for those who are in the best position to 
participate in his ethical cosmopolitanism is beneficial, however Appiah’s work provides 
little incentive for as to why that audience would want to participate. He appeals to the 
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notion of rationality and the idea of progress, though a call to do what is considered rational 
is, alone, an insufficient argument or incentive. Consider that the medical community can 
classify those who, whilst alive, would wish to donate an organ to a stranger as 
‘pathological’ (Henderson et al., 2003): they do not get something from the deal, therefore 
they have no rational reason to put their own life at risk. The same argument could be 
constructed for Appiah’s model of cosmopolitanism; if this particular model of 
cosmopolitanism requires the reduction of agency to function, the lack of incentive beyond 
the ‘greater good’ is inadequate. 
Conversely, the audience for the MCU’s reactive model of cosmopolitanism is broad. The 
films appeal to a wide range of social groups, with millions of viewers worldwide. Through 
simple and easy to understand ideas and thematic tropes, the films are able to disseminate 
a model of cosmopolitanism to their audience. This simplification of ideas, however, has the 
disadvantage of being at times too basic and too under-theorised. The films of the MCU 
suffer theoretically from the perception of their position as fantasy, as escapist narratives 
that have little impact on reality. They are created for a broad global audience as 
entertainment, rather than as a philosophical consideration of how we can live alongside 
one another; it can thus be considered that the implicit model of cosmopolitanism within 
the films is unrecognisable to viewers. While many viewers may understand the basic 
concepts that are being portrayed, there is no guarantee that they would or could piece 
them together as an understanding of the larger concept of cosmopolitanism. The audience 
of the MCU are also, by and large, not the individuals who have the capital and actionable 
agency necessary to participate in the cosmopolitan reactive act. They are not the 
superheroes but the unwitting bystanders, those waiting for someone to save them. In the 
narratives of the MCU, there are few spaces wherein the average person can be more than 
just a victim running from the threat; the audience is shown the spirit of cosmopolitanism, 
yet are not provided with a way of acting on it.  
The second limitation of these two models of cosmopolitanism is that, beyond being difficult 
to realise and thus remaining largely theoretical, Appiah’s ethical model and the MCU’s 
reactive model also suffer from a potential to be oppressive. These models are not 
necessarily going to be oppressive – it is often the people who execute the idea, not the 
idea itself, which is the largest problem – however they are structured in a way that could 
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be adversely manipulated against notions of social justice and equity. The particular aspects 
of these structures that could be problematic are their rigid set of ideologies for existence, 
and the position of both models as implicating cosmopolitanism as the act of people with 
significant levels of power.  
Appiah’s model rests on the premise of “universality plus difference” (Appiah, 2008a, p. 92, 
emphasis added). This places universality before difference: commonalities are more 
important than differences and should always be put first even, it is implied, if that it is at 
the expense of difference. The suggestion underlying this idea is that we can downplay our 
differences, that we can actually make them less important than our similarities. An 
argument can also be made – as it is by the reactive cosmopolitanism of the MCU – that 
solutions to problems are better found through differences, rather than in spite of them. By 
reducing difference to a strictly secondary position, the argument for a universal that 
downplays cultural and social diversity can potentially be made stronger. The universality of 
Appiah’s model is also reliant on a common moral code; it suggests that everyone shares a 
moral position and shares opinions on what is considered Right and Wrong. The belief in a 
strict common moral code, which prizes universality, can neglect and reject important 
cultural and social differences, though it can also work to discard those differences that 
actively work against the greater good.  
The MCU’s model of cosmopolitanism also suffers from a strict set of ideologies, though one 
cause for this is the inherent framework of a Hollywood action blockbuster, and another 
that popular culture is often just a reflection of popular contemporary social attitudes. The 
narratives of the MCU have a clear notion of what is morally right and what is morally 
wrong; there is always a hero and a villain, and the audience has a clear understanding of 
which is which. Even when it is unclear who is the villain, audiences are always sure of who 
is the hero, and always sure of who they are supposed to be cheering for. It is the hero 
characters who set the moral tone of the films, and thus the moral tone that propels the 
reactive cosmopolitan acts. Once the morality of the films is displayed, then the heroes of 
the MCU – the characters who are the ones capable of participating in the cosmopolitan 
acts – enforce this morality through the use of violence. As superhero comic books had 
relied on providing a reality where Good triumphs over Evil during World War II, the films 
also fit the same pattern; the hero is guaranteed to win the fight. Again, largely a by-product 
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of the medium, the use of violence legitimates one particular set of ideologies and the 
model of cosmopolitanism that the MCU puts forward is thus not only one that relies on a 
physical threat to exist, but one that also relies on physical violence as a response as well.  
Whilst both models of cosmopolitanism have strict sets of ideologies, they also both suggest 
that it is the people who have significant levels of power that are able to engage with a 
cosmopolitan position. Appiah’s model, as indicated above, relies heavily on nation-state 
governments. It is these governments who are tasked with providing and protecting spaces 
wherein a cosmopolitan identity can be engaged with. There is an understanding in Appiah’s 
model that the nation-state government will be democratic, and be an ideal democratic 
government that is not corrupt nor disproportionately favours any particular faction of 
society; the democratic government would service its citizens first whilst still 
accommodating the global, and given the shared moral code, would be able to function 
appropriately. The issue here is that it is an ideal democratic government system where, 
even assuming that a democratic system is truly the best option, the reality is not always 
going to meet the same standards. Human error is going to play a part. Beyond the notion of 
the nation-state government, Appiah’s model also implicates its audience – academics and 
policy makers – as the ones with the power to make changes towards a more cosmopolitan 
environment. As a reduction in one’s own agency is a necessary requirement of this model, 
it can be argued that those in power would be more likely to participate if they got 
something in return for this reduction; this can lead to adverse manipulation of this model, 
increasing inequality as opposed to reducing it. 
The model of cosmopolitanism suggested by the MCU has a particularly visible example of 
adverse manipulation by those who are in the best position to create a cosmopolitan 
environment. The films – Avengers: Age of Ultron (2015) in particular – show that the 
superheroes themselves can be irresponsible with their substantial power; they are often 
the cause of the problems that plague the general population, whether that be directly or 
indirectly. As the reactive model that the MCU suggests is only really accessible to those 
individuals with existing actionable agency and capital, it becomes problematic when those 
individuals are consistently creating and solving problems that they themselves are the 
cause of. Beyond this, the Avengers team itself – the ones who directly engage in the 
reactive cosmopolitan acts in the films – is a team that is created by those with extremely 
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high levels of capital and actionable agency; the secretive defence agency SHIELD brings 
them together, initially encouraged by the World Security Council. Even with all the power 
that each of the team members has individually, they do not come together of their own 
accord. The MCU suggests that even superheroes can be pushed and manipulated into 
playing along with an alternative agenda.  
The competing models presented by Appiah and the MCU share similar flaws. On account of 
their inaccessibility to the average person and the lack of incentive for those who can 
participate to participate, the models both remain theoretical, difficult to bring into reality. 
Their strict set of ideologies and their reliance on, and restriction to, those with significant 
levels of power also suggest a structure that has the potential to be oppressive, with neither 
model suggesting a way to hold those in power accountable. As such, I believe that the 
ethical model of Appiah and the reactive model of the MCU are both insufficient approaches 
as to how it is that we can best live together with our various, and at times incompatible, 
differences. Instead, I argue that a reimagining is needed; an alternative model of 
cosmopolitanism that synthesises and builds upon the sound components of these two 
models. This alternative model will be presented in the next section. 
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A Model of Situational Cosmopolitanism 
The model of cosmopolitanism that I propose, as an alternative to Appiah’s ethical model 
and the MCU’s reactive model, is a model of situational cosmopolitanism. This model draws 
concepts from Appiah’s model and the MCU’s model, reimagining and relocating them 
within an expanded framework. This expanded framework does not just combine these two 
models, instead it extends and reconceptualises their notions of partial cosmopolitanism.  
Situational cosmopolitanism is a model that, guided by a principle of freedom, emphasises 
social context; it is not just important what we do. How, why, and where we do it are 
important as well. Also emphasised in this model is the importance of difference within a 
universal collective; alternatively put, the importance of social identity movements to grand 
narratives. Situational cosmopolitanism endeavours to be accessible to a broad spectrum of 
society, to both those with high levels of actionable agency and those with lower levels. It 
believes that culture is crucial, particularly popular culture, and that along with nation-state 
governments, it has a distinctive part to play in the pursuit of fairness and equality. 
Whilst Appiah’s ethical model seeks to create a cosmopolitan state, and the MCU’s reactive 
model exists to respond to (physical) threats, this model of situational cosmopolitanism is 
intended as an ethos, an attitude. It is not a strict set of ideas or actions, emphasising the 
importance of context dependent decision making. Situational cosmopolitanism is 
underpinned by specific formulations of freedoms and decision-making, incorporating 
notions of Joseph Fletcher’s (1966) situation ethics and Gerald MacCallum’s (1967) triadic 
freedom.  
The idea of a partial cosmopolitanism, wherein allegiance is not automatically given to the 
global and the local is often prioritised, is an important idea in developing a robust model of 
cosmopolitanism. As Appiah and the MCU both suggest, humans live better on a smaller 
scale, and also cannot realistically be expected to care about strangers with the same 
passion that they care about friends and family. It is this notion of partiality that underpins 
and guides my model of situational cosmopolitanism; what is an appropriate cosmopolitan 
attitude in one locality is not necessarily going to be the same for another. The situation 
that decisions are made in are important and thus this model of situational cosmopolitanism 
is required to be continuously reflexive and aware of this fact.  
101 
 
Informing this model is a reimagined conception of Fletcher’s (1966) notion of situation 
ethics. Situation ethics helps deal with the challenge of defining the terms of decision-
making.  Like Fletcher, I believe that the context of an act is important to determining an 
appropriate response because each situation requires unique consideration, rather than a 
reliance on an absolute moral standard. Blanket decisions that do not take into 
consideration the nuances of any given situation have the potential to become totalitarian 
and constrictive. As such, this model needs to remain flexible and reflexive, as opposed to 
fixed. 
Fletcher suggests that ‘agape’, or ‘love’, is the only indisputable principle to be followed and 
he uses this principle to guide decisions. While he takes his notion of love from Christianity, I 
suggest a secularised version of this principle, one that speaks to a shared humanity as 
opposed to any one religion. To this end, I believe that a guiding principle of freedom, rather 
than love, is better suited to a model of situational cosmopolitanism. 
Situational cosmopolitanism is also underpinned by a particular conceptualisation of 
freedom. The concept of freedom that I put forward here is a triadic understanding of 
freedom, as explained by Gerald MacCallum (1967). This interpretation of freedom 
synthesises the models of freedom put forward by Appiah and the MCU. Appiah’s model of 
cosmopolitanism suggests a protective freedom in line with his reductive approach to 
agency; this suggests that the freedom of individuals needs protecting by the nation-state so 
that they are able to construct suitable ethical lives for themselves without any negative 
social stigma. The MCU’s model of cosmopolitanism suggests a different kind of freedom: 
the freedom to act. This freedom for the MCU is taken up by the civilian rather than being 
provided by the nation-state; it is often enacted despite and in spite of the actions of the 
nation-state. Isaiah Berlin (1969) defines these freedoms as expressions of negative liberty 
and positive liberty respectively, and MacCallum’s conception of triadic freedom combines 
these, suggesting that they impact one another and are not mutually exclusive. We need to 
consider freedom as multifaceted: “freedom is thus always of something (an agent or 
agents), from something, to do, not do, become, or not become something” (MacCallum, 
1967, p. 314).  
It is the notion of triadic freedom and the implicit part that freedom plays in an emergent 
actionable agency that has incited my reimagining of the guiding principle of situation ethics 
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as ‘freedom’ rather than Fletcher’s ‘love’. As with actionable agency, this triadic freedom is 
a freedom that we both need to grant to others and to take for ourselves. Through the work 
of Appiah and the MCU, we can further explore how we can pursue this freedom. They 
suggest that the nation-state and those with high levels of actionable agency need to be 
involved to ensure that everyone has access to the resources necessary for this to happen, 
such as access to healthcare and education as well as to protection from external threats. 
How much intervention is permissible from the nation-state is largely up for debate by both 
the nation-state and the citizens that the nation-state is accountable to, requiring case by 
case, situational driven deliberation. The obligations of those not directly associated with 
the nation-state is harder to determine; it relies on the individual agreeing to and abiding by 
an implicit social moral contract. This echoes Durkheim’s theorising on the sociology of 
morality, where he asserts that morality comes into being only when an individual belongs 
to a collective social group (1973). Durkheim’s ideas on social morality and collective 
consciousness are particularly relevant when the collective cosmopolitanism of the MCU is 
considered. 
When those with high levels of actionable agency work to restrict and limit the agency and 
freedom of others, a decision is necessary: whether to respond, or to retreat into nihilism. A 
response undertaken using the guiding principle of triadic freedom, and considering the 
distinct aspects of that situation is a task of collective intelligence requiring diverse 
participation. Individuals and groups – regardless of class or professional standing – are able 
to contribute information that can be combined with the information of others to create a 
comprehensive depiction of the situation and inform any response that is undertaken.  
It is through this collective intelligence that the importance of difference to the pursuit of a 
shared goal is realised. Appiah argues that universality should come before difference, and 
the MCU suggests that difference is more important than universality. In this model of 
situational cosmopolitanism, neither universality nor difference is automatically 
championed. Instead, a synthetisation of the two occurs. The stance that the MCU’s model 
takes, wherein collective strength is found through – not despite – difference, is important; 
the weaknesses of one individual can be balanced out by the strengths of another, and vice 
versa, and without difference, the combination of available strengths and weaknesses can 
be lacking. Equally important is Appiah’s emphasis on universality; it is the universal that can 
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be used to justify the collective, to legitimate a reason as to why those different individuals 
would want to come together in a collective. A combination of the two approaches is 
required, with an understanding that living together occurs both through differences and 
commonalities.  
A robust conceptualisation of agency is also required to theoretically combine universality 
and difference.  The approaches that Appiah and the MCU take to agency are, however, 
limited. Whilst there is an inherent agency, a self-determination, that each of us has as a 
result of our (human) existence, and also that we all differ in our ability to action that 
agency, the top-down approach that Appiah and the MCU both take is insufficient. A 
broader approach to agency is necessary for a more comprehensive model of 
cosmopolitanism.  
Therefore a conceptualisation of agency as both top-down and bottom-up is needed. It 
needs to encompass actionable agency as something that emerges from our actions, rather 
than as the reduction of the actionable agency of the powerful, or the granting of actionable 
agency from the powerful to the powerless. The emergence of agency should not be solely 
at the discretion of the powerful. In the name of social justice and equity, there needs to be 
both opportunities provided for actionable agency to develop in those who have less, and 
encouragement for those individuals to take up those opportunities for themselves. Appiah 
writes for those with significant levels of actionable agency, suggesting that they restrict 
that agency for the good of those who have less. The MCU speaks to those with less 
actionable agency, showing them that those with more should be acting to help them. Both 
approaches are important, however a third avenue is also needed, where those with less 
actionable agency are encouraged, and have the freedom, to engage in cosmopolitan acts 
that will develop their agency against acts that desire to limit them.  
Legislation is thus required to ensure that those with less actionable agency are able to 
engage in acts that help their agency flourish. In this model of situational cosmopolitanism, 
this centres on the idea of education. This is because, as Appiah suggests, education is 
integral to fostering a cosmopolitan attitude; by exposing people to diverse ideas, to diverse 
ways of existing, a familiarity can be cultivated, making the apparent Other less strange and 
more understandable. Education in global citizenship can be used to encourage tolerance 
and an understanding of the importance of both the universal and of difference.  
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Legislating for education in this model of situational cosmopolitanism is underpinned by a 
two stage approach. First, a top-down approach is required, where those who already 
possess high levels of power – of actionable agency and capital – are tasked with creating an 
educative environment that fosters a cosmopolitan ethos. This is done through education 
policies; these policies would need to be reflexive and context specific, and possess the 
ability to be flexible and malleable. The second stage is the taking up of the cosmopolitan 
ethos, encouraging people to engage in and work towards a more equitable approach to 
education. It is a cyclic process; bottom-up pressure is required to create top-down policies 
for a cosmopolitan education, an education that in turn encourages a bottom-up 
cosmopolitan ethos, which once more cycles back to encourage bottom-up pressure on top-
down policies. The pressure on top-down policies works within Gramsci’s notion of consent, 
where concessions are required to be made by the ruling class so as to provide a reason for 
the wider population to consent to their rule.  
There is a distinct focus on the education of children in this model of situational 
cosmopolitanism. To encourage participation, the focus is on fostering a cosmopolitan ethos 
for future generations to build upon. It does not require individuals to relinquish or limit 
their own agency, as Appiah’s model does, thus negating that particular barrier to 
participation; it instead works on the somewhat utopian ideal of creating a better future for 
those who will come next. As in Appiah’s (2010) discussion of changing honour codes, it is a 
process of working towards that better future, not necessarily that there is an ultimate end 
goal that can ever be reached. It is a continuous cycle of changing attitudes, of social 
pressures encouraging broader uptake – as with the turn away from foot binding in China – 
in a snowballing effect of continuously adapting moral codes. The idea of a continuous cycle, 
tied in with the emphasis on situation dependent responses, helps to mitigate the 
unavoidable fact that not everyone will want to participate or encourage a cosmopolitan 
ethos. 
That this model of situational cosmopolitanism is a synthesis of Appiah’s theoretical work 
and the popular culture of the MCU, attention is drawn to the idea that it is not only 
through traditional channels that people are educated. As Gramsci and others have 
suggested, mass and popular culture also play an important part in the way a society 
constructs and understands itself. Thus it is also important to consider how popular culture 
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can be utilised to foster the cosmopolitan ethos. As policy is constructed to inform the 
education system, situational cosmopolitanism suggests that those who are in a position of 
producing the cultural content that is mass consumed also consider their social contract. 
Again, as with Gramsci’s notion of consent, the mass culture that is produced is influenced 
by its consumers; the task of the nation-state government is to provide a space wherein 
those consumers can (safely) exercise that influence. Additionally, an economic incentive or 
something similar may be provided by governments to encourage producers of mass-
consumed content to replicate the cosmopolitan ethos that is provided through traditional 
education channels. Unlike the Motion Picture Production Code, which penalised producers 
for breaching a strict moral code (Lewis, 2000), policy, around tax breaks for example, can 
be created to reward producers for incorporating a reflexive cosmopolitan attitude in their 
content. By utilising the sphere of entertainment, situational cosmopolitanism breaches the 
home / school divide. Entertainment becomes edutainment; normalising the cosmopolitan 
ethos across multiple areas of life, including the divide between high and low brow 
education, encourages individuals to not just leave that attitude in the classroom.  
Situational cosmopolitanism is thus a model that synthesises and extends upon the models 
of cosmopolitanism put forward by Appiah and the MCU. It is underpinned by notions of 
partiality and driven by the desire to lay the foundations for a future that is better – more 
equal, fair, and just – than today. It is an ongoing aspiration, understanding that there is no 
cosmopolitan state to be reached, just an ethos to be fostered and encouraged.  
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Conclusion 
The concern with how it is that we can best live together, with our various and at times 
incompatible differences, is not new. Two polemic approaches that address this concern – 
global universalism and multiculturalism – are not convincing, because they lack an ability to 
respond to the nuances of lived reality. Cosmopolitanism has possibilities that encompass 
and extend the dominant positions of global universalism and multiculturalism.  
The partial cosmopolitanism models that are suggested by Appiah and the MCU, 
theoretically, better address this concern with co-existence. Each has its own positive 
components, particularly an appreciation for the partiality that is a reality of human 
existence. They both, however, lack an ability to be anything more than theoretical, and 
suffer from the potential to be adversely manipulated against a goal of social justice and 
equity.  Thus they can be considered insufficient models of cosmopolitanism.  
As an alternative, this thesis argues for a model of partial cosmopolitanism that synthesises 
components of Appiah’s ethical model and the MCU’s reactive model, and expands on these 
ideas. The result is a model of situational cosmopolitanism that encourages the education of 
future generations to foster a cosmopolitan ethos. It is understood that this model is 
situated in a primarily Western / American context; this is due to its location within a 
discipline of cultural studies that is influenced by thinkers such as Gramsci and the founders 
of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. However, there are 
indications that there is potential to widen the reach of this particular model of 
cosmopolitanism: the societal snowball effect, such as the one which Appiah argues brought 
an end to foot binding practices in China; the model’s reflexive nature; and the broad reach 
of the Hollywood Blockbuster given that entertainment is implicated in the educating 
process are three such examples.  
After locating this thesis within a broader theoretical framework, the discussion has 
examined the history, influences, and models of cosmopolitanism of both Appiah and of the 
MCU. This has been followed by an argument as to why these two models are insufficient. 
Finally, an alternative model of cosmopolitanism was presented, arguing that a model of 
situational cosmopolitanism can be used to reimagine a cosmopolitan approach to the 
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question of how it is that we can best live together, with our differences, in an environment 
of modernity / post-modernity tensions. 
In the end, for all their theoretical similarities and differences, what Appiah and the MCU 
ultimately have in common is an intense optimism. They both believe that the world can be 
a better place if we make the effort; it is an optimism and a hope that is infectious. It is why, 
I believe, that they work together. This combination of philosophy and superheroes, of high 
and low brow culture both proposes and demonstrates that two opposing ideas can come 
together to create something better. It is the idea of dialectic that sits at the heart of 
situational cosmopolitanism. Working with our strengths, bringing our differences to 
balance out one another’s weaknesses; this thesis is itself an example of the model of 
cosmopolitanism that it argues for. It invites further synthesis, a further blurring of 
boundaries, to encourage reflexive and evolving ideas. Situational cosmopolitanism suggests 
that nothing needs to be stagnant; we can always hope and strive for something better.  
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Appendix 
Plot descriptions of the films of the Marvel Cinematic Universe 
These plot descriptions are presented here to provide sufficient background and detail to 
support the thesis discussion. Further information on each of the films of the MCU can be 
found at http://marvel.com/movies/all [accessed 13/02/2016]. 
Phase One 
Iron Man, May 2008 
Director: Jon Favreau 
Primary Cast: Robert Downey Jr. as Tony Stark / Iron Man; Gwyneth Paltrow as Virginia 
“Pepper” Potts; Terrence Howard as Lieutenant Colonel James “Rhodey” Rhodes; Jeff 
Bridges as Obadiah Stane. 
The first feature of the MCU, Iron Man begins with billionaire weapons manufacturer Tony 
Stark showcasing his company’s latest missile in a Middle Eastern desert. After a dramatic 
display, Stark is taken hostage; he wakes up in a cave and discovers that his kidnappers want 
him to make them weapons of their own. With help from a fellow captured scientist, Stark 
designs and constructs a crude prototype of what will become the Iron Man suit. This suit, 
enabled with weapons and powered by an ‘arc reactor’ of Stark’s design, allows Stark to 
escape. Upon his return to the United States, Stark is treated as a returning hero; his mentor 
and quasi-father figure Obadiah Stane is ultimately exposed as having orchestrated the 
kidnapping to ensure that, in the event of Stark’s death, the ownership of Stark’s company 
would fall to him. Whilst Stark redesigns and updates the Iron Man suit, Stane does the 
same from the (wrecked) prototype. Stark and Stane go toe to toe in the film’s climactic 
battle sequence and, with the help of Potts and Rhodes, Stark walks away victorious. Stane 
falls into the large arc reactor that Stark had begun to construct (in his attempt to move his 
company away from weapons manufacturing to sustainable energy), and it explodes. 
In a final scene, SHIELD (Strategic Homeland Intervention, Enforcement, and Logistics 
Division) director Nick Fury approaches Stark to discuss what he calls the “Avengers 
Initiative”. 
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The Incredible Hulk, June 2008 
Director: Louis Leterrier 
Primary Cast: Edward Norton as Dr Bruce Banner; Lou Ferrigno as the voice of the Hulk; Liv 
Tyler as Betty Ross; Tim Roth as Emil Blonsky; William Hurt as Thaddeus “Thunderbolt” Ross. 
Bruce Banner has already been infected with the gamma radiation that causes him to 
transform into the Hulk before this film starts. He is hidden abroad, working in a soda 
bottling plant. When some of his blood accidently makes its way into one of the bottles, 
Banner is tracked down by the American military, led by Ross and Blonsky. Banner goes on 
the run, returning to the United States after an anonymous scientist suggests that the 
solution to his Jekyll / Hyde condition lies in the files on Banner’s gamma radiation accident. 
The files are on kept on a university campus; Banner is confronted on the campus by 
Blonsky and turns into the Hulk. Whilst Banner goes on the run again, Blonsky barely 
survives the fight; he undergoes radiation treatment with the intention of becoming a force 
capable of defeating the Hulk. A final battle between Banner and Blonsky, both in 
monstrous forms, destroys Harlem. Blonsky begins to lose his grip on reality due to his 
treatment, and Banner spares his life; Banner runs once more, leaving Betty Ross behind to 
pick up the pieces.  
In a final scene, Tony Stark approaches Banner at a bar in British Columbia, informing him 
that a superhero team is being formed and inviting him to take part.  
Iron Man 2, April 2010 
Director: Jon Favreau 
Primary cast: Robert Downey Jr. as Tony Stark / Iron Man; Gwyneth Paltrow as Virginia 
“Pepper” Potts; Don Cheadle as Lieutenant Colonel James “Rhodey” Rhodes; Mickey Rourke 
as Ivan Vanko; Sam Rockwell as Justin Hammer. 
This film sees Tony Stark dealing with the consequences of revealing his identity at the end 
of Iron Man. He faces governmental pressure to hand over the Iron Man armour; the media 
circus that surrounds the situation encourages Vanko to create an arc reactor of his own, 
and eventually at the request of Hammer, create a small army of Iron Man-inspired 
armoured drones. Stark also spends the film dealing with the palladium poisoning that 
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comes as a result of living with an arc reactor in his chest, which is keeping shrapnel from 
reaching his heart. Believing he is near death, Stark takes to life with reckless abandon, 
causing Rhodes to take one of the Iron Man suits to the American military after a drunken 
brawl between the pair; this brawl also prompts Stark to promote Potts to Stark Industries 
CEO to ensure the survival of his family’s company. After Vanko hijacks the drones he had 
created for Hammer, Stark and Rhodes join forces once again to take them down, ultimately 
leading to the death of Vanko. By the film’s conclusion, Stark has discovered a new element, 
left encoded in an old diorama by his father, which enables him to switch out the palladium 
in his personal arc reactor, thereby saving his own life by removing the poison. 
In a final scene, Stark is informed by director Nick Fury of SHIELD that he is unsuitable for 
the ‘Avengers Initiative’, but they would like to retain him as a consultant.  
Thor, April 2011 
Director: Kenneth Branagh 
Primary Cast: Chris Hemsworth as Thor; Tom Hiddleston as Loki; Natalie Portman as Jane 
Foster; Anthony Hopkins as Odin. 
This film has a more fantastical feel than the previous three films. After a battle with the 
frost giants of Jötunheim destroys the fragile truce between Jötunheim and Asgard, Thor is 
banished from his home of Asgard by his father Odin; he is stranded on Earth with none of 
his powers and no way to get home. Whilst Thor resigns himself to his new life on Earth, his 
brother, Loki, discovers that he is actually the son of the king of the frost giants, not the son 
of Odin, and brother of Thor, that he had been led to believe. He takes advantage of Odin’s 
retreat into a comatose-esque state and Thor’s banishment to plot to take the throne of 
Asgard for himself. He sends a large battle automaton to Earth to kill Thor; Thor defeats the 
threat once proving that he is worthy of wielding the magic hammer Mjolnir through self-
sacrifice, and he quickly returns to Asgard to confront his brother. He discovers that Loki 
had lured the frost giant king to Asgard to kill Odin; Loki had planned to kill his birth father 
and then to destroy Jötunheim using the Bifrost (a cosmic bridge that connects the different 
realms) in the hope of proving himself worthy to Odin. To stop any further damage, Thor 
destroys the Bifrost himself, and Loki chooses to fall into the abyss that takes its place. Thor 
rejects his claim on the throne of Asgard for the time being, and even though the realms are 
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disconnected and he cannot return to Earth, he is content to watch his new friends from a 
distance.  
Agent Coulson of SHIELD is a constant presence in the film; he confiscates Foster’s scientific 
instruments and findings once SHIELD discovers her association to Thor, and SHIELD create a 
perimeter around the hammer Mjolnir when it is stuck in the desert in New Mexico to study 
it. When Thor, enraged, goes to retrieve his hammer, SHIELD agent Clint Barton  trains an 
arrow on him, awaiting orders to put him down; he ultimately refrains from doing so, 
allowing Thor to escape.  
Captain America: The First Avenger, July 2011 
Director: Joe Johnston 
Primary cast: Chris Evans as Steve Rogers / Captain America; Hayley Atwell as Margaret 
“Peggy” Carter; Sebastian Stan as James “Bucky” Barnes; Dominic Cooper as Howard Stark; 
Hugo Weaving as Johann Schmidt / the Red Skull. 
Set during World War II, this film is an origin story that takes Steve Rogers from being a 
skinny, constantly ill, young man to being a war captain in the peak of health. After multiple 
rejections from the enlistment booth, Rogers is eventually accepted into a special 
programme designed by scientists to create a super-soldier capable of easing the cost of the 
American war effort. When the scientist heading the project is killed by a Hydra agent – a 
secret science division of the Nazi army – Rogers is put in a costume and paraded across the 
United States to sell war bonds; he is eventually sent to Europe to encourage troop morale. 
Upon hearing that Barnes, his best friend, is one of many soldiers being held behind enemy 
lines, Rogers takes off against his orders; with the help of Carter and Stark, he successfully 
navigates the rescue of all the prisoners. Realising that he is of more use on the battlefield 
than on a stage, Rogers gains permission to form his own elite team with the intention of 
taking down the Hydra threat. In the process of capturing Hydra’s lead scientist, Barnes is 
killed and his death hits Rogers hard. The climax of the film sees Rogers’ facing down the 
Red Skull; the pair eventually end up on a bomber plane headed for New York City. After 
defeating the Red Skull, Rogers realises he has no option but to crash the plane whilst still 
over the ocean to avoid any major causalities. The film closes with a scene of Stark on a 
boat, searching the arctic for the crashed plane and the hero that it entombed.   
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In a short scene played after the credits, Rogers wakes up in a hospital room that he quickly 
deduces is a replica; when he is confronted by SHIELD director Nick Fury in a New York City 
street, Rogers is told that he is now in the twenty first century. 
The Avengers, April 2012 
Director: Joss Whedon 
Primary Cast: Robert Downey Jr. as Tony Stark / Iron Man; Chris Evans as Steve Rogers / 
Captain America; Chris Hemsworth as Thor; Jeremy Renner as Clint Barton / Hawkeye; 
Scarlett Johansson as Natasha Romanoff / Black Widow; Mark Ruffalo as Bruce Banner / the 
Hulk; Tom Hiddleston as Loki; Samuel L. Jackson as Director Nick Fury. 
Having been promised an army with which he can subjugate Earth, Loki – having survived 
his fall into the abyss in Thor – returns to Earth to retrieve the Tesseract; the Tesseract is a 
cosmic cube which had enabled scientists to create the super soldier serum given to Rogers 
in Captain America: the First Avenger. SHIELD is studying the cube when a wormhole opens; 
Loki steps through and uses an alien sceptre to brainwash a handful of scientists and agent 
Barton before taking them and the cube. As a response, Nick Fury activates the Avenger’s 
Initiative: Romanoff goes off to a remote part of the world to retrieve Banner, who they 
hope will be able to track the cube; Agent Coulson visits Stark, asking him to look over the 
scientist’s research; Fury himself approaches Rogers, asking him to pick up his shield and go 
out to retrieve the cube. 
The group trace the cube to Germany, where, after a short confrontation, they take Loki – 
sans cube – into custody. On the way back to their holding facility, they are waylaid by Thor, 
who has come to retrieve his brother and the cube to return both to Asgard. After a short 
battle between Thor, Stark, and Rogers, Thor agrees to work with SHIELD until the cube can 
be located. The team members begin to clash once they return to the SHIELD helicarrier; 
Loki uses this to his advantage when his possessed agents, including agent Barton, storm the 
helicarrier. Banner transforms into the Hulk and goes on a rampage; the ships engines are 
stopped. The team quickly discover that they have to work together to fix both the engines 
and Banner, and to save the brainwashed SHIELD agents. 
In the chaos, Loki escapes and kills agent Coulson on his way out. Fury uses Coulson’s death 
to motivate the team into working together, though it does continue to create conflict 
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between them, particularly between Stark and Rogers. They quickly determine that Loki 
intends to use Stark Tower in New York City as the place to use the cube to open another 
wormhole, this time to bring through his promised army. By the time they arrive, they are 
confronted with said army, aliens known as Chitauri. In the film’s climactic battle, they have 
learnt to work together to contain and control this new threat. Romanoff discovers that 
Loki’s sceptre can be used to close the wormhole; before they get the chance, government 
officials launch a missile at Manhattan, as they are not convinced that Fury’s Avengers can 
defeat the advancing army. Stark realises that the only way to stop the missile from 
destroying the city is to fly it through the wormhole; his suit loses power whilst he is still 
through the hole, leaving him falling through the depths of space with no power. He barely 
makes it back through the wormhole before Romanoff has no choice but to close it.  
The film ends with Loki in chains and the cube in a protective box, both being taken back to 
Asgard by Thor. The other Avengers all choose to go off in their own directions; Fury 
indicates that if they are needed again, he will make sure they return.  
 
Phase Two 
Iron Man 3, May 2013 
Director: Shane Black 
Primary cast: Robert Downey Jr. as Tony Stark / Iron Man; Gwyneth Paltrow as Virginia 
“Pepper” Potts; Don Cheadle as Lieutenant Colonel James “Rhodey” Rhodes; Ty Simpkins as 
Harley Keener; Rebecca Hall as Maya Hansen; Ben Kingsley as the Mandarin; Guy Pearce as 
Aldrich Killian. 
Central to the film is Stark working through his experiences from The Avengers. He suffers 
from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; he is unable to sleep and creates endless versions of 
the Iron Man armour, many of which can pilot themselves. When his friend becomes a 
victim in a string of terrorist attacks, Stark publically announces a threat to the Mandarin, a 
shadowy figure who has taken responsibility for the attacks. The Mandarin responds by 
destroying Stark’s house; he narrowly escapes in an experimental Iron Man suit that flies 
him across the country on autopilot before losing power, leaving him stranded and near 
death. He befriends Keener and with the boy’s help he discovers that the Mandarin attacks 
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were explosions caused by the Extremis virus. Stark tracks the Mandarin to Miami – not the 
Middle East, where Rhodes and the American military had been searching for him – only to 
discover that the man who had claimed public responsibility for the attacks was nothing 
more than an actor. The actor was a cover for Killian, who reveals himself to Stark as the 
real Mandarin. Killian exposes Potts to the Extremis virus to torture Stark, before escaping 
to capture the President of the United States. He planned to kill the President on live 
television and to manipulate the vice president, but he is stopped by Stark in the Iron Man 
armour. In the final battle, Killian makes Stark choose between Potts and the President; 
Stark goes for Potts whilst Rhodes goes for the President, however the oil tanker that they 
are on crumbles, and Potts falls from sight. Stark confronts Killian and attempts to trap him 
in one of the Iron Man armours set to self-destruct, but fails. Potts reappears and kills Killian 
herself. The battle over, Stark chooses to destroy all the Iron Man suits that he had made in 
a symbolic gesture for Potts; he then undergoes surgery to remove the shrapnel that had 
been embedded near his heart in Iron Man, removing the necessity for his personal arc 
reactor.  
In a post-credits scene, Dr Banner is seen failing to stay awake while Stark narrates the 
preceding story to him.  
Thor: The Dark World, November 2013 
Director: Alan Taylor 
Primary cast: Chris Hemsworth as Thor; Natalie Portman as Jane Foster; Tom Hiddleston as 
Loki; Anthony Hopkins as Odin; Christopher Eccleston as Malekith. 
Following the events of The Avengers, this film sees Loki imprisoned on Asgard for his 
crimes. The Bifrost has been rebuilt, and peace has once again been achieved across the 
realms. On Earth, Foster follows a rumour to a warehouse where a truck is suspended in 
mid-air, and goes through a portal and arrives in another world. There, she touches a large 
cube and becomes infected with a substance known to the Asgardians as the Aether. When 
she returns to Earth, Thor is waiting for her, and after the Aether insider her lashes out at a 
local policeman, he transports her to Asgard for testing. Odin, upon recognizing the Aether, 
wants it – and Foster – removed. There is no time, however, as the remainder of the Dark 
Elves descend upon Asgard, freeing prisoners and killing Thor’s mother Frigga. The Dark 
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Elves want the Aether, believing it will allow them to destroy the realms. Thor uses Loki to 
get Foster and himself out of Asgard; he thinks that they will be able to trick Malekith into 
saving Foster. The plan fails and Loki is killed in the ensuing battle. Thor and Foster end up 
back on Earth. Malekith intended to use the Convergence – an alignment of portals to the 
various realms – to carry out his plan. The film’s climactic battle happens through the 
portals and is ultimately ended with the use of scientific instruments. With the realms safe, 
Thor returns to Asgard to inform Odin about Loki’s sacrifice, and to turn down the offer of 
the Asgardian throne once again. As Thor leaves the throne hall, it is revealed that it is Loki, 
using illusions to make himself look like Odin, sitting on the throne.  
Captain America: The Winter Soldier, March 2014 
Director: Anthony Russo and Joe Russo  
Primary cast: Chris Evans as Steve Rogers / Captain America; Sebastian Stan as James 
“Bucky” Barnes / the Winter Soldier; Scarlett Johansson as Natasha Romanoff / Black 
Widow; Anthony Mackie as Sam Wilson / Falcon; Robert Redford as Alexander Pierce; 
Samuel L. Jackson as Director Nick Fury. 
This film deals with Rogers’ man-out-of-time experience. He meets Wilson in the film’s first 
scene and the two form a brief friendship, able to relate to one another as war veterans. 
Rogers is soon picked up by Romanoff and whisked off to a save a SHIELD ship that is being 
overrun by pirates in the middle of the ocean. He secures the hostages, takes out the 
pirates, and discovers that Romanoff is copying SHIELD secrets off the ship’s computer 
servers. Furious, Rogers confronts Fury upon their return, who admits to him that SHIELD is 
taking the idea of national and global security very seriously; Fury shows Rogers three large 
helicarriers (flying warships) that will be able to maintain continuous flight and surveillance 
once they are finished. After being told that the objective of the helicarriers is to deal with a 
threat before it even becomes a threat, Rogers makes it his personal mission to destroy 
them before they become operational. Helped along by Romanoff and Wilson, Rogers is on 
the run from SHIELD and being hunted by some of their best operatives. A skirmish on a 
motorway reveals that one of the operatives is Barnes, Rogers (presumed) dead friend from 
WWII. Barnes has no recollection of Rogers and is shown to be regularly brainwashed by 
SHIELD, which has also been revealed to be infiltrated by the remnants of Hydra. Rogers 
sticks to his mission, but a confrontation on the final helicarrier sees Rogers throw down his 
116 
 
shield and remove his mask; he is willing to let Barnes beat him as he tries to get his friend 
to remember who he is. The helicarrier goes down into the Potomac River, taking Rogers 
and Barnes with it. Barnes is conscious enough to drag Rogers from the water, leaving him 
on the bank. As the film comes to its conclusion, SHIELD is exposed to the world. Romanoff 
goes off on her own, with the world fully aware of her past as a soviet agent; Fury is 
presumed dead, apparently killed earlier in the film by the Winter Soldier. Rogers is 
unwilling to give up on his friend, and Wilson signs up to help him track Barnes down. 
Guardians of the Galaxy, August 2014 
Director: James Gunn 
Primary cast: Chris Pratt as Peter Quill; Zoe Saldana as Gamora; Dave Bautista as Drax the 
Destroyer; Bradley Cooper as the voice of Rocket the Raccoon; Vin Diesel as the voice of 
Groot; Lee Pace as Ronan the Accuser; Karen Gillan as Nebula. 
This film is a space opera, with only a brief scene on Earth showing the death of Quill’s 
mother and his subsequent removal from the planet. Quill begins as a treasure hunter, 
trying to sell off his recently acquired bounty before being attacked by Gamora, who is after 
the sphere he is trying to sell. Rocket and Groot quickly join the fray, realising that Quill has 
a bounty on his head and wishing to secure it for themselves. The four end up in a prison for 
their public display, where they meet Drax, who wants nothing more than to take off 
Gamora’s head; she was associated with Ronan, who had killed his family, and he viewed 
her death as a justifiable act of revenge. After Gamora admits to Quill and Rocket that she 
has a buyer for the sphere, Quill convinces Drax that she can also provide him with an 
opportunity to take revenge on Ronan himself, and the five proceed to break out of the 
prison. From there, they fly to Knowhere, an alien world, to meet with Gamora’s contact. 
The contact opens the sphere, revealing an Infinity Stone (of which the Cosmic Cube that 
was central to Captain America’s creation and the plot of The Avengers, and also the Aether 
from Thor: The Dark World are both) that can destroy worlds. After a fight with Ronan and 
Nebula, the five find themselves on the ship that Quill had spent his childhood, convincing 
the smugglers that own it to help them recover the sphere that they had since lost to 
Ronan. A large space battle ensues, with the smuggling ships teaming up with galactic law 
enforcement group Nova Corps to break through Ronan’s ship’s defences, enabling Quill 
and his new friends to board it. They manage to send the ship crashing to the closest planet, 
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Xander (which Ronan seeks to destroy out of a culture conflict between the Kree and the 
Xandarians), and Groot sacrifices himself to save the others. Ronan emerges from the 
wreckage alive, and prepares to use the Infinity Stone to destroy the planet. Quill briefly 
distracts him, which gives him the opportunity to take the Stone. With help, Quill is able to 
use the Stone to defeat Ronan. In the aftermath of the battle, the smugglers take off with 
what they think is the real stone, ready to sell it to the highest bidder, whilst Quill hands the 
real stone over to the Nova Corps. The criminal records of Quill, Gamora, Drax, and Rocket, 
now known as the Guardians of the Galaxy, are expunged, and they head off into space, a 
small cutting from Groot in a pot clutched in Rocket’s paws.  
At present, this film is disconnected from the MCU as a whole, not situated in the main 
timeline as of yet. The film also deviates from the treatment that was given to the Avengers, 
in that its characters do not get a lead up of solo films before the team film.  
Avengers: Age of Ultron, April 2015 
Director: Joss Whedon 
Primary cast: Robert Downey Jr. as Tony Stark / Iron Man; Chris Evans as Steve Rogers / 
Captain America; Chris Hemsworth as Thor; Jeremy Renner as Clint Barton / Hawkeye; 
Scarlett Johansson as Natasha Romanoff / Black Widow; Mark Ruffalo as Bruce Banner / the 
Hulk; James Spade as the voice of Ultron; Aaron Taylor-Johnson as Pietro Maximoff; 
Elizabeth Olsen as Wanda Maximoff. 
The film opens with the Avengers team storming a fortress in Eastern Europe, hunting down 
the sceptre from The Avengers; they find it has been used to experiment on humans, two of 
which are the Pietro and Wanda Maximoff, who develop super speed and telekinesis 
respectively. The Avengers are able to recover the sceptre, though the twins escape. 
After a victory party, Stark and Banner discuss the possibility of using the sceptre to create a 
new artificial intelligence that can be used for Stark’s proposed Ultron programme: a 
sentient global defence system that would ultimately render the Avengers obsolete. Despite 
Banner’s misgivings, Stark sets up his computer to work with the sceptre and Ultron is 
created. Stark’s lab is destroyed as Ultron decides that Earth’s biggest threat is humanity 
itself; it uses an Iron Man suit as a body, and takes off intending to build itself a new 
purpose-built body.  
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The Avengers eventually track Ultron to an African shipyard and the base of an arms dealer. 
Ultron is after Wakandan vibranium (a substance not unlike the metal used to create 
Rogers’ unbreakable shield) to create yet another body. The Avengers prove incapable of 
stopping him, with many of them given hallucinations by Wanda Maximoff. These 
hallucinations cause Banner to turn into the Hulk and go on a rampage, leading to a 
worldwide backlash against the destruction that the Avengers have once again caused.  
The Avengers retreat to a safe house revealed to be Barton’s farmhouse home. Whilst 
Ultron blackmails scientists in Seoul to create a body for him out of the vibranium he had 
acquired, the Avengers begin to drift apart. They are brought back together by the return of 
Nick Fury and his insistence that they formulate a plan to stop Ultron. Rogers, Romanoff, 
and Barton fly to Seoul and retrieve the body, however Ultron escapes, taking Romanoff 
hostage in the process. The twins, having realised Ultron’s ultimate goal, turn on him and 
choose to side with the Avengers. 
Back at Avengers Tower, Stark decides to put his AI JARVIS into the empty body that had 
been recovered. Rogers takes issue with this; they get into a heated argument over whether 
or not it is a good idea to create another sentient AI, especially after the first attempt went 
so badly. Thor arrives back at the Tower – having gone off to receive guidance after the 
hallucination that Wanda Maximoff had given him – and explains that the stone on the 
body’s face is an Infinity Stone (like the Cosmic Cube, the Aether, and the stone in Guardians 
of the Galaxy). He uses it to transform the AI into a sentient android known as the Vision, 
and the Vision and twins accompany the Avengers back to the fortress from the beginning 
of the film; at this fortress, Ultron has decided to raise a nearby city and crash it back into 
the Earth, causing global devastation.  
The ensuing battle with Ultron leaves Pietro Maximoff dead, and Ultron is able to activate 
his machine to drop the city. Thor and Stark manage to explode the city before it reaches 
the ground, though the effect of the shattered pieces of land crashing to the Earth is never 
explored. Instead, the Avengers once more go their separate ways: Banner leaves, citing the 
danger he poses to everyone; Thor goes home to learn more about the vision that he had 
had; Stark and Barton both choose to set aside the responsibilities of being an Avenger. 
Rogers and Romanoff are last seen at a new Avenger’s base – the Tower being largely 
destroyed – and they welcome in a new line up to the team: Wanda Maximoff, the Vision, 
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James Rhodes (of the Iron Man films), and Sam Wilson (of Captain America: The Winter 
Soldier).  
Ant-Man, July 2015 
Director: Peyton Reed 
Primary cast: Paul Rudd as Scott Lang / Ant-Man; Evangeline Lilly as Hope van Dyne; Corey 
Stoll as Darren Cross / Yellowjacket; Michael Douglas as Hank Pym / the original Ant-Man. 
This film introduces the new character Ant-Man to the MCU. It opens with Scott Lang as he 
leaves prison; he moves in with a former cellmate and is unable to hold down a job, leading 
to him taking what is meant to be a quick burglary job to make ends meet. The house he 
and his team break into belongs to Hank Pym, creator of the Pym Particle (which enables 
objects to shrink); when Lang cannot find anything recognisably valuable within the house’s 
safe, he takes the suit that Pym designed to control the Pym Particle. When Lang realises 
what it is that he has taken, he goes back to the house to return it, only to be drawn into the 
conflict that exists between Pym, his daughter Hope, and the current CEO of Pym’s old 
company, Darren Cross. Cross seeks the Pym Particle, so as to sell it to the highest bidder, 
and designs his own version of the suit that he dubs the ‘yellowjacket’. After extensive 
training, Lang tries and fails to steal the yellowjacket suit; Cross then sells it to a Hydra 
official, leading to a confrontation wherein Lang, using Pym’s ant-man suit, forces Cross to 
don the yellowjacket suit and chase him across the city. Cross ends up holding Lang’s young 
daughter Cassie hostage; in a last ditch effort, Lang shrinks down to subatomic size to 
penetrate the yellowjacket suit, sabotaging it so it too would shrink and kill Cross in the 
process. Whilst shrinking so small caused Lang to enter the quantum realm – where Pym’s 
wife had gone missing – he eventually makes it back to regular size and his family.  
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